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Chapter 1
Separate Accounting versus
Formula Apportionment - A Survey
Literature Survey 2
1.1 Introduction
With economic integration capital investment has become increasingly mobile across
national borders. In the last decades, many OECD countries have hence politically
debated measures to attract this mobile investment from abroad and to refrain na-
tional capital from leaving the country. The major attention was thereby concentrated
on corporate taxes and their eﬀect on the migration of capital investment. Although
critics claim that other, possibly more important factors determine the corporate in-
vestment location, including market proximity, labor market conditions and political
stability, most academic observers note that according to empirical studies corporate
taxes mattered and that they belonged to the few direct policy instruments at govern-
ments’ disposal. Other investment determinants, in turn, could only be inﬂuenced in
the long run - if at all (BMF (2007)).
It is well known that governments in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) have strongly reduced their corporate tax rates in the last years.
Considering the major economies in the OECD, the average statutory corporate tax
rate dropped from 49% in 1982 to 32% in 2005.1 The same picture emerges with
respect to the average eﬀective corporate tax rate that additionally takes into account
the regulations for the tax base calculation. The development of corporate tax rates is
therefore consistent with a race-to-the-bottom scenario in which countries compete for
the increasingly mobile capital investment. Since countries maximize their own welfare,
they do not take into account that a reduction in their national corporation tax attracts
capital from abroad and lowers neighboring countries’ tax revenues. This constitutes
a positive ﬁscal externality on the foreign economies and leads to ineﬃciently low
equilibrium tax rates from a world welfare perspective.
1The numbers are taken from Hauﬂer (2006) and are calculated as an unweighted average of the
statutory corporate tax rates of the following OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, USA.
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Beyond international capital mobility, the last years have witnessed increased academic
and political attention for another form of resource mobility that may be even more
worrying from an eﬃciency point of view. Detached from the capital investment choice,
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have become known to shift proﬁt within the corpo-
rate group to aﬃliates located in tax havens. This proﬁt relocation becomes possible
since MNEs are not taxed as a unitary group under the current tax scheme but the
tax base is accounted separately for each aﬃliate. Usually the corporate tax regime
is therefore denoted as ’Separate Accounting’ system which we will abbreviate with
’SA’ in the following. A growing empirical literature provides evidence for this kind of
shifting behavior and indicates paper proﬁt to be more responsive to tax rate changes
than real economic activity (Mintz and Smart (2004), Clausing (2003)). Therefore,
proﬁt shifting activities have been perceived as a major source of allocative ineﬃciency
by academics and politicians for the last years (Heinemann and Janeba (2007)).
As a result of the described ineﬃciencies, the SA regime has recently come under
political pressure. In 2001, the European Commission proposed a fundamental reform
for the taxation of MNEs within the European Union (EU) and suggested to switch
from SA to a system of formula apportionment (FA). FA thereby prescribes that the
proﬁt of a MNE shall be consolidated at the group level. The consolidated proﬁt is
then apportioned to the aﬃliates on the basis of a formula which measures a location’s
relative corporate activity. In the aftermath of the proposal a debate on merits and
limits of a corporate tax system based on FA has taken place in the economic literature.
The aim of this chapter is to review this literature and to outline the author’s own
contributions in this area which are presented in detail in the Chapters 2 to 6.
Before we turn to the analysis, it seems appropriate to make clear under which criteria
the alternative corporate taxation schemes shall be judged. We focus on three objec-
tives. First, a corporate tax reform should follow the goal to implement an eﬃcient
taxation scheme in the sense that corporate tax diﬀerences between countries do not
distort economic decisions. This applies to the location of investments as well as to the
location of proﬁts. The lion share of our analysis below will focus on this objective.
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Second, conceptual aspects have to be taken into account. The corporate tax scheme
has to assure that the corporation tax can fulﬁll its function as income and equivalence
tax. Moreover, the system should not discourage the systematics of the tax legislation
(BMF (2007)). Third, the costs for taxpayers to comply with the tax scheme as well
as the administrative cost on the side of the tax authorities to ensure and control the
keeping of the tax rules shall be as small as possible.
1.2 Limits to the Separate Accounting System
As mentioned in the introduction, SA is currently applied for the corporate taxation
of MNEs at the international level. Since it prescribes corporate proﬁts to be taxed in
the country where they accrue, MNEs have an incentive to shift proﬁts from high-tax
to low-tax locations. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we discuss the
channels through which proﬁts may be shifted within a MNE and describe bilateral
and multilateral measures implemented today to limit shifting activities. Second, we
present empirical evidence for shifting behavior and show that the amount of proﬁt
shifted to tax havens is quantitatively relevant.
1.2.1 Separate Accounting and Measures against Proﬁt Shift-
ing
Conceptually, MNEs may relocate proﬁts through two channels. First, they might
distort transfer prices for goods traded within the corporation. Consider for example
a MNE which is headquartered in a country with a high corporate tax rate. The
MNE provides a management service to its subsidiary located in a country with low
corporate taxes. In this scenario, the multinational has an incentive to charge the
subsidiary with a lower than the true transfer price for the service delivered since it
thereby enlarges pre-tax proﬁt taxed at the low-tax location and keeps taxable proﬁt
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down at the high-tax headquarter. Second, the MNE may shift proﬁt by distorting the
corporate debt-equity structure, for example through intra-ﬁrm capital lending. If the
low-tax subsidiary provided a loan to the headquarter, it receives interest payments
that lower pre-tax proﬁt at the headquarter location, and reallocate it to the subsidiary
at the tax haven.
Governments in the OECD have reacted to the emergence of intra-group proﬁt shifting
in the last decades and pursued several policy directions to shore up capital income tax
revenues and arrest their decline. These include bilateral and multilateral attempts
to coordinate corporate income tax policies, such as strengthening transfer pricing
guidelines and limiting intra-ﬁrm capital lending.
The OECD has for example adopted the so-called ’arm’s length principle’ in Article 9
of the OECD Model Tax Convention, to ensure that transfer prices between aﬃliates
of multinational enterprises are established on a market value basis. The principle
means that prices should be the same as they would have been, had the parties to the
transaction not been related to each other. MNEs have to document transfer prices
for intra-ﬁrm transactions and national tax authorities control compliance with the
transfer pricing guidelines on a regular basis.
Besides these transfer pricing regulations, many countries restrict the capital structure
choice of MNEs to limit the scope of tax planning strategies. In fact, the imposi-
tion of so called thin-capitalization rules, which deny interest deductions on inter-
company debt, if the debt-equity ratio or interest expenses exceed certain thresholds,
is widespread. In 1996, around half of the major OECD countries had imposed those
rules. Until today the share has increased to almost 75% (see Bu¨ttner et al. (2006)).
However, all these regulations come at a cost. On the side of the MNE the compli-
ance with the ’arm’s length principle’ is associated with the administrative burden of
calculating and documenting transfer prices. National tax authorities in turn have to
monitor transfer pricing and cost allocation within MNEs which incurs administra-
tive costs, and may even be conceptually impossible in some cases in which the goods
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traded within a multinational are unique patents and services for which an objective
market value is not known to the authorities. Moreover, the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention acts as guideline for bilateral treaties only. Hence, transfer pricing rules are
not fully coordinated internationally and there is potential for conﬂicts between states
that happen to apply diﬀerent standards to the same transaction (Raimondos-Moeller
and Scharf (2002), Nielsen et al. (2003)).
Furthermore, the regulations to shore oﬀ the corporation tax revenue have often come
in conﬂict with national and international law. For example, the European Court of
Justice has disapproved limits to intra-ﬁrm lending by foreign aﬃliates since this puts
investments abroad in a disadvantaged position compared to national investment and
henceforth contradicts the freedom of establishment. Germany and other countries had
to react to this judgment by extending their thin-capitalization rules to purely national
cases to align with European law. Thus, international law has hampered national eﬀorts
to undermine proﬁt shifting activities in the past since it forced governments either to
extend restrictions for MNEs to purely national ﬁrms or vice versa.
To summarize, the current SA system comes at high administrative cost associated
with the compliance of transfer pricing regulations and monitoring costs on the side of
the national governments. Moreover, the regulations to limit proﬁt shifting by MNEs
have violated the systematics of the corporate tax system which introduces additional
compliance costs for the tax payer and possible ineﬃciencies by the forced extension
of MNE-regulations to national ﬁrms.
Moreover, it shall be noted that one conceptual justiﬁcation for the corporation tax
roots in its function as equivalence tax. Since corporations proﬁt from goods and
services provided by the hosting country, the tax payment may be seen as compensation
for these services. With proﬁt shifting, the equivalence function may be eroded since
corporate proﬁt is not taxed in the country where the corporate activity takes place but
may be shifted to foreign tax havens. Hence, this aspect should be taken into account
when discussing a possible abolishment of the SA system. However, considering the
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literature on the optimal tax scheme for MNEs, most authors are mainly concerned
not with tax systematics, but rather with the allocative eﬃciency of the corporate tax
system. To judge on that, we have to turn to the empirical evidence that quantiﬁes
proﬁt shifting behavior.
1.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Proﬁt Shifting Behavior
In the last years, a growing empirical literature has provided evidence that MNEs
engage in proﬁt shifting that is quantitatively relevant. The following paragraphs will
give a short overview over the main contributions in this area. For a more detailed
survey on the topic see Devereux (2006).
Methodologically, most papers follow the approach to give indirect evidence for shifting
behavior by comparing corporate proﬁtability across diﬀerent countries. The idea
thereby is that proﬁtability of corporate investments should be equal in all countries,
and should not depend on corporate taxes. Observed diﬀerences in the sense that
proﬁtability in low-tax countries exceeds proﬁtability in high-tax countries are then
attributed to proﬁt shifting behavior. The ﬁrst papers in this tradition were brought
forward by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994). Both studies use
aggregated country data for 1982, comprising 33 and 59 host countries respectively.
Regressing total reported pre-tax income on measures of the statutory tax rate both
studies ﬁnd large tax eﬀects on reported proﬁts. For example Hines and Rice (1994)
provide estimation results according to which a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate
reduces proﬁt by 6%. Since the data sets constitute small country cross sections only,
the authors can, however, not or only deﬁciently account for unobserved characteristics
of the host country. This makes the estimation prone to biases caused by endogeneity
problems and casts some doubt on the estimated eﬀects. Follow-up studies accounted
for this and investigated the impact of corporate taxes on pre-tax proﬁts based on ﬁrm
panel data with which they could handle the endogeneity problems mentioned above
(e.g. Collins et al. (1998)). These studies also ﬁnd evidence in line with substantial
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proﬁt shifting behavior.
Two other inﬂuential papers give indirect evidence for shifting behavior by investigating
the decision of US MNEs to locate in international tax havens. Grubert and Slemrod
(1998) use data on US aﬃliates in Puerto Rico that eﬀectively pay taxes neither in
Puerto Rico nor in the US. They obtain cross sectional data for 1987 on 150 US
corporations owning aﬃliates in Puerto Rico, and compare these ﬁrms to 4000 other
US companies which did not locate in Puerto Rico. They analyze which corporate
parameters determine the location in tax havens and thereby focus on measures related
to the costs of income shifting like R&D and advertising. In line with basic intuition,
the authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant data patterns in the sense that ﬁrms with low shifting costs
have a higher probability to be located in Puerto Rico. A similar study was conducted
by Desai et al (2006). They estimate the determinants of whether US multinationals
choose to locate in tax havens using conﬁdential US ﬁrm level data from 1982, 1989,
1994 and 1999. In line with Grubert and Slemrod (1998), they ﬁnd that larger, more
international ﬁrms, and those with extensive intra-ﬁrm trade and high R&D intensities,
are more likely to use tax havens.
All studies presented above are restricted to the US. Therefore, the last years have
witnessed the emergence of papers that investigated proﬁt shifting based on non-US
data. Demingu¨c and Huizinga (2001) provide evidence on proﬁt shifting activities us-
ing a data set on the proﬁtability of banks in 80 countries. Bartelsman and Beetsma
(2003) employ industry level data on value added to investigate proﬁt shifting within
16 OECD countries between 1979 and 1997 and also ﬁnd signiﬁcant and quantitatively
substantial eﬀects. The latest evidence was brought forward by Ramb and Weichen-
rieder (2005), Overesch (2006) and Dischinger (2007) who use micro data on multi-
national corporations provided by the German Federal Bank (MIDI) and Bureau van
Dijck (AMADEUS).
A recent paper by Dischinger and Riedel (2007) shows that proﬁt shifting activities of
MNEs are strongly tied to the location of intangible assets and service units (like R&D,
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management and administration) within a corporate group. Precisely, the authors
demonstrate that proﬁt shifting behavior is signiﬁcantly more pronounced if these
units are located in countries with a low tax rate compared to other group aﬃliates.
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that MNEs actually distort the location of
their intangible assets towards countries with a relatively small corporation tax.
One major shortcoming of the studies cited above is that they give only indirect ev-
idence on proﬁt shifting behavior. The results thereby rely on the assumption that
the observed corporate tax eﬀects on proﬁtability cannot be generated by other mech-
anisms apart from shifting behavior. Therefore, the literature acknowledged the need
for direct evidence on shifting activities. This gap has been ﬁlled by two studies on
transfer pricing distortions conducted by Swenson and Clausing. Swenson (2001) uses
US import data for the period from 1981 to 1988. Since the data does not allow for a
diﬀerentiation between intra-ﬁrm and arms-length prices, she identiﬁes transfer pric-
ing incentives by regressing price choices on the diﬀerences in corporate tax rates. She
ﬁnds signiﬁcant results, although they are quantitatively small. The follow-up study
by Clausing (2003) employs data of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on in-
ternational trade prices for 1997, 1998 and 1999. The major advantage of this data
set (compared to Swenson’s work) is that it allows to diﬀerentiate between intra-ﬁrm
trade prices and arms-length trade prices since half of the observations reﬂect trade
between two unrelated parties. She ﬁnds strong evidence for income shifting since US
intra-ﬁrm trade with low-tax countries exhibits lower export prices and higher import
prices. Quantitatively, a 10% increase in the foreign corporate tax rate lowers US
intra-ﬁrm export prices by 9.4% and raises US intra-ﬁrm import prices by 6.4%.
Last, it shall be mentioned that several papers estimate corporate tax eﬀects on MNEs’
debt-equity structure. A recent study by Desai et al. (2004) exploits US ﬁrm data for
1982, 1989 and 1994 which includes information on the total amount of external debt in
each aﬃliate and on the amount of debt from the parent. They ﬁnd evidence that tax
rates strongly aﬀect the use of debt by aﬃliates. Their central estimate suggests that
a 10% increase in the corporate tax rate is associated with 2.8% higher aﬃliate debt
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as a proportion of assets. Moreover they ﬁnd internal debt to be even more sensitive
to tax rate changes: a 10% increase in the corporate tax rate raises aﬃliate debt by
3.5%.
Thus, we can conclude that proﬁt shifting behavior is rather well documented and that
the estimates indicate that the tax planning strategies of multinational corporations
are quantitatively relevant. This proﬁt shifting behavior gives therefore rise to distor-
tions in the international tax scheme since countries try to attract the shifty tax base
(without accounting for welfare eﬀects of foreign countries) which leads to ineﬃciently
low corporate tax rates in equilibrium.
1.3 The Alternative - Formula Apportionment?
Given the deﬁciencies of the SA system outlined in the previous section, policy makers
and economists have thought about alternative regimes to tax the corporate proﬁt of
MNEs for quite some time.
One possibility to abolish the allocative ineﬃciencies described above lies in the com-
plete harmonization of national tax regimes. Early studies of the European Commission
on the corporate taxation within the EU were largely inspired by this goal. The ten-
dency to harmonize national tax laws can be found in the ’Neumark-Report’ from 1962
where the authors emphasize the necessity to harmonize the income taxation systems,
including harmonized corporate taxes rates and tax bases. The Ruding-Report which
was published in 1992 draws comparable conclusions, and suggests a minimum cor-
porate tax as well as the harmonization of accounting standards and advocates the
implementation of a common EU corporate taxation system in the medium run.
However, both reports could not exert any inﬂuence on the political debate or action.
The reasons for this failure are complex but probably root to a large extend in the
suggestions’ strong intervention in the national tax sovereignty. Considering these past
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experiences and valuing the subsidiarity principle, the European Commission currently
refrains from the goal of corporate tax rate harmonization although many of the distor-
tions described above could be abolished by harmonizing taxes (European Commission
(2001) and BMF (2007)).
In 2001, the Commission instead suggested to abolish the SA system within the EU
and to introduce a system based on proﬁt consolidation and formula apportionment
(FA). The general idea behind FA is that the multinational proﬁt is consolidated at
the group level and is afterwards apportioned to the aﬃliates on the basis of a formula
that shall measure the relative corporate activity. The Commission’s report thereby
comprises four reform scenarios that diﬀer in the degree of planned changes.
1.3.1 The Proposal of the European Commission
The ﬁrst model carries the name ‘Home State Taxation’ and “involves all or a group of
Member States agreeing to accept that certain enterprises with operations in a number
of Member States should compute their taxable base according to the tax code of a
single Member State − the ’Home State’. . .” (Commission study (2002)). Under Home
State Taxation, a MNE’s income within the EU is calculated under the tax rules of the
country in which the corporate headquarter is located. Hence, Home State Taxation
is based on mutual recognition, that is, participating member countries have to accept
each others systems for calculating and consolidating the proﬁts of corporate groups in
the participating member states. Aggregate income is apportioned among participating
states in which the group’s operations were located using a formula and are then taxed
at the national corporate tax rate.
The second model is named ’Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base’ and “involves
all Member States, or possibly initially only a group, agreeing on a set of common rules
for establishing the taxable base of certain enterprises with operations in a number of
Member States (or even in a single member state)” (Commission study (2002)). Thus,
in contrast to Home State Taxation the tax base is calculated under one set of common
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European rules. The design of the Common Consolidated Tax Base has thereby still
to be deﬁned.
The third model prescribes a ‘Harmonized Tax Base’ and extends the tax base deﬁnition
applied to MNEs under the ‘Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base’ to national
ﬁrms. This would imply a common tax base regulation for all corporations within the
EU. The fourth model is named ‘European Union Company Income Tax’ and extends
the third proposal by a harmonized corporate tax rate within the EU. However, the
latter two models are commonly perceived to be too far reaching to receive political
acceptance from EU member states. Hence, the focus of the academic and political
discussion lies instead on the suggestions of ’Home State Taxation’ and the ’Common
Consolidated Tax Base’.
Many authors have pointed out that ’Common Consolidated Base Taxation’ is supe-
rior to a system of ’Home State Taxation’ from an eﬃciency point of view as it would
imply a larger decrease in complexity. Moreover, ’Home State Taxation’ gives rise
to the problem that the tax base of corporations located in the same host country is
calculated according to diﬀerent tax base deﬁnitions if their parent ﬁrms resided in
diﬀerent European countries. This regulation might come in conﬂict with European
non-discriminatory laws. However, on the other hand an agreement between the Eu-
ropean member states on a common tax base may not be feasible in the near future
as this would imply a considerable decline in tax autonomy of the single governments.
Therefore, ’Home State Taxation’ is usually seen as a passable short run option and
pilot project (Mintz and Weiner (2003)).
Apart from the question which FA model should be chosen and how the system shall
be designed, one should keep in mind that a transition to FA is only reasonable if
the problems caused by SA are solved (or at least largely reduced) and no equally
problematic distortions are caused. This should be investigated carefully since a real
world experiment might be costly. In the following we will give an overview on the
strand of the literature that analyzes allocation eﬀects of corporate taxation under FA
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and compares it to distortions under SA.
1.3.2 Distortions and Welfare under FA and SA
The main advantage of FA compared to SA is usually seen in the abolishment of proﬁt
shifting activities. Since proﬁts are consolidated at the group level, MNEs have no
incentive to engage in costly transfer pricing or distortions of the debt-equity structure
to move proﬁts between locations. Thus, the introduction of FA may eliminate the
allocative distortions of proﬁt shifting behavior as well as the attached problems of
conceptual corporate tax justiﬁcation (equivalence taxation) and the administrative
costs of monitoring multinational transfer pricing and ﬁnancing choices.
Moreover, the application of a common group-wide tax base deﬁnition would reduce
the MNEs’ compliance cost of handling 27 diﬀerent tax systems.2 Another advantage
named by several authors in the corporate tax literature is that FA is already operated
for the division of corporate income on state level in the US, Canada, Germany and
Switzerland (e.g. Mintz (1999)). Thus, one may learn from previous experiences with
the FA scheme and can thereby ensure that a system switch would not be prone to
(too many) unexpected problems.
Despite these appealing advantages many authors have also pointed out limits to the
system as well as disadvantages only present under FA. To tie in with the last point pre-
sented in the previous paragraph, Weiner (2002) claims that the success of FA systems
on the subnational level is largely due to factors that are particular to subnational fed-
erations and that do not exist within the EU. First, US states and Canadian provinces
as well as German municipalities operate under the umbrella of the federal tax system
and may call on the federal tax authorities for assistance in administering the system.
Second, she notes that the tax environment in these countries diﬀers dramatically from
the one in the EU. For example, barriers to cross-state expansions or mergers do not
2Note however, that apart from the introduction of a FA system, this could also be realized by a
harmonization in tax bases.
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exist, and there are no withholding taxes levied on cross-border payments which may
be relevant for the functioning of the FA system. Last, she raises concerns that prob-
lems may arise since the provinces and states are in general much more integrated
economically than are the individual EU member states.
Moreover, although proﬁt shifting incentives are abolished, the introduction of FA may
give rise to new allocative distortions that possibly outweigh the gains from reduced
proﬁt shifting activities. In the following, we will present theoretical models that
compare allocative eﬃciency under SA and FA from diﬀerent perspectives. All models
in this section have in common that they investigate FA systems in which formula
factors as well as the formula weights are taken as given. Thus, the qualitative and
quantitative ineﬃciencies are derived under the assumption of an exogenous, possibly
suboptimal formula design. The question of optimal formula choice will be addressed
in the subsequent section 3.3.
Path breaking theoretical contributions with respect to allocative distortions under
FA were made by McLure (1980) and Gordon and Wilson (1986). McLure (1980)
examines how the system of FA aﬀected business decisions, and found that by using a
formula based on ﬁrm speciﬁc factors to determine state income, the states eﬀectively
transformed the formula into a direct tax on whatever factors are included in the
formula. Gordon and Wilson (1986) present a theoretical model that shows the complex
ways in which the apportionment formula aﬀects the incentives of ﬁrms to undertake
new investment, or change employment or sales in a state. Under taxation based
on a property formula, price distortions diﬀer in general among corporations within
the same state, creating incentives for ﬁrms producing in diﬀerent states to merge
their operations. Moreover they show that apportionment of the tax based on payroll
creates many similar incentives. With this tax, however, the merging incentive of ﬁrms
producing diﬀerent goods is discouraged. When a sales component to the tax is added,
there are incentives for the cross-hauling of output, with production in low-tax states
sold in high-tax states and vice versa. In contrast, the authors emphasize that none of
these distortions is present in a system of SA on basis of arm’s length prices.
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Moreover, Nielsen et al. (2003) demonstrate that transfer pricing may not be abolished
under FA if the MNEs operate in imperfectly competitive product markets. Under
oligopolistic competition, the MNE has an incentive to distort the intra-ﬁrm transfer
price for tax saving as well as for strategic reasons (see also Schjelderup and Soergard,
(1997)). The strategic eﬀect arises if the MNE delegates the sales decision in the
product market to its local aﬃliate. Since the aﬃliate takes the transfer price as given,
the MNE may employ the price as strategic device to win shares in local markets. The
strategic eﬀect is shown to determine transfer pricing choices under SA and under FA.
Moreover, the transfer price is also distorted for tax saving reasons under FA. This is
due to the fact that apportionment is assumed to take place according to the relative
sales share. If the MNE now distorts its transfer price, it inﬂuences the revenues at
the foreign and at the local subsidiary and thereby changes the apportionment shares
according to which the consolidated proﬁt is apportioned under FA. In general, the
strategic beneﬁts may be counteracted or enhanced by the incentive to reduce tax
payments, depending on the relation between tax rates in countries in which the MNE
operates. The authors show that a switch from SA to FA may actually increase transfer
pricing distortions.
While the papers presented so far, investigate the adaption of economic agents to a
given tax rate distribution under SA and FA, another strand of the literature has
investigated tax competition under the two corporate tax schemes. By comparing
equilibrium tax rates to the benchmark case of tax coordination one may quantify
the ineﬃciencies caused by the multinational tax scheme which are represented by
the ﬁscal externalities exerted on foreign jurisdictions’ social welfare. The basic ﬁscal
externalities derived from these models comprise a positive proﬁt shifting externality
under SA and a positive formula externality under FA (see e.g. Mintz, 1999). With a
SA system, an increase in the corporate tax rate of one country raises the corporate
tax base of neighboring jurisdictions since the tax increase induces MNEs to shift
proﬁts abroad. As the tax setting government does not take the tax base eﬀect on the
foreign jurisdiction into account, this constitutes a positive ﬁscal externality. Under
Literature Survey 16
FA corporate taxation exerts a positive externality as well since an increase in the
corporate tax rate causes MNEs to distort their apportionment formula in favor of the
foreign country, which enlarges the share of consolidated proﬁt that is apportioned to
this country and enhances the foreign tax base. Thus, these basic externalities suggest
corporate tax rates to be ineﬃciently low under both taxation schemes. Theoretically,
the relative size of these two ineﬃciencies is ambiguous and it calls for empirical analysis
to quantify the eﬀects.
Several theoretical papers have extended this basic analysis in diﬀerent directions.
Nielsen et al. (2001) analyze ﬁscal externalities under FA and SA. They consider a
model with two small countries that host the aﬃliates of a MNE. Under FA, income
is apportioned according to the relative capital share. The authors show that in this
setting corporate tax rates may be ineﬃciently high or low under both SA and FA
systems. The basic externalities under SA are the positive proﬁt shifting externality
described above and a negative externality that is caused by the presence of a public
input factor within the MNE. The intra-ﬁrm public good is produced by the corpo-
rate headquarter and enhances capital productivity at the headquarter and subsidiary
location. The basic mechanism of this externality can be described as follows: If the
headquarter country increases its corporate tax rate, the provision of the public good
is reduced which in turn diminishes capital productivity at the subsidiary level and
henceforth capital investment at the subsidiary. This leads to a proﬁt reduction and
establishes a negative ﬁscal externality on the foreign country. Under FA, corporate tax
rates may equally be ineﬃciently high or low due to two eﬀects. Besides the positive
formula externality described above, the authors derive a negative investment exter-
nality caused by distortive proﬁt taxation. An increase in the corporate tax rate leads
to a rise in the MNE’s average corporate tax rate and thereby enlarges capital costs
in both countries and reduces corporate investment in the home and in the foreign
country. Since the government does not take the eﬀect on the foreign country into
account when it decides on the corporate tax rate, this constitutes a negative ﬁscal
externality. A structurally similar model was presented by Peter Soerensen (2004).
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Kind et al. (2005) build a model similar to Nielsen et al. (2003). The innovation of
their paper is that the transfer price applies to a traded commodity that can only be
shipped to the subsidiary at a (trade) cost. This allows the authors to analyze the
impact of economic integration on the welfare under FA and SA. Following Nielsen et
al. (2003), the authors assume apportionment according to the relative sales share and
take into account that the transfer price is distorted for tax saving and for strategic
purposes. Their analysis shows that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium
corporate taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. From a welfare point
of view, the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic
integration, with high degrees of integration favoring the FA regime and low degrees
of economic integration favoring the SA scheme.
Two recent papers examine the eﬀect of corporate taxation on welfare in the presence
of labor market imperfections. Eichner and Runkel (2006) consider a model with
unemployment caused by a minimum wage. They ﬁnd that corporate taxes exert no
additional externality on foreign welfare through the introduction of the labor market
rigidity under SA. However, with a FA regime that apportions income according to
the relative payroll share, the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates is enforced by
the introduction of minimum wages. Riedel (2006), in turn, investigates corporate tax
eﬀects on labor market outcomes, employing a union wage bargaining model. She ﬁnds
that a raise in the corporate tax rate increases wages bargained at home and diminishes
wages bargained in the foreign country under SA. A transition to FA is likely to turn
these results on the head. Thus, the author ﬁnds that corporate taxes tend to lower the
domestic wage rate while they tend to enlarge the wages set at the foreign country. The
main insight derived from a tax competition analysis is the derivation of an ambiguous
wage income externality caused by the presence of union wage bargaining under SA,
while the wage income externality is unambiguously positive under FA. Moreover, some
empirical results in line with the model predictions are provided.
Most of the above cited papers derive ambiguous results with respect to a welfare
comparison of SA and FA. One of the few studies with a clear-cut prediction was
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brought forward by Eggert and Schjelderup (2003). They show in a symmetric setting
that under SA a combination of a residence-based capital tax and a property tax
ensures the eﬃcient outcome, while a switch to FA with a two-factor formula based on
the sales and capital share, combined with a residence-based capital tax, in turn, leads
to an ineﬃcient solution.
Therefore, one may conclude that it is far from being obvious that the introduction of
FA within the EU may reduce distortions caused by corporate taxation. The theoretical
studies cited above often derive ambiguous results, some like Eggert and Schjelderup
(2003) suggest to refrain from the introduction of FA. The welfare eﬀects under FA
thereby strongly depend on the apportionment formula chosen. The next section will
therefore discuss questions related to the optimal (formula) design of a FA union.
1.3.3 The Design of a FA System within the EU
Firstly, it has to be decided whether the countries should be able to choose the appor-
tionment formula autonomously or if it is set by agreement on a central level. If the
latter should be the case, the EU has to decide according to which formula corporate
income shall be apportioned. Moreover, practical issues also comprise the question
according to which criteria corporate aﬃliates shall be included in the group consoli-
dation. These questions will be discussed in the following.
Formula Choice
The literature presented in section 3.2 assumes the apportionment formula to be ex-
ogenous to the tax-setting jurisdictions. Although this assumption is in line with FA
systems in Canada and Germany, subnational taxation in the US follows the principle
that states can autonomously choose the design of their apportionment formula.
Although autonomous formula choice is appealing with regard to the subsidiarity prin-
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ciple, the economic literature clearly shows that from a welfare point of view jurisdic-
tions should bind themselves to a common apportionment formula. Anand and Sansing
(2000) demonstrate in a two state equilibrium model of location choice by ﬁrms that
aggregate social welfare is maximized when both states use the same formula, regardless
of which formula is chosen. However at least one of the states can increase its welfare
by deviating from this coordinated solution; thus the Nash equilibrium features the
states choosing diﬀerent formulas. Moreover, the authors show that importing states
have an incentive to increase the sales factor, whereas exporting states will tend to in-
crease the input factors. They conﬁrm their theoretical predictions by empirical tests
for the US.
Provided that the participating EU member countries could agree on a common appor-
tionment formula, the question remains which formula should be chosen. Existing FA
systems rely on diﬀerent apportionment factors and weights. While local business tax-
ation in Germany is based on apportionment according to the relative payroll shares,
FA in Canada uses a formula comprising payroll and sales. As mentioned above, US
states can autonomously choose their apportionment formula. However, since US au-
thorities have recommended to use an equal-weighted three-factor formula of capital,
payroll and sales, traditionally most states relied on this formula scheme in the past.
However, the last years have witnessed a tendency to put an increased weight on the
sales share. Thus, nowadays some states apportion the business tax according to the
sales share only, while others double weight sales in their formulas.3
Following Hellerstein and McLure (2004) one may state three central demands on the
factors included in the apportionment formula: ﬁrst, the factors must be economically
mandatory. Second, they must be administratively practical and third, they must not
be easily manipulated.
With respect to the economic justiﬁcation of the apportionment formula, one may
3Since a lower weight on the input factors capital and labor reduces the eﬀective tax burden on these
resources (McLure (1980)), a relatively larger weight on the sales share is perceived to boost business
investment.
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consider two views on the apportionment of consolidated proﬁt that were originally
proposed by Musgrave (1984). First, a supply based view that suggests proﬁt to be
apportioned to the production units of the corporate output. This approach claims
that economic proﬁt depends on the location of production, and hence the factors used
in the formula shall be origin based. In turn, the supply/demand based view suggests
proﬁt to be partially apportioned to the jurisdictions where production took place and
partially to the market jurisdictions where the output was sold. The rationale behind
this approach is that a part of the multinational proﬁt may be linked to markets, such
as proﬁts resulting from tariﬀ protection and advertising. Under the supply-based
view Musgrave argues that property should be used to apportion income which reﬂects
the normal return to capital. The payroll factor could only be an indirect solution.
Nevertheless if production functions and relative factor prices were the same in all
taxing jurisdictions, it makes no diﬀerence from a theoretical point of view whether
payroll or property is used to apportion income. In contrast, under the supply/demand
based view, a share of the apportionment formula should reﬂect the sales of the MNE
at the destination principle.
Moreover, the factors included in the formula shall be easy to measure. If one decided
to include property in the apportionment formula, capital measurement can either
follow a ‘stock’ approach or a ‘ﬂow’ approach (Musgrave (1984)). While the former
employs the current (depreciated) market value of assets, the latter grounds on eco-
nomic depreciation and interest (the user cost of capital). Many authors favor the value
based approach since the value of an asset reﬂects the contribution to the creation of
proﬁt probably in a better way than the asset’s cost or the user cost of capital (see
e.g. Hellerstein and McLure (2004)). Others claim that it is more appropriate from
a theoretical point of view to base the deﬁnition of property on the ﬂow of capital
services, as measured by the user cost of capital. McLure (1999) presents examples in
which the apportionment based on asset values leads to theoretically incorrect appor-
tionment outcomes. Nevertheless, irrespective of which approach is chosen to measure
an aﬃliate’s property, the measurement of the property factor will be problematic,
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since neither asset values nor depreciation and interest rates to calculate the cost of
funds are obvious.
Moreover, many authors note that the property factor should include intangible assets,
such as intellectual property, since modern corporations are largely characterized by
the presence of intangibles (Weiner (2002)). This contrasts the existing FA system
in the US which accounts for tangible assets only. While the inclusion of intangible
assets is justiﬁed from a conceptual point of view, it may nevertheless give rise to
severe administrative problems since the valuation of intangible assets may be even
more problematic than the valuation of tangible assets.
Therefore, if the choice of apportionment factors was based on administrative eﬃciency,
the payroll factor is claimed to be superior to the property factor by most authors (e.g.
McLure and Hellerstein (2004)) since measurement and testing is much easier than
with property. The same is true for the sales factor although one might arrive at
relatively mild conceptual problems with respect to the question which kind of sales
should be included in calculating apportionment shares. In the US for example, the
sales factor is not limited to the sale of goods, but it includes, inter alia, receipts from
the provision of services, rentals, and royalties; whether it includes gross receipts from
sales or ﬁnancial assets, or is solely based on net sales, is often subject to controversy.
Apart from the stated administrative and conceptual aspects, another goal to guide
the formula choice should be to avoid economic distortions. While tax planning of
ﬁrms takes the form of manipulating transfer prices under a system of SA, they might
reallocate income under FA by manipulating the location of factors as already presented
above. If the sales factor was included in the apportionment formula, a company could
shift the location of its sales by altering the location where sales reach their ultimate
destination, for example by delivering the sales to a location where the company does
not have a permanent establishment. In turn, if the property factor was included in the
apportionment formula, a company could store its inventory (which is included in the
calculation of the capital share) in a low-tax area to reduce the property fraction and
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consequently the amount of income attributed to a high tax area. The payroll factor
could be reduced in a state by hiring independent contractors, whose compensation
is not included in the payroll factor. All these possibilities can be restricted by law
to some extend, but can surely not totally be abolished (see McLure and Hellerstein
(2004)).
Pethig and Wagener (2003) investigate apportionment formula choices in a tax com-
petition model. Intuitively, they ﬁnd that tax competition is sharper the higher the
tax elasticity of the apportionment formula which, in turn, depends on the produc-
tion technology. In particular, if labor input is ﬁxed, tax competition is sharpest if
apportionment is based on property shares, followed by the sales and payroll shares. If
capital and labor are endogeneous and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, tax competition
under the property- and the payroll share rule is sharper than under the output-share
rule.
Eichner and Runkel (2006) consider the optimal choice of the formula weights under FA
for the apportionment factors capital, labor and origin based sales from an eﬃciency
point of view. Their analysis is build on the well-known positive formula externality
and the negative investment externality derived by Nielsen et al. (2001) and Soerensen
(2004) under FA. Since the two described externalities point in diﬀerent directions
corporate tax rates may in general be ineﬃciently high or low under the FA system.
The authors now show that apportionment based on the input factors lead to ineﬃcient
under-taxation. This result is due to a strong formula externality caused by direct
formula manipulation incentives of the MNE. In turn, if apportionment was based
on the sales formula, the formula externality will be dampened since apportionment
is directed on the production inputs only indirectly. This leads to ineﬃcient over-
taxation in equilibrium. The authors now show that the economy may achieve the
eﬃcient outcome if the sales factor is double-weighted in the apportionment formula.
Wellisch (2004) analyzes tax competition for mobile capital under FA whereas the ju-
risdictions are assumed to choose their apportionment formulas autonomously. The
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analysis reveals that jurisdictions choose apportionment according to immobile factors
like labor. The result thus resembles the outcome of standard models on tax compe-
tition behavior (Zodrow and Mieskowski (1986) and Gordon (1986)) which show that
the tax burden is shifted on to the owners of immobile resources. Interestingly, Runkel
and Schjelderup (2007) show in a slightly modiﬁed setting that a positive weight on
mobile capital is chosen, irrespective of decentralized or centralized choice of the ap-
portionment formula. Under decentralized choice of the apportionment formula, the
positive weight on capital follows from the principle that a tax on capital is an eﬃcient
way of taxing economic rents. Under centralized choice of the apportionment formula,
the central planner uses the decision on the formula weights as corrective instrument
to internalize ﬁscal externalities. Since the model accounts for the positive formula
externality as well as for negative externalities, the authors show that it is optimal to
put a strictly positive weight on the capital factor.
When discussing the optimal formula design within a FA system, one may also draw
from the results in section 1.3.2., in which tax competition under FA was investigated,
assuming given formula weights. The main insight from this section might be that from
the viewpoint of additional externalities derived under diﬀerent factor weights, property
apportionment seems advantageous compared to payroll apportionment. Remember
that Nielsen et al. (2001) show that the inclusion of capital in the apportionment
formula may be beneﬁcial since it generates a negative investment externality that tends
to compensate for the positive formula distortion.4 In contrast, Eichner and Runkel
(2006) as well as Riedel (2006) ﬁnd that the inclusion of payroll in the apportionment
enhances the race-to-the bottom in corporate tax rates in the presence of labor market
imperfections.
All studies presented so far are based on apportionment according to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors capital, payroll or sales. The central advantage of using micro factors for the
4Note, however, that this result relies on the assumption that the participating member states are
small with respect to the rest of the world and therefore changes in their capital demand do not alter
the capital market interest rate.
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apportionment of proﬁts lies in the direct justiﬁcation of the tax claim as the formula
refers to ﬁrm speciﬁc features. The drawback of including micro factors is the gener-
ation of tax planning incentives as illustrated above. Contrary to micro-factors, the
apportionment due to macro factors is founded on industry-averages. The advantage
lies in the elimination of the tax planning incentives of MNEs and its administrative
simplicity. However, the use of macro factors can result in attribution of income to
member states that bear little or no relation to where the income is earned. As pointed
out by several authors this violates fairness considerations concerning the inputs in-
volved and the equivalence principle of taxation. In general, apportionment according
to macro factors does not seem to be considered a serious option for a FA scheme
within the EU.
The discussion in this section makes clear that there is no easy answer to the question
which formula should be adopted by the EU if it decided to switch to FA. While from a
conceptual point of view, the inclusion of capital as apportionment factor is appealing,
the measurement diﬃculties referred to above suggest to follow the examples of FA in
Canada and Germany and refrain from the inclusion of property in the apportionment
formula. The payroll factor in turn is easy to measure, but may lead to additional
distortions which enforce the race to the bottom in corporate tax rates (Eichner and
Runkel (2006), Riedel (2006)). However, since from a conceptual point of view the
inclusion of a origin based factor seems appropriate, one has to weight the measure-
ment problems with respect to the property factor against possibly higher allocative
distortions with the inclusion of payroll.5 Last, the sales factor is as a destination-
based variable disputed to be included in the apportionment formula at all. From an
eﬃciency point of view, distortions caused under the relative sales share depend on the
ﬂexibility of multi-jurisdictional corporations to adjust their sales to tax rate diﬀeren-
tials. This, as well as behavioral responses to tax rate diﬀerentials under payroll and
5Note, however, that the presence of additional externalities with a payroll factor does not necessarily
mean that the sum of distortions under payroll apportionment must be larger than under property
apportionment. Capital might instead be more responsive to changes in the corporate tax rate which
may outweigh the additional distortions in a system with a payroll formula.
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property apportionment respectively are in the end an empirical question to which we
will turn in section 3.4.
Group Deﬁnition
Most authors moreover note that the avoidance of transfer pricing problems under
FA demands the mandatory consolidation of aﬃliates since otherwise the incentives
for the MNE to shift proﬁts to low-tax jurisdictions are not eliminated (Hellerstein
and McLure (2004)). In general, there are two diﬀerent approaches to deﬁne a cor-
porate group: unitary combination and consolidation based on ownership. Unitary
combination considers the economic connection of the related entities to the parent
company and consolidates all those aﬃliates which are economically related to the par-
ent company irrespective of the percentage of legal ownership. The integrated units
are treated as a single unity for tax purposes, while economically independent aﬃliates
are excluded. Thus, the unitary tax treats a highly-integrated company as a single
operation even though that group may be composed of legally separate entities. In
contrast, consolidation based on ownership deﬁnes a legal threshold ownership level,
i.e. aﬃliates of which the parent company owns the threshold level percentage or above
are consolidated irrespective of the economic relationship of the aﬃliate to the parent
company.
The main argument in favor of unitary taxation is that proﬁt consolidation and formula
apportionment are appealing from a conceptional point of view only if two parties are
economically related and contribute to the production process of an output good.
However, there are a number of problems with this approach from the standpoint of
practical administration. As known from the US, group consolidation according to
economic criteria does not rely on hard facts but is rather a matter of interpretation.
Hence, this may introduce tax planning possibilities and inconsistency in the deﬁnitions
of corporate groups.
From an administrative perspective, it is therefore more appealing to use legal own-
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ership for the deﬁnition of a multi-jurisdictional group. However, two principal weak-
nesses of the concept show up: First, income may be misattributed because the income
from aﬃliated - but economically unrelated - enterprises would be sourced by reference
to consolidated apportionment factors that would not have contributed to the income
in question. Second, a deﬁnition of the consolidated apportionable tax base predicated
solely on legal control could give rise to tax planning incentives in form of adjustment
of ownership interests in other corporations to minimize the tax burden, depending on
whether consolidation or separate company reporting was more advantageous from a
tax standpoint.6 One possible solution to this problem might be to include aﬃliates
only by pro rata share when ownership is above a certain threshold and an aﬃliate is
considered to belong to the group (Hellerstein and Hellerstein, (1998)). However, the
drawback would certainly be enlarged administrative complexity. The literature does
not agree on the question which group consolidation method shall be used within a
FA system. While Hellerstein and McLure (2004) recommend to rely on a legal deﬁ-
nition of the consolidated group, McLure and Weiner (2000) point out the advantages
of unitary combination.
Another related question is how a FA union within the EU would treat multinational
aﬃliates in outside countries that stick to SA. Following the legislation in existing FA
systems, the European Commission’s (2002) proposal suggests to limit group taxation
to income earned in the EU which is traditionally called ’Water’s Edge Taxation’. This
is in line with the recommendation of practitioners who claim several reason for limiting
consolidation to the FA area, among others the international diﬀerences in accounting
standards and the need to translate documents in foreign languages.
The most pressing problem with ‘Water’s Edge Taxation’ is usually seen in the fact that
proﬁt shifting channels remain open to multinational aﬃliates located outside the FA
union. Several authors thus worried that the proﬁt shifting distortions are reintroduced
to a FA system through the back-door in the sense that MNEs start substituting the
6A recent empirical project by Bu¨ttner, Riedel and Runkel (2007) shows that multi-jurisdictional
corporations indeed adjust their group deﬁnition in line with tax planning behavior.
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lost proﬁt shifting opportunities within the union by enhanced shifting to outside tax
havens. However, Riedel and Runkel (2007) show that these worries may be causeless.
They present a theoretical model that predicts proﬁt shifting to tax havens to go down
with the foundation of a FA union. Moreover, the authors show that the water’s edge
regulation gives rise to a negative ﬁscal externality that tends to compensate for other
distortions and brings the economy closer to the eﬃcient outcome.
1.3.4 The Empirical Literature on FA (versus SA)
The previous sections have shown that theoretical considerations cannot derive a clear-
cut recommendation whether the European Union shall introduce FA within its bor-
ders. Apart from considerations concerning the systematics and administrative simplic-
ity of the tax scheme, theoretical papers that compare distortive corporate tax eﬀects
under SA and FA usually derive ambiguous results. This calls for empirical analysis
to quantify the distortions described above and henceforth to provide guidance on the
question if a system switch to FA can (at least) be recommended from an eﬃciency
point of view.
However, the empirical literature on corporate tax eﬀects under FA is rather thin.
Most existing work is largely inspired by the FA system implemented for subnational
taxation in the US. Hence, a large share of the relevant articles focuses on the US-
peculiarity that states may choose their apportionment formula autonomously and
investigates the eﬀect of changes in the apportionment formula on real investment and
the sales decision. Weiner (1994) and Weiner (1999) examine how the apportionment
factor choice aﬀects multi-regional ﬁrms’ investment decisions employing cross sectional
state-level data for the year 1977 and state-level data for 1982 and 1990 respectively.
She could derive no or only marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects. Her research was followed by
a paper by Klassen and Shackelford (1998). They use a panel of data on US states and
Canadian provinces and ﬁnd that the apportionment formula impacts on the multi-
regional ﬁrms’ sales decision, but has no eﬀect on property investment or employment.
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Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) were, hence, the ﬁrst paper that found a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the apportionment formula on the corporate employment decision. Similar to the
studies cited above, the authors use US state-level data for the period from 1978-1994.
They ﬁnd that for the average state, reducing the payroll weight from one-third to
one-quarter increases manufacturing employment by around 1.1%.
A study with a slightly diﬀerent focus was published by Mintz and Smart (2004).
They make use of a peculiarity in the Canadian corporate tax system at the province
level that prescribes dependent production and sales units to be taxed according to
FA while for independent subsidiaries SA applies. They employ aggregated tax base
data for dependent corporate units (FA applies) and independent subsidiaries (SA
applies) respectively and investigate corporate tax eﬀects on the tax base of these
ﬁrms. The central result emerging from their analysis is that the corporate tax base
reacts signiﬁcantly more elastic to tax rate changes for ﬁrms taxed according to SA
rules than for ﬁrms taxed according to FA. Under the former system a 1% increase in
the corporate tax rate is suggested to decrease the local tax base by 4.9% while under
the latter system the tax base elasiticity to corporate tax changes is measured to be
2.3.
All empirical evidence presented above examines FA systems implemented in the US
and Canada. Moreover, the studies relied on macro data which may be prone to
endogeneity problems with respect to the tax rate and formula choice. The results of
the cited studies therefore rely on the validity of the estimation approaches to handle
these endogeneity concerns. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) are for example cautious
with respect to their ﬁndings since “there may be other unobserved policy changes
contributing to the result”. Additionally, apart from the study by Mintz and Smart
(2004), the papers strongly focus on the endogeneity of the formula choice. This,
however, is of minor relevance with respect to FA systems in Canada and Germany
that rely on a centrally set apportionment formula. Note, that the EU equally considers
the introduction of FA based on a formula set at the central level.
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This gap is ﬁlled by a study of Riedel (2007) who quantiﬁes the formula externality
using data for the population of German ﬁrms. The data is available for 1998 and
2001 whereas the two cross sections can be added to a panel. Since aﬃliates of a multi-
regional group can be identiﬁed in the data, she can estimate investment distortions by
corporate taxation at the aﬃliate’s home jurisdiction as well as by corporate taxation
at foreign group locations. Her results indicate that corporate taxation under FA
substantially distorts the multi-jurisdictional ﬁrms’ input factor choice.
Another strand of empirical papers has been concerned with the short-term tax revenue
consequences of a switch from SA to FA. These studies argue that to make the regime
transition politically supportable it must be assured that there are no negative revenue
implications for the jurisdictions who join the FA union.
Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) examine the 1989-1993 publicly available ﬁnancial
reports of 46 U.S.-based multinationals to estimate the revenue implications of imple-
menting a U.S. federal FA system. Ignoring behavioral responses, they estimate the
tax revenue eﬀect from shifting to an equal-weighted, three-factor formula. According
to their results the transition would have increased MNEs’ U.S. tax liabilities by 38
percent, with an 81 percent increase for oil and gas ﬁrms.
A similar exercise was conducted by Fuest et al. (2007) for the European Union. Using
data on German MNEs they estimate revenue eﬀects of a transition from SA to FA
within the EU. Their results suggest that due to border crossing loss-oﬀset, the EU
wide corporate tax base represented by the data sample shrinks signiﬁcantly. Smaller
countries which are usually considered to attract book proﬁts under the current system,
i.e. Ireland and the Netherlands, tend to lose a larger part of their tax base than
larger countries like Germany, Italy, France or Great Britain. However, analogously to
Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) they cannot account for behavioral responses which
limits their analysis.
Recently, Devereux and Loretz (2007) brought forward a follow-up paper in which they
estimate the revenue consequences of a switch to FA within the EU based on a large
Literature Survey 30
data set for European MNEs. According to their estimates, overall tax revenues are
likely to drop by 1% if companies can choose whether to participate. By contrast, if
they are forced to participate, total tax revenues are likely to increase by more than 8%,
leaving most European countries, especially Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
better of. However, it should be noted that they, too, assume that corporations do not
adopt their investment decision to the new corporate taxation system.
Thus, it can be concluded that far too few empirical research has been conducted in this
area yet. Although the studies by Fuest et al. (2007) and Devereux and Loretz (2007)
provide some indication on the short-run revenue eﬀects of the introduction of a FA
union, they are unsatisfactory in the sense that they have to rely on the assumption
that companies do not adjust their capital investment to the new system. This is
highly unrealistic in the medium run and calls for evidence on ﬁscal distortions under
existing FA systems. The paper by Riedel (2007) is one of the ﬁrst that tries to ﬁll
this gap since she quantiﬁes externalities for the German FA system which apportions
income according to the relative payroll share. Her analysis suggests that corporate
tax distortions under FA may be substantial.
1.4 Conclusion
The main insight from this survey is probably that a clear cut answer to the question
according to which scheme, FA or SA, MNEs should be taxed, is hard to ﬁnd. While
the abolishment of proﬁt shifting incentives with a switch to FA seems appealing, the
transition may give rise to new ineﬃciencies and administrative problems that might
well outweigh the gains from reduced shifting activities.
Some new empirical work moreover suggests that the allocative distortions under SA
may not be as large as considered so far. Becker and Riedel (2007a) show that the
proﬁt shifting externality under SA is partly compensated by a negative externality
based on complementarities within multinational ﬁrms. Following papers by Desai
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et al. (2006), Egger and Pfaﬀermayer (2003) and Jaeckle (2006), the authors build
on the observation that increased activity at one aﬃliate location generates positive
spillovers on other aﬃliates within the corporate group. The rationale is commonly
seen in complementarities in the production process. From a public ﬁnance perspective,
this implies that an increase in the corporate tax rate at one aﬃliate reduces local
capital investment which translates in reduced investment at other aﬃliates. This
constitutes a negative ﬁscal externality that tends to compensate for the positive proﬁt
shifting spillover. Employing a large panel for European MNEs, the authors provide
evidence for the negative causal eﬀect of corporate taxes on foreign aﬃliate investment
and estimate that around one third of the proﬁt shifting eﬀect on foreign countries’
corporate tax bases may be compensated by this negative spillover. If one considered
welfare components beyond the national corporate tax base, the fraction of the proﬁt
shifting externality that is compensated by the complementarity eﬀect may be even
larger. This suggests, that at least from an eﬃciency point of view, the current SA
system may not be as bad as usually considered with the narrow view on the proﬁt
shifting externality alone.
The following Chapters contain the author’s contribution to the debate on corporate
taxation of MNEs.7 The Chapters are in the order of their inception and can be read
independently.
7Note, that Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Marco Runkel, Chapter 5 is based on joint work
with Johannes Becker and Chapter 6 is based on joint work with Matthias Dischinger.
Chapter 2
Company Tax Reform with a
Water’s Edge
Company Tax Reform with a Water’s Edge 33
2.1 Introduction
At an international level, corporate income taxation is based on the separate accounting
(SA) principle. Proﬁts of a multinational enterprise (MNE) are assigned to the state
where they accrued using standard accounting methods. It is well documented that
MNEs take advantage of this legislation and distort transfer prices and the debt-equity
structure to shift income from high-tax to low-tax countries and reduce their overall tax
burden (e.g. Hines (1999)). Owing to such proﬁt shifting activities, corporate tax policy
causes a ﬁscal externality as governments have an incentive to reduce their corporate
tax rates in order to attract proﬁt from abroad and improve the national tax base. The
negative eﬀect on the tax bases of other countries is ignored and governments tend to
engage in a race-to-the-bottom with ineﬃciently low tax rates (e.g. Mintz (1999)).
At a national level, several countries tax multiregional companies applying a formula
apportionment (FA) regime instead of SA. Under FA, the corporate income of a mul-
tiregional company is consolidated and allocated to the tax regions according to a
certain formula, for example, a combination of the corporation’s capital, payroll and
sales shares in the respective region. Prominent examples of FA systems are the corpo-
rate taxation on state and province level in the US and Canada, respectively, and the
German local business tax (“Gewerbesteuer”).1 Moreover, the European Commission
(2001) proposed to replace the SA principle by a FA regime within EU-borders. Due
to the consolidation of tax bases, the central advantage of FA over SA is usually seen
in the abolishment of the MNEs’ proﬁt shifting incentives and, in consequence, the
erasement of the ﬁscal externality mentioned above (McLure (1980), Mintz (1999)).
This argument implicitly supposes that the headquarters and aﬃliates of MNEs are
located in countries joining the FA union. In reality, however, many MNEs headquar-
tered in a FA union run subsidiaries in countries outside the union. Given the growing
importance of international (intra-ﬁrm) trade and FDI, this connection between a FA
1While the US and Germany apply consolidation across companies of a group, in Canada consolidation
is only applied to dependent branches. For our purpose, this distinction is immaterial.
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union and the outside world is not a minor issue. FDI of US multinational companies,
for example, amounted to 2,063 billion US dollar in 2003 (OECD, 2004), FDI of Cana-
dian and German MNEs to 312 and 718 billion US dollar, respectively. Similarly, if
the EU introduces FA, the outside connection to non-EU countries will be substantial
as a large part of the member countries’ FDI is located outside Europe.
The borders of a FA union are called “water’s edge”, a concept shaped in the US 20
years ago when world wide corporate income consolidation was abandoned in response
to protests from non-US states, mainly concerning double taxation issues. Subse-
quently, proﬁt has been consolidated within US borders only and aﬃliates overseas
have been taxed according to SA. The water’s edge consolidation is also part of the
European FA proposal. Thus, if the EU decides to form a FA union, European MNEs
will stay linked to non-European aﬃliates by means of SA. This implies that shifting
channels to countries outside the FA union will remain open. Politicians and economists
expressed reservations that shifting to aﬃliates located in countries outside a FA union
may undermine the aim of FA. For example, McLure and Weiner (2000) state that “
. . . world-wide unitary combination might need to be considered as an option for . . .”
solving the limitations of the water’s edge.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the taxation of MNEs under SA and FA in the
presence of a water’s edge. We develop a model with three countries. Each country
hosts a MNE with a headquarter in the home country and subsidiaries in the other two
countries. A MNE decides on investment in each of its entities and may shift proﬁt by
transfer pricing methods. Proﬁt shifting is assumed to entail convex concealment costs.
Within this framework, we analyze the eﬀects of a transition from a pure SA system
to a system in which two countries form a FA union and the third country sticks to
SA. In the FA union, tax bases are consolidated and apportioned to member countries
according to the MNEs’ relative investment and sales shares. The analysis is carried
out under a short-run perspective, deﬁned as a situation where corporate tax rates are
ﬁxed, and a long-run perspective where governments engage in tax competition.
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The basic insight emerging from the short-run analysis is that the MNEs’ overall volume
of proﬁt shifted to non-participating tax havens diminishes with the formation of a
FA union. This result may seem counterintuitive since MNEs might be expected to
substitute eliminated proﬁt shifting opportunities to low-tax countries within the union
by intensiﬁed shifting to tax havens outside the union. But MNEs do not shift a ﬁxed
volume of proﬁt but rather tie their shifting decision to the tax rate diﬀerential between
home and host countries. Under SA proﬁt is taxed at the respective national tax rate
while in a FA union an eﬀective tax rate applies which equals the average of the national
union tax rates weighted by a combination of the MNEs’ investment and sales shares.
Thus, the introduction of FA increases (decreases) the tax rate diﬀerential between the
low-tax (high-tax) union country and a non-participating tax haven thereby increasing
proﬁt shifting from the low-tax union country to the tax haven and reducing proﬁt
shifting from the high-tax union country to the tax haven. The latter eﬀect dominates
as investment in the low-tax FA country is relatively more attractive and therefore the
eﬀective tax rate is biased towards the lower national tax rate within the union.
The results from our long-run tax competition analysis are less clear-cut but basically
point in the same direction. For both tax systems we identify ﬁscal externalities which
represent the marginal eﬀects of a country’s corporate tax rate on the other countries’
welfare. These externalities cause ineﬃciencies in international tax policy. The eﬀect
of a transition from SA to FA turns out to be ambiguous, i.e. it cannot be excluded that
FA exacerbates the ineﬃciencies. Besides other well-known cross country eﬀects, we
derive a ﬁscal externality which is caused by the water’s edge regulation under FA: If
a union country increases its national tax rate, the MNEs’ eﬀective tax rates in the FA
union will rise. Hence, the tax rate diﬀerential to low-tax (high-tax) non-FA countries
increases (falls) and proﬁt shifting to (from) the non-FA country is intensiﬁed (lowered).
In consequence, taxable resources of all FA countries decline. This eﬀect establishes
a negative ﬁscal externality within the union and may lead to ineﬃcient overtaxation.
But this water’s edge externality tends to be less detrimental than the proﬁt shifting
externality under SA and it may even bring the union closer to the eﬃcient policy
Company Tax Reform with a Water’s Edge 36
by compensating other positive externalities, at least if the union countries choose a
suitable design of the apportionment formula. In this sense, also the long-run tax
competition analysis draws a positive picture on the water’s edge regulation under FA.
Previous literature provides several studies on the short-run eﬀects of FA, for example,
McLure (1980), Weiner (1994), Mintz (1999), Mintz and Smart (2004) and Nielsen et
al. (2003). But all of these articles assume either a pure SA and/or a pure FA system
and do not capture interactions between union and non-union countries. Hence, in
contrast to our analysis, they do not address the question whether in the presence of a
water’s edge the transition from SA to FA increases or decreases proﬁt shifting to tax
havens outside the FA union. Moreover, there are several articles which consider tax
competition under FA, for instance, Gordon and Wilson (1986), Eggert and Schjelderup
(2003, 2005), Pethig and Wagener (2003), Ge´rard and Weiner (2003), Kind et al. (2005)
and Ge´rard (2005, 2006). Our paper is related most closely to Nielsen et al. (2004)
and Sørensen (2004). In line with our results, they show that the welfare eﬀects of the
transition from SA to FA are ambiguous. However, since they consider a two-country
framework and do not account for the water’s edge regulation, they cannot point to
the positive role of the water’s edge externality.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model and
characterize the MNEs’ proﬁt maximization under SA and FA. Section 3 analyzes
the short-run eﬀects of introducing FA while Section 4 considers the long-run tax
competition game. Section 5 discusses some extensions and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
Consider three small countries labeled a, b and c. Let N = {a, b, c} be the set of all
countries and N i = N/{i} be the set of all countries except for country i with i ∈ N .
Each country hosts a MNE which owns two subsidiaries located in the other countries.
In each country, the MNEs produce an output using mobile capital as input. Let
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subscripts denote the country where a MNE has its headquarter and superscripts the
country where the economic activity takes place. Accordingly, kji is investment of MNE
i in country j.2 Output of MNE i in country j is given by the production function
F (kji ) with F
′(kji ) > 0 and F
′′(kji ) < 0. The concavity of F implies that there is a
ﬁxed factor like e.g. entrepreneurial knowledge which gives rise to positive pure proﬁt.
MNEs may shift proﬁt between their headquarters and entities by transfer pricing
methods. The basic idea is that the MNE’s headquarter delivers an input good or
overhead service to its entities which is essential for production. The true transfer price
of the good is not observable by the tax authority.3 MNEs may over- or understate
the transfer price in order to shift proﬁt. The simplest way to model transfer pricing
is to assume that the headquarter of MNE i provides the entity in j ∈ N i with exactly
one unit of the overhead service, for example, a single patent which is necessary for
production.4 The true transfer price (or true cost) of the service is normalized to unity
while the MNE declares a transfer price equal to pji . If MNE i overstates (understates)
the transfer price, it will shift proﬁt pji − 1 from the entity in j to the headquarter
(from the headquarter to the entity in j). This approach to proﬁt shifting is also used,
for instance, by Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000).
Proﬁt shifting involves a concealment cost that reﬂects the corporation’s risk of being
detected and the associated expected penalty (e.g. Kant (1988)) or the eﬀort cost of
hiding the true transfer price from tax authorities (e.g. Huber (1997), Hauﬂer and
Schjelderup, (2000)). The concealment cost of MNE i for shifting income between the
headquarter and the entity in country j ∈ N i is given by Q(pji ) with
Q(1) = 0, sign
{
Q′(pji )
}
= sign
{
pji − 1
}
, Q′′(pji ) > 0. (2.1)
2Since we consider a static model reﬂecting the steady state of the countries, the terms ”investment”
and ”capital” are used interchangeably. This is the usual procedure in previous models.
3In reality, the true price for goods traded within a MNE is often hard to determine by tax authorities
as comparable market goods do not exist. An example are intangible assets like patents.
4One formalization of the underlying production technology is to introduce an indicator variable sji
which will be one (zero) if the service is (not) provided to the aﬃliate. Production of the entity in j
is sjiF (k
j
i ). If we suppose the MNE to produce in j (s
j
i = 1), production will reduce to F (k
j
i ).
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The concealment cost is convex with a minimum at the point pji = 1 where the ﬁrm
honestly reports the true transfer price. Convexity may be due to decreasing economies
of scale in transfer pricing. For simplicity, we ignore economies of scope, i.e. the cost
of shifting proﬁt to one aﬃliate is independent of shifting to the other aﬃliate.5
In each country, the MNEs have to pay a corporate income tax. The tax rates and
the precise rules of taxation will be explained below. For the time being, only the
MNEs’ tax bases have to be speciﬁed. The user cost of capital is assumed to be tax
deductible since most tax systems grant depreciation allowances and the deduction of
debt ﬁnancing cost. To capture such features of tax systems, we introduce a general
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] representing the part of the capital cost which can be deducted
from the corporate tax base. The case γ = 1 (γ = 0) indicates full (no) deduction. For
γ ∈]0, 1[, the user cost of capital is partially deductible. Denoting the (exogenously
given) world interest rate by r > 0, the tax base of MNE i ∈ N in the home country is
πiti = F (k
i
i)− γrkii +
∑
j∈N i
(pji − 1), (2.2)
while the tax base of MNE i ∈ N in the host country of its entity j ∈ N i amounts to
πjti = F (k
j
i )− γrkji − (pji − 1). (2.3)
According to (2.2) and (2.3), the MNE’s tax base equals revenue corrected by deductible
user cost of capital and the proﬁt shifting term.
5A more general concealment cost function is Q˜(pji , p

i) with j,  ∈ N i and j = . In principle, the
sign of the cross derivative of Q˜ is indeterminate. It may be positive as the detection risk of proﬁt
shifting to one aﬃliate may be positively correlated with the detection risk of shifting to the other
aﬃliate. But the sign may also be negative since e.g. lawyer cost for shifting to one aﬃliate falls
due to accumulated concealment knowledge from shifting to the other aﬃliate. To the best of our
knowledge, such economies of scope have been analyzed neither empirically nor theoretically and
thus we leave a detailed analysis to future research.
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Separate Accounting
Under SA, proﬁt is taxed in the country where it accrues. In computing the after-tax
proﬁt, we assume that the countries apply the exemption method. This is consistent
with the observation that international taxation is mainly characterized by the source
principle (e.g. Keen (1993)). The before-tax proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N in country j ∈ N can
be written as πjti − (1− γ)rkji . Denoting the tax rate in country j ∈ N by τ j ∈]0, 1[,
the after-tax (pre-concealment-cost) proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N in country j ∈ N reads
πji = (1− τ j)πjti − (1− γ)rkji . (2.4)
Summing up the headquarter’s and the aﬃliates’ proﬁt net of concealment cost yields
total proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N , i.e.
πi =
∑
j∈N
πji −
∑
j∈N i
Q(pji ). (2.5)
MNE i ∈ N chooses pji for j ∈ N i and kji for j ∈ N to maximize (2.5). Diﬀerentiating
and taking into account (2.2) – (2.4), we obtain for all i ∈ N the ﬁrst-order conditions
Q′(p˜ji ) = τ
j − τ i, j ∈ N i, F ′(k˜ji ) =
r(1− γτ j)
1− τ j , j ∈ N. (2.6)
The tilde indicates proﬁt maximizing values under SA. The ﬁrst part of (2.6) states
that MNE i sets the transfer price of the service good delivered to the entity j such
that marginal concealment cost equals the marginal gain from proﬁt shifting, i.e. the
tax rate diﬀerential between host country j and home country i. Hence, if the tax rate
in j exceeds the tax rate in i, the marginal concealment cost will be positive. MNE i
overstates the transfer price and shifts proﬁt from the entity in j to the headquarter.
If the tax rate in j falls short of the tax rate in i, shifting will be the other way round.6
6One may argue that there are single MNEs with zero concealment cost which shift their whole proﬁt
earned in high tax countries to aﬃliates located in tax havens. Nevertheless, this assumption is
implausible with respect to the aggregate of MNEs since in reality we do not observe all multinational
proﬁt to accrue in low-tax countries. Thus, the MNEs in our model may also be interpreted as
representatives for the aggregate of MNEs. Moreover note, that most of the previous studies on
corporate tax evasion made use of the positive concealment cost assumption.
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The second part of (2.6) characterizes MNE i’s optimal investment decision. Capital
investment in country j will be undistorted if the user cost of capital is fully deductible
(γ = 1). The marginal return to investment then equals the interest rate. If the user
cost is (at least partially) deductible (γ < 1), however, the corporate income tax will
distort the MNE’s capital investment in country j downwards.
Formula Apportionment with Water’s Edge Consolidation
Suppose countries a and b form a FA union while country c sticks to SA. Let U = {a, b}
be the set of FA countries. In the union, a MNE has to consolidate its tax bases and
apportion it to the two countries according to a certain formula. The apportionment
formula is supposed to contain the investment and sales shares in convex combinations.7
The part of the consolidated tax base of MNE i ∈ N allocated to country a equals
A(kai , k
b
i ) = θ
kai
kai + k
b
i
+ (1− θ) F (k
a
i )
F (kai ) + F (k
b
i )
, (2.7)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight the formula places on the investment share. The sales
share receives the weight 1 − θ. The part of MNE i’s consolidated tax base which
is allocated to country b amounts to B(·) = 1 − A(·). By diﬀerentiating (2.7), we
obtain Aia(·) := ∂A(·)/∂kai > 0 > ∂A(·)/∂kbi =: Aib(·). This means that an increase in
MNE i’s investment in country a increases the relative investment and sales shares in
country a and thereby raises the fraction of the consolidated tax base which is allocated
to country a. A rise in MNE i’s investment in country b has the opposite eﬀect.
The MNE’s tax burden in a FA country is calculated by multiplying the tax base
7We follow Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) and assume that the sales share is computed on an origin
basis. This can be motivated, for example, by the proposal of the European Commission (2001) to
use an origin-based value added factor in the apportionment formula. Many US states apply the
origin principle to the sales of services or employ a throwback rule (Mazerov, 2001), though generally
the destination rule is the main principle. Destination-based sales shares are used in the models of
Ge´rard (2005, 2006) and Kind et al. (2005). Note also that most existing FA systems use payroll
as third apportionment factor. We do not explicitly model this factor since our framework ignores
labor input in production. But we expect our basic arguments to carry over to a model with labor.
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allocated to that country by the national corporate tax rate. Thus, the after-tax (pre-
concealment-cost) proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N in the FA countries a and b reads
πai = π
at
i − (1− γ)rkai − τaA(kai , kbi )(πati + πbti ), (2.8)
πbi = π
bt
i − (1− γ)rkbi − τ b
[
1− A(kai , kbi )
]
(πati + π
bt
i ). (2.9)
The tax due in country c is calculated on the grounds of SA. The after-tax (pre-
concealment-cost) proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N in country c is therefore still equal to (2.4) for
j = c. Total proﬁt of MNE i ∈ N becomes
πi = (1− τi)(πati + πbti ) + (1− τ c)πcti −
∑
j∈N
(1− γ)rkji −
∑
j∈N i
Q(pji ), (2.10)
with
τi = τ
aA(kai , k
b
i ) + τ
b
[
1−A(kai , kbi )
]
(2.11)
representing the eﬀective tax rate MNE i faces in the FA countries. This average union
tax rate calculates by weighting the national tax rates with the MNE’s apportionment
shares according to which the consolidated tax base is allocated to countries a and b.
Let us start with proﬁt maximization of MNEs headquartered in the FA union. From
(2.2), (2.3) and (2.7) – (2.11), we obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions for MNE i ∈ U
Q′(pˆji ) = 0, j ∈ U, j = i, Q′(pˆci) = τ c − τi, (2.12)
F ′(kˆji ) =
r(1− γτi)
1− τi +
(τa − τ b)Aij(kˆai , kˆbi )
1− τi (π
at
i + π
bt
i ), j ∈ U, (2.13)
F ′(kˆci ) =
r(1− γτ c)
1− τ c . (2.14)
The hat indicates the proﬁt maximizing solution under FA. Equation (2.12) conﬁrms
the conventional wisdom that any proﬁt shifting incentive between FA countries is
abolished by tax base consolidation, i.e. pˆji = 1 for i, j ∈ U and j = i. Neverthe-
less, owing to the water’s edge regulation, proﬁt shifting activities persist between the
headquarters located in FA countries and subsidiaries in countries that stick to SA.
In contrast to the pure SA system, however, the transfer price now depends on the
Company Tax Reform with a Water’s Edge 42
diﬀerence between the tax rate in country c and MNE i’s eﬀective tax rate as under
FA the latter applies to all corporate income earned within the union.
Optimal capital investment of MNEs headquartered within the FA union is described by
(2.13) and (2.14). Compared to a pure SA system, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to investment in country c remains unchanged as country c sticks to SA. This directly
follows from the comparison of (2.14) and (2.6) for j = c. In contrast, the optimality
condition (2.13) for capital investment in the union countries is characterized by an
additional term which reﬂects the MNE’s incentive to manipulate the apportionment
shares through favorably adjusting the capital investment. By increasing (reducing)
capital investment in the FA country with the lower (higher) corporate tax rate, the
MNE increases the relative share of the consolidated tax base which is apportioned
to the low-tax country and thereby reduces its eﬀective tax rate. This investment
distortion eﬀect was derived in previous articles referred to in the introduction.
It will be helpful to highlight some important properties of the proﬁt maximizing
solutions for MNEs a and b. For all national tax rates, it is straightforward to show
that the solution to (2.12) – (2.14) for i = a is also a solution to (2.12) – (2.14) for
i = b, i.e.
kˆaa = kˆ
a
b =: kˆ
a, kˆba = kˆ
b
b =: kˆ
b, kˆca = kˆ
c
b =: kˆ
c, pˆca = pˆ
c
b =: pˆ
c, pˆba = pˆ
a
b = 1, (2.15)
πata + π
bt
a = π
at
b + π
bt
b =
∑
j∈U
[
F (kˆj)− γrkˆj]+ pˆc − 1 =: πˆ, (2.16)
τa = τb = τ
aA(kˆa, kˆb) + τ b
[
1− A(kˆa, kˆb)] =: τˆ . (2.17)
According to equation (2.15), MNEs a and b choose the same investment levels in
countries a, b, and c and the same transfer prices. Consequently, both MNEs have the
same consolidated union tax base πˆ deﬁned in (2.16) and face the same eﬀective tax
rate τˆ deﬁned in (2.17). With this information, Appendix A proves
Lemma 1.The eﬀective tax rate of MNEs a and b satisﬁes τˆ∈] min{τa, τ b}, (τa+τ b)/2[.
Lemma 1 will be central for our short-run analysis. It states that MNE a’s and MNE
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b’s common eﬀective tax rate τˆ is biased towards the lower national tax rate within
the FA union, i.e. it is smaller than the (unweighted) average tax rate (τa + τ b)/2 and
therefore lies closer to the lower national tax rate in the union. The intuition is as
follows: MNEs have an incentive to invest more capital in the union country with the
lower national tax rate. According to the apportionment formula speciﬁed in (2.7), it
is then clear that the share of the consolidated tax base allocated to the low-tax union
country is higher than the share allocated to the high-tax union country. Hence, the
lower national tax rate is weighted overproportionally in the calculation of the MNEs’
eﬀective tax rate given by (2.17).
Diﬀerentiating (2.10) for i = c yields the ﬁrst-order conditions of MNE c
Q′(pˆjc) = τc − τ c, j ∈ U, (2.18)
F ′(kˆjc) =
r(1− γτc)
1− τc +
(τa − τ b)Acj(kˆac , kˆbc)
1− τc (π
at
c + π
bt
c ), j ∈ U, (2.19)
F ′(kˆcc) =
r(1− γτ c)
1− τ c . (2.20)
Equation (2.18) indicates that MNE c’s proﬁt shifting behavior diﬀers from that of
MNEs a and b in two aspects. First, even though the tax bases of MNE c’s sub-
sidiaries located in the FA union are consolidated, there is no consolidation between
the headquarter in the non-union country and the subsidiaries due to the water’s edge
regulation. Therefore, MNE c engages in shifting between the headquarter and both
subsidiaries. Second, compared to MNEs a and b the diﬀerential of the eﬀective and
the national tax rate enters the shifting decision of MNE c with the reversed sign. The
reason is that MNE c’s headquarter is located in the non-FA country while its sub-
sidiaries reside in the union. MNE c’s investment decision is determined by (2.19) and
(2.20) and qualitatively complies with the investment decisions of MNEs a and b. Nev-
ertheless, it is important to note that MNE c’s investment levels in the union countries
will not necessarily correspond to those of MNEs a and b, basically due to diﬀerences
in proﬁt shifting incentives and therefore in the consolidated union tax bases.
Equation (2.18) immediately implies that MNE c charges the same transfer price to its
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entities in a and b as both entities are taxed by the eﬀective tax rate τc. Hence
pˆac = pˆ
b
c =: pˆc, π
at
c + π
bt
c =
∑
j∈U
[
F (kˆjc)− γrkˆjc − pˆc + 1
]
=: πˆc, (2.21)
τc = τ
aA(kˆac , kˆ
b
c) + τ
b[1−A(kˆac , kˆbc)] =: τˆc. (2.22)
Analogously to the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A, we can show
Lemma 2. The eﬀective tax rate of MNE c satisﬁes τˆc ∈] min{τa, τ b}, (τa + τ b)/2[.
MNE c’s eﬀective tax rate is likewise biased towards the national tax rate of the low-tax
union country since, analogously to MNEs a and b, it invests relatively more capital in
the FA country with the lower corporate tax rate.
2.3 Short-Run Analysis: Given National Tax Rates
The main purpose of this section is to analyze changes in the MNEs’ proﬁt shifting
activities triggered by the transition from SA to FA. In doing so, we will assume that
national tax rates remain unaﬀected by the transition. This may be interpreted as a
short-run analysis since governments usually need some time to adjust tax rates.
Without loss of generality, the national tax rate in the FA country a is assumed to
exceed the national tax rate in the FA country b. Furthermore, we ﬁrst focus on
the most interesting case that the non-participating country c is a tax haven with
τ c < τ b < τa. Under SA, (2.6) then implies that both MNE a and MNE b shift proﬁt
from their headquarters to the subsidiaries in country c. Shifting is higher for MNE a
than for MNE b since the tax rate diﬀerential between the countries a and c is larger
than the diﬀerential between countries b and c. In Appendix B, we prove
Proposition 2.1. Suppose τ c < τ b < τa. Then the transition from SA to FA increases
proﬁt shifting of MNE b to country c, but reduces shifting of MNE a to country c.
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Proposition 2.1 shows that the introduction of FA does not necessarily induce a MNE
headquartered in one of the FA countries to increase proﬁt shifting to non-FA tax
havens. While MNE b shifts more income to country c, proﬁt shifting of MNE a to
country c declines. The latter eﬀect seems counterintuitive since the introduction of FA
eliminates any shifting opportunity between FA countries and one might expect that
the MNEs fall back on transfer pricing channels to countries outside the union. But
this ﬁrst intuition treats the volume of proﬁt shifting as ﬁxed. Instead, the extent of
proﬁt shifting is determined by the tax rate diﬀerentials, and introducing FA changes
these diﬀerentials. While under SA the home country proﬁt of MNE b is taxed at the
national tax rate τ b, this proﬁt is taxed at the eﬀective tax rate τˆ > τ b under FA.
The introduction of FA thus increases the diﬀerence to the tax rate in country c and,
consequently, MNE b expands income shifting to country c. This argument is reversed
for MNE a. Under SA it faces the national tax rate τa in its home country while under
FA its home country proﬁt is taxed at the eﬀective tax rate τˆ < τa. Hence, the tax
rate diﬀerence to country c declines and MNE a shifts less proﬁt out of the FA union.
The opposing eﬀects on the behavior of MNEs a and b immediately raise the question
how the sum of proﬁt shifting is aﬀected by the introduction of FA. Appendix B proves
Proposition 2.2. Suppose τ c < τ b < τa and Q′′′ ≥ 0. Then the transition from SA to
FA reduces total proﬁt shifting of MNEs a and b to country c.
The rationale may best be explained by ﬁrst focusing on the special case Q′′′ = 0. In
this case, the marginal concealment cost is linear and, by (2.6) and (2.12), a change in
the tax rate diﬀerential between the FA countries and country c leads to a proportional
change in transfer prices and proﬁt shifting. In other words, we may measure changes
in proﬁt shifting directly by changes in the tax rate diﬀerentials. Given τ c < τ b < τa,
we know from Lemma 1 that the introduction of FA decreases the tax rate diﬀerential
of MNE a to country c by more than it increases the diﬀerential of MNE b to country
c. The reduction in shifting of MNE a thus outweighs the increase in shifting of MNE
b and total shifting of both MNEs to country c declines. This line of reasoning also
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holds for convex marginal concealment cost, i.e. Q′′′ > 0. The transfer price and proﬁt
shifting are then concave in the tax rate diﬀerential and Lemma 1 still ensures that
the reduction in MNE a’s shifting more than oﬀsets the shifting increase by MNE b.8
Proposition 2.2 hinges on the curvature of marginal concealment cost since in case
of Q′′′ < 0 it cannot be excluded that the increase in shifting of MNE b dominates the
reduction in shifting of MNE a. There is hardly an interpretation of Q′′′ that allows
plausibly judging its sign. The determination of the sign is an empirical question which
goes beyond the scope of our paper. However, it can be shown that for Q′′′ < 0 total
shifting to country c will increase only if the eﬀective tax rate τˆ is close to the average
tax rate (τa + τ b)/2. Thus, the diﬀerence in the national tax rates of countries a and b
has to be quite small.9 But with nearly harmonized tax rates proﬁt shifting would be
a minor problem and incentives to form a FA union would be low. This case therefore
seems of little relevance for our short-run analysis. Thus, even for Q′′′ < 0 total shifting
of MNEs a and b to non-FA tax havens is likely to be reduced by FA.
Regarding the change in proﬁt shifting of MNE c, Appendix B shows
Proposition 2.3. Suppose τ c < τ b < τa and Q′′′ ≤ 0. Then the transition from SA to
FA reduces total proﬁt shifting of MNE c to country c.
Hence, we obtain nearly the same result as for shifting of MNEs a and b. The only
8Interestingly, Proposition 2 does not depend on the shape of the apportionment formula. The param-
eter θ only determines the size of the total proﬁt shifting decline. Intuitively, the MNEs’ incentive
to manipulate the formula for tax purpose is stronger under a pure property formula (θ = 1) than
under a pure sales formula (θ = 0). The reason lies in the ﬁxed production factor which makes a
pure property formula more sensitive to the MNEs’ manipulation eﬀorts than a pure sales formula.
Hence, the diﬀerence between the MNEs’ investment in countries a and b is the highest (lowest) for
θ = 1 (θ = 0). Under a pure property formula, the eﬀective tax rate of MNEs a and b is then closer
to the lower tax rate in the union (τb) than under the pure sales formula. This argument suggest
that the decline in total proﬁt shifting is increasing in the formula weight θ and, thus, is maximized
under a pure property formula.
9Referring to Appendix B, Q′′′ < 0 implies H ′(xi) > 0, i.e. proﬁt shifting pci − 1 is convex in xi.
Plotting this function, we see that −dpca − dpcb > 0 only if τˆ ≈ (τa + τb)/2 or, equivalently, τa ≈ τb.
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diﬀerence is that now Q′′′ ≤ 0 (instead of Q′′′ ≥ 0) ensures the decline in total shifting
since the tax rate diﬀerentials enter the shifting decision of MNE c with the opposite
sign compared to MNEs a and b. However, for Q′′′ > 0 we can again show that the
result will be reversed only if the tax rates in countries a and b are almost equal. Finally,
it should be noted that we will obtain qualitatively the same results if country c is not
a tax haven, but has a higher tax rate than the union countries, i.e. τ c > τa > τ b. The
MNEs then shift income into the union and FA tends to intensify this shifting.
To summarize, the analysis in this section suggests that against the ﬁrst intuition the
transition from a pure SA tax system to a FA regime with water’s edge consolidation
is likely to change proﬁt shifting in favor of the countries joining the FA union.
2.4 Long-Run Analysis: Tax Competition
We will now relax the assumption of ﬁxed corporate tax rates and model a (Nash) tax
competition game between the three countries. Each government chooses the tax rate
that maximizes national welfare, taking as given the other countries’ tax rates.
Separate Accounting
Following Nielsen et al. (2004), each government is supposed to maximize a welfare
(social surplus) function containing the MNEs’ proﬁts accruing to residents of the
respective country and the corporate tax revenue weighted by the marginal cost of
public funds μ ≥ 1. Denoting the share of MNE j owned by residents of country i with
zij ∈ [0, 1] for i, j ∈ N , welfare of country i ∈ N reads
W i(τa, τ b, τ c) =
∑
j∈N
zijπj + μτ
i
∑
j∈N
πitj , (2.23)
where πj and π
it
j are determined by (2.2) – (2.5). Equation (2.23) is evaluated at the
MNEs’ proﬁt maximizing solutions k˜ji for i, j ∈ N and p˜ji for i ∈ N and j ∈ N i which
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depend on τa, τ b and τ c due to (2.6). Accounting for these relations, the government
of country i determines its optimal tax rate by ∂W i(·)/∂τ i = 0. Setting zij = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N yields tax revenue maximization as a special case of welfare maximization.
To ensure tractability, we follow most previous studies and focus on a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game with the equilibrium tax rate τ˜ = τa =
τ b = τ c. Equation (2.6) then implies k˜ji = k˜ for i, j ∈ N and p˜ji = 1 for i ∈ N ,
j ∈ N i so that there is no proﬁt shifting in equilibrium. Obviously, this stands in
contrast to our short-run analysis and real world observations. But even though there
is no proﬁt shifting in a symmetric equilibrium, proﬁt shifting behavior inﬂuences
the countries’ tax policy choice. As we will see shortly, each country has a marginal
incentive to reduce its tax rate in order to attract proﬁt and to improve its tax base.
The symmetry assumption only ensures that this incentive is equal for all countries.
Put diﬀerently, with the symmetry assumption we abstract from redistribution eﬀects
and focus on the eﬃciency implications of the countries’ marginal incentives.10
We investigate the eﬃciency of international tax policy by deriving ﬁscal externalities
that capture the inﬂuence of one country’s corporate tax rate on the other countries’
welfare. As, by the Nash assumption, governments do not take these cross eﬀects into
account, the tax rate will be ineﬃciently low (high) if the ﬁscal externality is positive
(negative), i.e. if the tax rate of one country increases (decreases) welfare in another
country. The marginal eﬀect of the corporate tax rate in country  ∈ N on welfare
in country i ∈ N  is obtained by diﬀerentiating (2.23), making use of the envelope
theorem and the comparative static properties reported in Appendix C, and ﬁnally
10We brieﬂy discuss asymmetries in Section 5. Note that according to the ﬁrst-order conditions
of welfare maximization,
∑
j∈N z
i
j = z¯ ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ N is a necessary condition for a symmetry
equilibrium. The residents of all three countries have to own the same shares in the MNEs. Examples
are zij = 1/3 for i, j ∈ N (i.e. the residents of country i ∈ N own one third of every MNE j ∈ N),
zii = 1 and z
j
i = 0 for i ∈ N and j ∈ N i (i.e. MNE i is fully owned by residents of country i) and
zij = 0 for i, j ∈ N (i.e. tax revenue maximization or the MNEs are fully owned by a fourth party).
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applying the symmetry assumption. This yields
∂W i(τa, τ b, τ c)
∂τ 
∣∣∣
τa=τb=τc=τ˜
= Z˜E + P˜E (2.24)
with
Z˜E =
∑
j∈N
zij
∂πj
∂τ 
=
[
γrk˜ − F (k˜)]∑
j∈N
zij < 0, P˜E = μτ˜
[
∂p˜i
∂τ 
− ∂p˜
i

∂τ 
]
=
2μτ˜
Q′′(1)
> 0,(2.25)
where F (k˜) − γrk˜ = F (k˜) − k˜F ′(k˜) + rk˜(1 − γ)/(1 − τ˜ ) > 0 according to (2.6) and
the concavity of F , i.e. F (k˜) > k˜F ′(k˜). Due to symmetry, all cross eﬀects are identical
and comprise two externalities. Z˜E is a negative private income externality: If country
 increases its tax rate, the corporate after-tax proﬁt will decline leading to a drop in
private income for the residents in country i who own shares in the MNEs. P˜E describes
a proﬁt shifting externality: If country  raises its tax rate, MNEs will increase proﬁt
shifting to country i thereby improving country i’s tax base. Hence, we obtain a
positive ﬁscal externality. As the externalities point in diﬀerent directions it is unclear
whether international tax policy is characterized by ineﬃcient over- or undertaxation.
Nevertheless, if we reduce the governments’ objective to tax revenue maximization
(zij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N), the private income externality will disappear and the proﬁt
shifting externality will render equilibrium tax rates ineﬃciently small. Similar results
are obtained by Nielsen et al. (2004) and Sørensen (2004) in a two-country setting.11
11Nielsen et al. (2004) point out that the ambiguous externality result will hold even if governments
maximize tax revenue. They ﬁnd a negative ﬁscal externality under SA by assuming that MNEs
endogenously choose the quantity of a service good which is publicly provided within the corporation
and acts as a complement to capital in the production process.
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Formula Apportionment with Water’s Edge Consolidation
Assume that countries a and b form a FA union while country c sticks to SA. Welfare
in the FA countries a and b reads
W a(τa, τ b, τ c) =
∑
j∈N
zaj πj + μτ
a
{
2A(kˆa, kˆb)πˆ + A(kˆac , kˆ
b
c)πˆc
}
, (2.26)
W b(τa, τ b, τ c) =
∑
j∈N
zbjπj + μτ
b
{
2
[
1− A(kˆa, kˆb)]πˆ + [1−A(kˆac , kˆbc)]πˆc}.(2.27)
πj , πˆ and πˆc are determined by (2.10), (2.16) and (2.21). In contrast to SA, tax revenue
under FA is given by the MNE’s consolidated tax base within the FA union multiplied
by the relative apportionment share and the national tax rate. Since country c sticks to
SA, its welfare function is structurally unaltered, therefore (2.23) applies. The welfare
functions of all three countries are now evaluated at the proﬁt maximizing solutions
under FA, i.e. kˆj , kˆjc for j ∈ N , pˆc and pˆc, which depend on the national tax rates
according to (2.12) – (2.14) and (2.18) – (2.20). Country i takes these relations into
account and sets ∂W i(·)/∂τ i = 0.
Even with fully identical countries it is not suitable to assume a fully symmetric Nash
equilibrium as only a subset of countries joins the FA union. Nevertheless, the union
members are identical and, thus, we assume them to choose equal tax rates τa = τ b = τ ∗
while the non-participating country sets τ c = τ o. This implies the following equilibrium
properties: First, (2.17) and (2.22) lead to τˆ = τˆc = τ
∗, i.e. all three MNEs face
the same eﬀective tax rate which equals the union countries’ equilibrium tax rate.
Second, from (2.13), (2.14), (2.19) and (2.20) we obtain kˆa = kˆb = kˆac = kˆ
b
c =: kˆ and
kˆca = kˆ
c
b = kˆ
c
c =: kˆ
c. In each country, all MNEs invest the same amount of capital.
Additionally, investment levels in countries a and b are identical. Finally, (2.7) yields
Aia(kˆ, kˆ) = −Aib(kˆ, kˆ) = θ/4kˆ+(1−θ)F ′(kˆ)/4F (kˆ) > 0 for all i ∈ N and A(kˆ, kˆ) = 1/2.
Thus, each FA country receives half of the MNEs’ consolidated tax bases.
Analogously to SA, we investigate whether the equilibrium tax rates are ineﬃciently
low or high. Since country c sticks to SA, it can be shown that the externalities between
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union and non-union countries are qualitatively identical to the externalities derived
under SA. New insights can be gained from an evaluation of policy eﬃciency within
the FA union. Therefore, we derive the ﬁscal externalities one union member  ∈ U
imposes on the other union member i ∈ U with i = . Diﬀerentiating (2.26) and (2.27)
and applying the envelope theorem, the comparative static properties in Appendix C
and the equilibrium properties described above yields
∂W i(τa, τ b, τ c)
∂τ 
∣∣∣τa=τb=τ∗
τc=τo
= ẐE + F̂E + ÎE + ŴE (2.28)
with
ẐE =
∑
j∈N
zij
∂πj
∂τ 
= −(zia + zib)
πˆ
2
− zic
πˆc
2
≤ 0, (2.29)
F̂E = 2μτ ∗πˆAi(kˆ, kˆ)
[
∂kˆa
∂τ 
− ∂kˆ
b
∂τ 
]
+ μτ ∗πˆcAci(kˆ, kˆ)
[
∂kˆac
∂τ 
− ∂kˆ
b
c
∂τ 
]
,
= −μτ
∗(πˆ2 + πˆ2c/2)
4(1− τ ∗)F ′′(kˆ)
[
θ
kˆ
+
(1− θ)F ′(kˆ)
F (kˆ)
]2
> 0, (2.30)
ÎE = μτ ∗
[
F ′(kˆ)− γr] [∂kˆa
∂τ 
+
∂kˆb
∂τ 
+
1
2
(
∂kˆac
∂τ 
+
∂kˆbc
∂τ 
)]
=
3μτ ∗r2(1− γ)2
2(1− τ ∗)3F ′′(kˆ) ≤ 0,(2.31)
ŴE = μτ ∗
[
∂pˆc
∂τ 
− ∂pˆc
∂τ 
]
= − μτ
∗
2Q′′(pˆc)
− μτ
∗
2Q′′(pˆc)
< 0. (2.32)
Equation (2.28) shows that the total cross eﬀect between union members comprises four
externalities. ẐE in (2.29) is a private income externality with the same interpretation
and consequences as the one derived under SA. F̂E in (2.30) represents a formula
externality: If a FA country increases its corporate tax rate, MNEs will reallocate
capital to the foreign FA country thereby increasing the foreign apportionment share.
Since this FA eﬀect raises the tax base in the other FA country, it reﬂects a positive ﬁscal
externality. It is obvious that both ẐE and F̂E increase in the tax bases πˆ and πˆc which,
in turn, tend to be increasing in the pure proﬁt or, equivalently, in the importance of
the ﬁxed production factor. In addition, F̂E will gain importance if investment receives
a higher weight in the apportionment formula (high θ). This is driven by the existence
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of the ﬁxed production factor which ensures that the MNEs’ formula manipulation
incentive is the weaker the higher the sales share in the formula.12 ÎE in (2.31) reﬂects
an investment externality: If a union country raises its corporate tax rate, the MNEs’
eﬀective tax rate will increase thereby lowering investment in both union countries.
This implies a shrinking tax base in the foreign FA country and therefore imposes a
negative externality. ÎE tends to be important for a low deductibility parameter γ as
corporate taxation then heavily distorts investment. The three externalities described
so far are well-known from Nielsen et al. (2004) and Sørensen (2004).
Our analysis contributes a fourth externality ŴE in (2.32) which is caused by the
water’s edge regulation and therefore could not be derived by previous studies that
abstracted from this legislation. The underlying intuition may be described as follows:
If a FA union country increases its corporate tax rate, it will trigger enlarged eﬀective
tax rates within the FA union for all MNEs. As this raises (lowers) the tax rate
diﬀerential to low-tax (high-tax) non-FA countries, proﬁt shifting from the FA union
members to the non-FA countries increases (proﬁt shifting from the non-FA countries
towards the FA union declines). In consequence, the MNEs’ consolidated tax bases in
the union are reduced and tax revenues of all FA countries decline. The increase in
the tax rate of one union country thereby reduces welfare of the other union country
and establishes a negative ﬁscal externality motivating ineﬃciently high corporate tax
rates. The described water’s edge externality will gain importance if proﬁt shifting
cost becomes lower, indicated by a smaller Q′′. MNEs then have high proﬁt shifting
incentives and corporate income tax policy creates a considerable distortion.
Although the creation of a FA union abolishes the proﬁt shifting externality between
the union member countries, our water’s edge externality indicates that proﬁt shifting
to non-participating countries leads to new ineﬃciencies within the union. Interestingly,
under FA proﬁt shifting causes a negative externality and ineﬃcient overtaxation while
under SA proﬁt shifting opportunities give rise to a positive externality rendering tax
rates ineﬃciently small. To highlight the role of the water’s edge externality, suppose
12Formally, the existence of a ﬁxed factor implies concavity of F and, thus, 1/kˆ > F ′(kˆ)/F (kˆ).
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for the time being that governments maximize tax revenue and the capital cost is
fully deductible, i.e. zij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N and γ = 1. The income and investment
externalities then disappear and (2.28) – (2.32) yield
Proposition 2.4. Suppose the tax competition game under FA attains a Nash equi-
librium with τa = τ b = τ ∗. Then τ ∗ may be ineﬃciently large even if governments
maximize tax revenue and the capital cost is fully tax deductible. Overtaxation will
occur, ceteris paribus, if the tax bases πˆ and πˆc, the formula weight on investment θ
and/or concealment cost Q′′ are small.
Focusing on tax revenue maximization and abstracting from tax deductibility of capital
cost leaves two ﬁscal externalties under FA: the positive formula externality and the
negative water’s edge externality. Whether tax policy in the FA union is characterized
by overtaxation or undertaxation will depend on the relative size of these two exter-
nalities. As a low concealment cost tends to create a high water’s edge externality in
absolute terms, and small tax bases and a low formula weight on investment motivate
a small formula externality, this constellation leads to ineﬃciently high corporate tax
rates. Note the diﬀerence between Proposition 2.4 and the result under SA. While in a
SA regime overtaxation is coupled with welfare maximization, overtaxation under FA
may also occur if the governments’ objective function comprises corporate tax revenue
only. Moreover, Proposition 2.4 complements the ﬁndings by Nielsen et al. (2004) and
Sørensen (2004) who identify the investment externality as a reason for ineﬃciently
high corporate tax rates under FA. Our analysis derives a second source of overtaxa-
tion and therefore strengthens the existing results as now overtaxation may occur even
for a negligible investment externality.
Comparison of SA and FA with Water’s Edge Consolidation
By comparing the ﬁscal externalities under the two tax regimes, we will now discuss
whether a transition from SA to FA is beneﬁcial. Unfortunately, an analytical treat-
ment of such a comparison is considerably hampered by asymmetric equilibrium tax
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rates under FA. Our analysis therefore relies on two strategies. First, some analytical
insights are gained by considering a purely hypothetical situation with fully symmetric
tax rates. Second, we will account for asymmetries by running numerical simulations.
For equal tax rates τ ∗ = τ o under FA, it follows pˆc = pˆc = 1. If we evaluate the
ﬁscal externalities under SA and FA for the same tax rate τ˜ = τ ∗ = τ o =: τ¯ , (2.25)
and (2.32) will imply P˜E = 2μτ¯/Q′′(1) > μτ¯/Q′′(1) = |ŴE|. Hence, we obtain
Proposition 2.5. For equal tax rates τ˜ = τ ∗ = τ o =: τ¯ , the water’s edge externality
under FA is smaller in absolute terms than the proﬁt shifting externality under SA.
Consider a situation in which country a rises its corporate tax rate by one percentage
point. Then, compared to FA, proﬁt shifting reacts twice as strongly under SA. This is
true as under SA the gains from proﬁt shifting between countries a and b (represented
by τa − τ b) are increased by one percentage point, while under FA the eﬀective union
tax rate increases by half a percentage point, raising the gains from proﬁt shifting
between the FA union and country c (represented by τˆ −τ c) by half a percentage point
only. Hence, starting from a fully symmetric situation, we show that the proﬁt shifting
eﬀect on country b’s tax base is larger under SA. This implies that the water’s edge
externality falls short of the proﬁt shifting externality in absolute terms.
On the basis of this insight, one may argue that the water’s edge externality is ben-
eﬁcial for the union countries. Consider ﬁrst the special case of revenue maximization
and full deductibility. Under SA, tax rates are ineﬃciently small due to the proﬁt
shifting externality. Under FA, the formula externality points to ineﬃciently low tax
rates while the water’s edge externality carries the opposite sign and tends to oﬀset
the formula externality. According to Proposition 2.4, the water’s edge externality
may thus cause ineﬃciently high tax rates. But as suggested by Proposition 2.5 the
resulting overtaxation will be less detrimental than the undertaxation under SA since
the sum of formula and water’s edge externality, if negative, falls short of the proﬁt
shifting externality under SA in absolute terms. If the sum of formula and water’s
edge externality is positive, the resulting undertaxation may be more pronounced than
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under SA. But the increased ineﬃciency is then caused by a strong formula externality
while the water’s edge externality brings tax rates closer to the optimum.
This line of reasoning must not necessarily be true under welfare maximization and
partial deductibility. Under FA, the negative income and investment externalities may
already oﬀset the formula externality. The water’s edge externality then aggravates
ineﬃcient overtaxation. Moreover, accounting for asymmetric tax rates between the
FA union and the outside world could alter the results. But in the following we numer-
ically simulate our model and thereby show that the main insights and implications of
Proposition 2.5 will be preserved in the general setting, at least if the union countries
choose a suitable design of the apportionment formula.
Our numerical analysis uses a Cobb-Douglas production function F (k) = u1−λkλ
with λ ∈]0, 1[. The parameter u represents the ﬁxed production factor. The conceal-
ment cost is quadratic, i.e. Q(p) = q(p−1)2/2 with q > 0. All MNEs are equally owned
by the residents of the three countries so that zij = 1/3 for all i, j ∈ N .13 In order to
make the results as reliable as possible, we try to choose realistic values for the model
parameters. Similar to calibrated growth models, e.g. Ortigueira and Santos (1997),
we set λ = 0.33. Following estimations by Kleven and Kreiner (2006), the marginal
cost of public funds is assumed to be μ = 1.65.14 To determine r and γ, we distin-
guish between the deductibility of debt ﬁnancing cost and depreciation allowances.
Assume the MNEs ﬁnance a share γρ of their activities by debt and the interest rate
is ρ. In the long-run, economic depreciation is δ = 1 while we assume a share γδ to
be tax deductible. Our model will reﬂect these two reasons for deductibility if we set
γr = γρρ + γδ in (2.2) and (2.3) and (1 − γ)r = (1 − γρ)ρ + 1 − γδ in (2.4) and (2.8)
– (2.10). Desai et al. (2004) show that γρ ≈ 0.4 and Devereux et al. (2002) estimate
γδ ≈ 0.7. Setting ρ = 0.05 yields γr = 0.72 and (1 − γ)r = 0.33 or, equivalently,
r = 1.05 and γ = 0.69. The parameters q and u are set such that the model derives an
13Other symmetric distributions of ownership leave the results completely unchanged.
14The authors estimate the marginal cost of public funds to range from 1.3 to 2.0. Our numerical
results are robust against variations of μ in this interval.
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equilibrium tax rate and tax revenue under SA that equal the EU-25 average in 2002.
This is suitable as SA is the current tax regime in Europe. The average tax rate and
corporate tax revenue in EU-25 equal 27.4% and 9.35 billion euros.15 The calibration
yields q ≈ 0.04 and u ≈ 26.63.
With these parameter values, we can compute the equilibrium tax rates, welfare
and the values of the externalities. The results are displayed in Table 1 which can be
found in the appendix. As predicted by Proposition 2.5, the water’s edge externality
under FA turns out to be less detrimental than the proﬁt shifting externality under
SA in all our numerical simulations. Whether the water’s edge externality still plays
the positive role described above, however, depends on the shape of the apportionment
formula. The third row of Table 1 considers sales to be the only apportionment factor
(θ = 0). The water’s edge externality is then not beneﬁcial as income and investment
externalities overcompensate the (small) formula externality and the (large) water’s
edge externality further increases the already ineﬃciently high tax rates. In contrast,
the ﬁrst row in Table 1 shows that with a pure capital formula (θ = 1) income and
investment externalities are too small to oﬀset the (large) formula externality. Here,
the water’s edge externality is advantageous as it shifts tax rates upward towards the
eﬃcient solution. For an intermediate apportionment weight (θ = 0.5), formula and
water’s edge externality are both of medium size in absolute terms and the sum of
externalities turns out to be negative, but close to zero. Put diﬀerently, with a suitable
design of the apportionment formula, namely intermediate weight on capital, the union
countries can optimally exploit the positive eﬀect of the water’s edge externality.
Given the ﬁscal externalities, welfare in the union countries under FA is inverted
U-shaped in the apportionment share θ implying that the overall welfare eﬀect of the
transition from SA to FA is most likely to be positive for an intermediate weight
on capital in the apportionment formula. From a worldwide perspective we arrive
at a diﬀerent conclusion. Welfare in the non-participating country is monotonically
decreasing in the apportionment share θ and it can be shown that the sum of all three
15These values are taken from the Eurostat website under http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/.
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countries’ welfare is the highest under a pure sales formula (θ = 0). Interestingly,
however, it is again the water’s edge externality which renders FA more favorable
than SA in this case: From a worldwide perspective, we additionally have to account
for externalities between FA and non-FA countries which are found to be positive
and relatively large. For θ = 0, it is mainly the large water’s edge externality that
compensates for these as well as for the positive formula externality under FA.
Finally, Table 1 also shows how the other model parameters inﬂuence the comparison
between SA and FA. For this, we take the ﬁrst row of Table 1 as benchmark and then
conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the model parameters. The results are
displayed in the last three rows of Table 1. They reveal that a welfare-enhancing eﬀect
of FA becomes more likely with decreasing concealment cost q, a lower share 1 − λ
on the ﬁxed production factor (or lower pure proﬁt) and/or higher deductibility γ of
capital cost. In all three cases, the main reason is again that the formula externality
becomes less and the water’s edge externality becomes more important.
2.5 Discussion and Possible Extensions
Our modeling strategy relied on a number of simplifying assumptions. In this section
we discuss the robustness of our results when some of these assumptions are relaxed.
We suppose the volume of proﬁt shifted depends on the misreporting of the transfer
price for one unit of the service good traded within the ﬁrm. A slightly more general
approach is employed by Sørensen (2004) and Eggert and Schjelderup (2005) who pre-
sume that shifting opportunities additionally depend on investment at the aﬃliate’s
location. Formally, proﬁt shifted by MNE i to country j equals (pji − 1)kji and con-
cealment cost becomes Q(pji )k
j
i . A possible interpretation is that the internally traded
number of goods depends on the capital investment in the subsidiary, e.g. one unit of a
overhead service is provided for every machine installed at the entity or the quantity of
a headquarter’s management service increases with the aﬃliate’s size. This approach
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to transfer pricing implies that investment abroad eases proﬁt shifting in the sense
that for given pji the volume of shifting increases with k
j
i . It can be shown that all
our results remain qualitatively unchanged for this more general shifting technology as
investment simply ampliﬁes the shifting induced by the distortion of transfer prices.16
Next, there may be concerns that our short-run results hinge on the assumption of
equal deductibility parameters while empirical observations suggest considerable cross
country heterogeneity in the tax base legislation. For the results of Section 3 to hold,
the MNEs’ eﬀective tax rate within the union must be biased towards the tax rate of the
low-tax union country (Lemmas 1 and 2). If the deductibility parameters diﬀer across
countries, these lemmas may not be true.17 However, it is straightforward to show
that deductibility has to be equal for member countries after the formation of the FA-
union only. The deductibility parameters may diﬀer between FA and non-FA countries
and between SA and FA. In reality, many existing FA unions are characterized by a
common deﬁnition of the corporate tax base, for example, local and regional business
taxation in Germany and Canada. Moreover, the proposal of the European Commission
(2001) emphasizes the need for a homogeneous legislation with respect to the tax base
deﬁnition across EU countries. Therefore, the condition of an equal tax base deﬁnition
in the FA-union is in line with the planned design of a potential European FA system.
Our analysis so far assumed that corporate income taxation follows a pure source
principle. If instead the residence principle with a limited tax credit was in operation,
our results might not hold.18 Nevertheless, worldwide corporate taxation is to a large
16Formal proofs are contained in an earlier draft of this paper (Riedel and Runkel, 2005). Further
information can be obtained from the authors upon request. The logic of our results will also hold if
proﬁt is shifted by a distortion of the MNEs’ debt-equity structure. The reason is that even with this
shifting technology the volume shifted depends on the tax rate diﬀerential between two countries.
17Intuitively, if the low-tax FA country allows fewer deductions, one might think of a situation in
which the MNEs invest relatively more capital in the high-tax country and the eﬀective tax rate
under FA is biased towards the higher national tax rate within the FA union.
18For example, consider Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 with τc < τb < τa. Under a SA system with tax
crediting, MNEs a and b do not shift any proﬁt to c since their foreign income is taxed at their
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extent consistent with the source principle (e.g. Keen (1993), Hauﬂer and Schjelderup
(2000)). A related question which is consistent with the predominance of the exemption
principle is whether the EU should combine the introduction of FA with the adoption
of other instruments to protect its tax base against outﬂows to non-participating tax
havens. Ge´rard (2006) discusses a so-called Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rule
which means that proﬁt of an entity in a third country is included in the consolidated
tax base. Such a rule resembles worldwide consolidation and preserves our short-run
results as MNEs do not shift proﬁt under FA. Alternatively, Ge´rard (2006) suggests the
EU might reject granting exemption to proﬁt from water’s edge countries and apply
the tax credit method instead. In this case, our short-run results are equally preserved:
We now have to compare a SA-exemption system with a FA system where exemption
is applied within the FA union and crediting to countries outside the union. Under
SA-exemption, MNEs a and b shift proﬁt to country c. Under the FA system, the
union proﬁt of MNEs a and b is again taxed at the eﬀective tax rate. Hence, MNE b’s
tax rate diﬀerential to country c changes from τ b − τ c to τb − τ b. As τb − τ b always
falls short of τa− τ c, shifting of MNE b under the FA system is smaller than shifting of
MNE a (!) under the SA-exemption system. In addition, MNE a reverses its direction
of proﬁt shifting as all proﬁt earned within the FA union is taxed at rate τa while upon
repatriation proﬁt earned in country c is taxed at the national tax rate τa > τa. In
sum, total shifting of MNEs a and b to country c declines.
Finally, we suppose fully symmetric countries within the FA union. Under this
assumption our analysis shows that replacing SA by FA will increase the union coun-
tries’ welfare if the apportionment formula is suitably designed. From tax competition
models like e.g. Wilson (1991) it is well known that in case of country asymmetry the
smaller country chooses the smaller tax rate and may beneﬁt from tax competition.
home countries’ national tax rate. Under FA with crediting, all proﬁt of MNE a is taxed at rate
τa. MNE a therefore still refrains from shifting. But MNE b’s proﬁt in the FA union is taxed at
the eﬀective tax rate τb > τb. As proﬁt earned in c is taxed at τb, MNE b starts shifting from the
union to country c. Thus, under crediting FA raises total shifting by MNEs a and b from the union
to country c.
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Tax harmonization is then not Pareto improving as the small country’s welfare declines.
Similar, in case of asymmetric countries the introduction of FA may be beneﬁcial for
some union countries but detrimental for others. The optimal formula design under
homogenous countries is then diﬀerent from the design which ensures a strict Pareto
improvement in case of asymmetric countries. However, before investigating the con-
ditions for a Pareto improvement in the presence of a water’s edge it is important to
understand the implications of country asymmetries in the absence of a water’s edge.
To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis is missing in the literature so far.19
As a rigorous analysis is beyond the scope of our paper, we have to leave it for future
research.
2.6 Conclusion
Many policy-makers and researchers have been skeptic about replacing SA principles
by FA. One main objection concerns the necessity to restrict proﬁt consolidation to the
local area of a FA union (water’s edge), since FA systems with world wide consolidation
rules proved to be politically non-feasible in the past. With the water’s edge regula-
tion, proﬁt shifting channels to countries outside the union stay open and thereby may
undermine the aim of FA regarding the abolishment of income shifting and the asso-
ciated ﬁscal externalities. Using a three-country model with MNEs, our paper shows
that this fear is basically unfounded. On the contrary, for given national tax rates,
introducing FA with a water’s edge consolidation is likely to reduce proﬁt shifting to
tax havens outside the union. Our paper shows that MNEs tie their shifting decision
to the tax rate diﬀerential between two countries and that a switch to FA reduces the
eﬀective tax rate diﬀerential between high-tax FA countries and outside tax havens by
more than it increases the eﬀective tax diﬀerential between low-tax FA countries and
outside tax havens. Under tax competition, the water’s edge causes a ﬁscal externality
19Asymmetric FA is considered by Anand and Sansing (2000) and Ge´rard (2005, 2006). But their
framework is diﬀerent from ours and they do not investigate the conditions for a Pareto improvement.
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that distorts corporate tax rates upward. But this externality is smaller in absolute
terms than the proﬁt shifting externality under SA and tends to compensate for other
externalities under FA. Therefore, the existence of a water’s edge is likely to be ben-
eﬁcial. A numerical simulation of our model suggests that the suitable design of the
apportionment formula is important for this positive role of the water’s edge to evolve.
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2.7 Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Consider ﬁrst the case of τa > τ b so that min{τa, τ b} = τ b. With the help of
Aia(·) > 0 > Aib(·), (2.13) and (2.15) – (2.17) we can then write
F ′(kˆa)− r(1− γτˆ )
1− τˆ =
(τa − τ b)Aia(·)πˆ
1− τˆ >
(τa − τ b)Aib(·)πˆ
1− τˆ = F
′(kˆb)− r(1− γτˆ)
1− τˆ .
Hence, F ′(kˆa) > F ′(kˆb), kˆa < kˆb and F (kˆa) < F (kˆb). Investment and sales shares in a
become kˆa/(kˆa + kˆb) < 1/2 and F (kˆa)/[F (kˆa) + F (kˆb)] < 1/2, respectively. We obtain
A(kˆa, kˆb) < 1/2 due to (2.7). The eﬀective tax rate τˆ from (2.17) can then be written
as τˆ = τ b + (τa − τ b)A(kˆa, kˆb) < τ b + (τa − τ b)/2 = (τa + τ b)/2. τa > τ b and A(·) > 0
ensure τˆ > τ b. The proofs in case of τa < τ b and τa = τ b are completely analogous.
Appendix B: Proof of propositions 2.1 – 2.3
According to (2.6) and (2.12), the transfer price of MNE i ∈ U in country c is
determined by Q′(pci)− τ c + xi = 0. Setting xi = τ i yields the solution under SA, i.e.
pci = p˜
c
i , while for xi = τi = τˆ we obtain the FA solution p
c
i = pˆ
c. Hence, the impact
of the transition from SA to FA on proﬁt shifting to country c can be characterized by
totally diﬀerentiating the above condition with respect to xi. This yields
H(xi) :=
dpci
dxi
= − 1
Q′′(pci)
, H ′(xi) :=
d2pci
dx2i
= − Q
′′′(pci)
[Q′′(pci)]3
. (2.33)
τ c < τ b < τa implies pci − 1 < 0. Due to (2.33), we have dpci/dxi < 0. For MNE b the
variable xb increases from τ
b to τˆ . Hence, replacing SA by FA increases MNE b’s proﬁt
shifting −(pcb−1) to country c. In contrast, for MNE a the variable xa is reduced from
τa to τˆ so that its shifting −(pca − 1) to country c falls. This proves Proposition 2.1.
To prove Proposition 2.2, write the change in total proﬁt shifting of MNEs a and b
as
−dpca − dpcb = −H(τa)dxa −H(τ b)dxb. (2.34)
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Q′′ > 0, Q′′′ ≥ 0 and (2.33) imply H ′(xi) ≤ 0. It follows H(τa) ≤ H(τ b) < 0. Since
τˆ ∈]τ b, (τa + τ b)/2[ due to Lemma 1, we have dxb = τˆ − τ b < −(τˆ − τa) = −dxa. Using
this in (2.34) yields −dpca − dpcb < 0, i.e. total shifting −(pca − 1)− (pcb − 1) to c falls.
Proﬁt shifting of MNE c is determined by Q′(pic) − xi + τ c = 0 with xi = τ i under
SA and xi = τc under FA, i ∈ U . Proposition 2.3 immediately follows by the same
arguments as for Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, if we additionally take into account that the
tax rate diﬀerential xi − τ c enters MNE c’s shifting decision with the opposite sign.
Appendix C: Comparative Statics under SA and FA
Proﬁt maximization of MNE i ∈ N under SA is characterized by (2.6). Totally
diﬀerentiating and then applying the symmetry assumption yields, inter alia,
∂k˜ji
∂τ 
= 0, j,  ∈ N, j = , (2.35)
∂p˜ji
∂τ i
= −∂p˜
j
i
∂τ j
= − 1
Q′′(1)
< 0, j ∈ N i, (2.36)
∂p˜ji
∂τ 
= 0, j,  ∈ N i, j = . (2.37)
These expressions are true for all MNE i ∈ N and are used to derive (2.24) and (2.25).
Under FA, the proﬁt maximum of MNEs a and b is determined by (2.12) – (2.14).
Totally diﬀerentiating and then applying the equilibrium assumption yields for i, j ∈ U
∂kˆi
∂τ i
=
r(1− γ)
2(1− τ ∗)2F ′′(kˆ) +
πˆ
4(1− τ ∗)F ′′(kˆ)
[
θ
kˆ
+
(1− θ)F ′(kˆ)
F (kˆ)
]
< 0, (2.38)
∂kˆi
∂τ j
=
r(1− γ)
2(1− τ ∗)2F ′′(kˆ) −
πˆ
4(1− τ ∗)F ′′(kˆ)
[
θ
kˆ
+
(1− θ)F ′(kˆ)
F (kˆ)
]
 0, i = j, (2.39)
∂kˆc
∂τ i
= 0,
∂pˆc
∂τ i
= − 1
2Q′′(pˆc)
< 0. (2.40)
The solution of MNE c’s proﬁt maximization is determined by (2.18) – (2.20). The
impact of the union tax rates on MNE c’s investment kˆic, i ∈ U , is the same as in
(2.38) and (2.39) except for replacing πˆ by πˆc. We also obtain ∂kˆ
c
c/∂τ
i = 0 and
∂pˆc/∂τ
i = 1/[2Q′′(pˆc)] > 0 for i ∈ U . These results are used to derive (2.28) – (2.32).
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Chapter 3
Taxing Multinationals under Union
Wage Bargaining
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3.1 Introduction
With increasing economic integration the importance of multinational entities (MNEs)
has steadily grown for the last decades. Today, more than one third of international
trade ﬂows through intra-ﬁrm channels (OECD (2002)). The outward FDI stock of
companies headquartered in the OECD has sextupled since the early 1990ies (OECD
Statistics (2007)). Hence, it is not surprising that the public ﬁnance literature has
extensively studied the interaction between corporate taxation and the behavior of
MNEs. Key results are that a multinational’s investment and proﬁt declaration deci-
sion depends on the prevailing corporate tax rates. MNEs are shown to reduce their
overall tax burden by relocating investment to low-tax countries and shifting pre-tax
proﬁts through intra-ﬁrm channels (see for example Hines (1999), Devereux (2006)).
In consequence, governments compete to attract the mobile corporate tax base which
results in ineﬃciently low equilibrium tax rates (e.g. Mintz (1999)).
Although the interaction between corporate taxation and MNEs is generally well
studied, the literature has so far neglected that taxation may impact on the wage
bargaining process between MNEs and labor unions. This analysis is especially relevant
since labor markets in the OECD are characterized by substantial market imperfections.
It is well known that the system of wage formation is determined by unionization in
most OECD countries (see e.g. Nickell et al. (2005)). Union coverage especially tends
to be high and stable in Continental Europe and Scandinavia. Additionally, MNEs
have become strong players in the markets for factor demand. Thus, a substantial
fraction of the workforce within the OECD is employed by MNEs (OECD (2005)), in
the manufacturing industry, for example, almost every second worker.
The paper’s central aim is to investigate how corporate taxes aﬀect wage bargaining
between MNEs and national labor unions. Departing from these results, we will derive
implications for the tax competition game. We develop a theoretical model with two
symmetric countries. Each country hosts the aﬃliate of a representative MNE. The
MNE produces a homogeneous good using labor as input factor. We assume that the
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corporation is led by a central management which maximizes the MNE’s total after-tax
proﬁt. Our model considers a three stage game in which labor demand, workers’ wages,
transfer prices for internally traded goods and corporate tax rates are endogenously
determined. The structure of the game is as follows: At the ﬁrst stage, the governments
simultaneously choose their corporate tax rates ignoring the eﬀect of their decisions
on the social welfare of the other country. At the second stage, the representative
MNE and local labor unions bargain over the wage level in a standard right-to-manage
setting. Therefore at the third stage, the MNE sets labor demand and the transfer
price. The model is solved by backward induction.
The third stage of the analysis delivers the standard results for the MNE’s corporate
labor demand and transfer pricing decision. Our model’s innovation is the introduction
of a wage bargaining game between the MNE and national labor unions at the second
stage. Contrary to the ﬁrst intuition, we ﬁnd that increases in the local corporate
tax rate raise the wage level bargained for the MNE’s domestic workers. This result
constitutes from two eﬀects. Obviously, increasing the corporate tax surges the MNE’s
corporate tax burden and therefore directly reduces the multinational’s after-tax proﬁt.
Consequently, the wages bargained for local workers tend to decline. However, in addi-
tion we ﬁnd that increasing the corporate tax rate reduces the MNE’s proﬁt sensitivity
with respect to the domestic wage level. This is because - in line with prevailing legal
regulations - we model payroll cost to be deductible from the corporate tax base. The
value of this payroll deduction rises with the domestic corporate tax rate. Hence, the
higher the corporate tax rate the less sensitive the MNE’s proﬁt reacts to changes in
the local wage rate since higher payroll cost become less detrimental. In consequence,
the local workers’ wage rate tends to increase. Our analysis proves that the latter eﬀect
globally exceeds the former and hence, local wages rise in the corporate tax rate.
In contrast, we show that corporate tax increases reduce the wage level bargained
at the foreign aﬃliate. Since foreign wages are deductible from the foreign tax base
only, an increase in the domestic corporate tax does not impact on the MNE’s proﬁt
sensitivity with respect to the foreign wage level. However it lowers the MNE’s after-
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tax proﬁt and thus reduces wages bargained at the foreign aﬃliate.
At the ﬁrst stage we consider a tax competition game in which each country max-
imizes a social welfare function comprising tax revenues and residents’ wage income.
We obtain the well-known positive proﬁt shifting externality reﬂecting that a rise in the
domestic corporate tax rate induces the MNE to shift proﬁts to the foreign country.
Since this directly increases the foreign corporate tax base, the domestic tax policy
imposes a positive ﬁscal externality on the foreign country. In addition, we derive an
ambiguous wage income externality established by the endogenous remuneration level.
On the one hand, a rise in the domestic corporate tax rate lowers foreign workers’
wages. The wage decline reduces the MNE’s foreign payroll cost thereby increasing the
aﬃliate’s pre-tax proﬁt and the foreign corporate tax base. On the other hand, the
reduction in the foreign wage level translates in a direct decline of foreign residents’
utility from wage income. The sign of the wage income externality depends on the
relative size of these eﬀects. Ceteris paribus, low marginal cost of public funds and low
labor demand sensitivity to wage changes lead to a negative ﬁscal externality.
We test the theoretically predicted corporate tax eﬀects on workers’ wages employing
a panel dataset of subsidiaries located in the countries of EU 15. Our data comprises
the years 1995 to 2005 and enables a link between the accounting information for
subsidiaries and their direct and ultimate parent companies. Estimating a ﬁxed eﬀect
model, we ﬁnd corporate tax eﬀects on workers’ wages in line with the predictions of
our model.
Our investigation so far presumed that MNEs are taxed according to separate ac-
counting (SA) principles. SA is currently employed for the taxation of multinational
corporations and prescribes proﬁt to be taxed in the country where it accrues. In an
extension to our theoretical model, we investigate how the interaction between cor-
porate taxation and union wage bargaining is aﬀected by a switch to a tax system
following formula apportionment (FA) regulations. Taxation according to FA is cur-
rently employed at the subnational level in the US, Canada and Germany. According
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to its legislation, proﬁts of multi-jurisdictional corporations are consolidated and ap-
portioned to the jurisdictions by a formula measuring the MNE’s relative activity. The
last years observed increased scientiﬁc interest in a comparison of SA and FA since the
European Commission proposed to switch to FA within European borders in 2001 (Eu-
ropean Commission (2001)). Our analysis shows that the impact of corporate taxation
on wage bargaining between local labor unions and MNEs is fundamentally altered by
the introduction of FA. Explicitly, in contrast to SA, increases in the corporate tax rate
are likely to reduce the domestic wage level while they are likely to increase foreign
workers’ wages. A tax competition game under FA derives a positive ﬁscal externality
established by the endogenous wage level.
Our paper touches several strands of the theoretical and empirical economic liter-
ature. Our theoretical model is closely related to the literature on international tax
coordination. Fuest and Huber (1999) investigate capital and labor taxation in open
economies with union wage bargaining. In line with our results, they ﬁnd that corpo-
rate tax rates may be ineﬃciently high or low. Since they assume nationally operating
ﬁrms and focus on distortive capital and labor taxation, they cannot derive the results
presented in this paper. A similar setting was analysed by Koskela and Scho¨b (2002).
Moreover, our paper relates to Lejour and Verbon (1996) who model tax competition
assuming that countries ﬁnance a social insurance system by a wage tax and corpo-
rations bargain over workers’ wages with a monopoly union. They show that foreign
workers beneﬁt from domestic tax increases while foreign capital owners are negatively
aﬀected. Our analysis contrasts their results since we ﬁnd that increases in the domestic
tax decrease foreign workers wages and increases foreign corporate proﬁts.
Our paper might also be connected to a small literature that explicitly investigates
how union wage bargaining is aﬀected by the presence of MNEs. Zhao (1998) mod-
els a MNE’s subsidiary that is located in a unionized market and shows that with
decentralized wage bargaining and centralized transfer pricing choice, the MNE uses
the transfer price to decrease the pre-tax proﬁt at the subsidiary location. Leahy and
Montagna (2000) investigate the welfare eﬀects of FDI in an economy with union wage
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bargaining discriminating for diﬀerent degrees of centralization in union wage setting.
Naylor and Santoni (2003) examine a similar question concentrating on the impact of
the union bargaining power on corporate FDI decisions. However, all papers in this
ﬁeld abstract from taxation aspects and hence, could not derive corporate tax eﬀects
on the wage bargaining outcome.
Additionally, we contribute to the literature on multiregional corporations which
compares taxation systems based on SA and FA principles respectively (see e.g. McLure
(1980), Gordon and Wilson (1986)). Existing papers assume perfectly competitive
labor markets and are not concerned with corporate tax eﬀects in the presence of labor
market imperfections due to union wage bargaining. The wage eﬀects found in these
papers thus fundamentally diﬀer from our results. Moreover, our model replicates the
standard ﬁndings derived by the literature on tax competition under SA and FA (see
e.g. Nielsen et al. (2004), Kind et al. (2005) and Riedel and Runkel (2006)) but
additionally contributes new ﬁscal externalities under SA and FA established by the
introduction of wage bargaining. Recently, Eichner and Runkel (2006) brought forward
a paper closely related to our work. They investigate corporate taxation under SA and
FA with a minimum wage. While they do not derive additional externalities due to the
labor market imperfection under SA, in line with our results they ﬁnd that the labor
market imperfection enforces the race-to-the bottom in corporate tax rates under FA.
The empirical literature on MNEs has so far been silent on possible wage eﬀects
of corporate taxation. There exists a large literature which investigates the causal
impact of corporate tax rates on the investment and employment decision of multi-
jurisdictional corporations (e.g. Hines (1996) and (1999)). Our empirical section is
most closely related to Budd et al. (2005) who investigate how corporate proﬁt at
the subsidiary and parent location aﬀects the subsidiary’s workers’ wages. They ﬁnd
evidence that own as well as foreign parent proﬁt positively inﬂuences the remuneration
level.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in section 2 we develop the
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theoretical model. Section 3 presents the results of our empirical analysis. In section
4 we consider possible extension to our model, section 5 discusses policy implications
and concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Model
We consider a simple model with two symmetric countries a and b which have the
same size, production technology and labor supply. Each country hosts the aﬃliate of
a representative MNE. The MNE produces a homogeneous good using labor as input
factor. The labor demand of the MNE in country i, i ∈ {a, b} is denoted by Li. The
workers’ remuneration in country i is symbolized by wi. Domestic labor supply N is
assumed to be ﬁxed as workers are immobile between the two countries. The MNE
earns an after-tax proﬁt
Π =
∑
i
ΠT i −
∑
i
Ti −
∑
i
θ(pi − 1), i, j ∈ {a, b} (3.1)
with ΠT i and Ti describing pre-tax proﬁts and tax payments in country i; pi represents
the transfer price for an internally traded good delivered from aﬃliate i to aﬃliate j
with i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. Formally the aﬃliates’ pre-tax proﬁt calculates
ΠT i = F (Li)− wiLi + (pi − 1)− pj , i, j ∈ {a, b}, i = j (3.2)
The MNE’s output is given by the production function F (Li) which is identical across
countries and has the usual properties F ′(Li) > 0 and F ′′(Li) < 0. As the MNE’s
workers at location i receive a remuneration wi and provide one unit labor Li, MNE i’s
payroll cost at location i calculates wiLi. Additionally, we assume that each aﬃliate
i delivers one good or service to the foreign aﬃliate in the country j for which the
true price is normalized to 1. Since the true price is not observable to tax authorities,
the MNE might attach a transfer price pi which deviates from the true price to shift
proﬁts between its aﬃliates. To derive an interior solution we assume transfer pricing
to entail convex concealment costs with the following properties
θ(pi = 1) = 0, sign(θ
′) = sign (pi − 1) , θ′′ (pi − 1) > 0 (3.3)
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The concealment costs are not deductible from the corporate tax base. This corre-
sponds to a perception of the costs as penalty fees which an MNE has to pay if the tax
authority detects proﬁt shifting activities.1
In the theoretical part of our paper we investigate a three stage game in which
labor demand, wages, transfer prices and tax rates are endogenously determined. The
structure of the game is as follows: At the ﬁrst stage, the governments of countries
a and b simultaneously choose their corporate tax rates ignoring the eﬀect of their
decisions on the tax base of the other country. At the second stage, the representative
MNE and national labor unions bargain over the wage level in a standard right-to-
manage setting. Finally at the third stage, the MNE decides about labor demand and
sets the intra-ﬁrm transfer prices for the goods traded. The model will be solved by
backward induction.
3.2.1 Labor Demand and Transfer Prices
Under SA proﬁt is taxed in the country where it is earned. Therefore the multinational’s
tax payments in country i are Ti = tiΠT i, where ti is the corporate tax rate in country
i ∈ {a, b}. The MNE maximizes its total after-tax proﬁt by choosing the optimal values
for Li and pi, which yields the following ﬁrst order conditions
tj − ti = θ′(pi − 1), (3.4)
F ′(Li) = wi. (3.5)
for i, j ∈ {a, b}. The MNE’s optimal transfer pricing decision is determined by equation
(3.4). If tj > ti the marginal concealment cost θ
′ is positive and therefore the MNE
overstates its transfer price pi > 1 to shift proﬁts from the foreign aﬃliate in country
1In contrast, if the MNE spends eﬀort to refrain the tax authority from observing its proﬁt shifting
activities, it might declare these expenditures (e.g. lawyer fees) as administration costs and may
deduct them from the corporate tax base. There is no unique modeling strategy in the economic
literature, for a discussion of the approaches see Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000). Nevertheless our
results would not qualitatively change if we assumed concealment cost to be tax deductible.
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j to the aﬃliate in country i. If ti > tj the transfer price is understated and proﬁts
are shifted to the aﬃliate in country j. Moreover, we modeled the corporate tax to be
a pure proﬁt tax and therefore labor demand is not distorted by corporate taxation
under SA (see equation (3.5)).
3.2.2 Wage Bargaining
In the following, we investigate the eﬀects of corporate taxation on wage bargaining
between the MNE and a national labor union in a standard right-to-manage bargaining
model. Despite the growing importance of MNEs in the last two decades, labor unions
did not adjust to this new development but to a large extend remained organized at
the subnational level. Transnational union cooperation is restricted to few individual
examples (Gordon and Turner (2000)). Therefore, we model the interaction between
a MNE and national labor unions. One may show that this fragmentation of workers
into local unions is ineﬃcient from a workers’ perspective since each union exerts an
externality on foreign workers’ wages.2
The workers’ collective utility is assumed not to depend on the wage and employment
level at the foreign aﬃliate and, therefore, local trade unions follow the objective to
maximize local wage rents and local employment. The MNE, in contrast, is assumed
to be led by a central management that acts as an entity in the bargaining process.
Therefore, the MNE is assumed to maximize overall after-tax proﬁt.3 Formally, the
2There are two classic arguments for the merger of labor unions in an industry context. First, an
industry-wide labor union is able to bargain for higher wages since its threat-point payoﬀs are larger.
Second, decentralized unions in oligopolistic markets do not internalize the positive impact of their
wage rate increases on other ﬁrms employment situation (Davidson (1988)). Note that these argu-
ments refer to a setting in which decentralized labor unions bargain with diﬀerent corporations for
workers’ wages. In our setting decentralized labor unions bargain with one MNE over workers’ wages
and the source of ineﬃciency is therefore diﬀerent from previous work.
3One unique implication of centralized corporate wage bargaining is that wages bargained in one coun-
try depend on proﬁt earned at foreign aﬃliates. Since Budd et al. (2005) ﬁnd empirical support for
this kind of international rent sharing between multinational subsidiaries, we consider our modeling
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MNE and the local labor union solve the following problem by choosing the optimal
wage level wi
max
wi
[Π(wa, wb)]
1−δ[(wi − w)Li]δ, i ∈ {a, b} (3.6)
subject to Li < N and wi > w; Π(wa, wb) represents the corporation’s proﬁt, wi is
the remuneration level bargained4, w symbolizes the reservation (or minimum) wage, δ
the union’s bargaining power and N describes the overall national work force, all three
assumed to be equal across the two countries. Last, Li(wi) deﬁnes the MNE’s labor
demand function in country i. In equilibrium (along the Pareto frontier with respect
to contracts between the union and the MNE if we explicitly modeled the bargaining
game), it holds ∂Ui/∂wi > 0 whereas Ui = [(wi − w)Li] represents union i’s utility.
The reasoning is very simple. Since the corporate proﬁt is declining in the wage rate,
the MNE always desires lower remuneration. If the union also preferred a lower wage,
the bargaining parties could improve their joint surplus by lowering the wage to zero.
Thus, it holds
∂Ui
∂wi
= Li + (wi − w)∂Li
∂wi
= Li
(
1 +
(wi − w)
Li
∂Li
∂wi
)
= Li(1 + i) > 0 (3.7)
with i is symbolizing the labor demand sensitivity with respect to the multinationals’
workers wage rent. Taking logs and diﬀerentiating equation (3.6) with respect to wi,
i ∈ {a, b}, gives the following ﬁrst order conditions
Φa =
δ
La
∂La
∂wa
+
δ
wa − w +
1− δ
Π
∂Π
∂wa
= 0, (3.8)
Φb =
δ
Lb
∂Lb
∂wb
+
δ
wb − w +
1− δ
Π
∂Π
∂wb
= 0. (3.9)
To derive the corporate tax eﬀect on the bargained wage level, we apply the implicit
function theorem to equations (3.8) and (3.9).
dwi
dti
=
−∂Φi/∂ti · ∂Φj/∂wj + ∂Φj/∂ti · ∂Φi/∂wj
∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj − ∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi > 0 (3.10)
dwi
dtj
=
−∂Φi/∂tj · ∂Φj/∂wj + ∂Φj/∂tj · ∂Φi/∂wj
∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj − ∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi < 0 (3.11)
strategy to be valid.
4The assumption of a linear objective function is for analytical and expository convenience. Our
results do not change if we assumed the union’s utility to be a concave function of the wage level wi.
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with i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. This directly leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Under SA, the local corporate tax rate has a positive (negative)
eﬀect on the wages bargained at the local (foreign) aﬃliate.
Proof: For the objective function (3.6) to be concave, the second derivative with
respect to the wage rate must be negative ∂Φi/∂wi < 0 and ∂Φj/∂wj < 0, with
i ∈ {a, b}. Moreover, it can be shown that ∂Φi/∂wj = ∂Φj/∂wi = −(1− δ)/Π2 ·
∂Π/∂wi · ∂Π/∂wj < 0 for i ∈ {a, b} and i = j. Since our analysis focuses on stable
equilibria only, the determinant of the equation system is assumed to be positive,
∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj − ∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi > 0 for i ∈ {a, b} and i = j.5 Thus, the
signs of equations (3.10) and (3.11) depend on the sign of the numerator, explicitly
on ∂Φi/∂ti and ∂Φi/∂tj . Taking into account that it follows from equations (3.1) and
(3.5) that
∂Li
∂wi
=
1
F ′′(Li)
,
∂Li
∂wj
= 0,
∂Π
∂wi
= −(1− ti)Li (3.12)
∂Li
∂ti
=
∂Li
∂tj
=
∂2Li
∂wi∂ti
=
∂2Li
∂wi∂tj
= 0,
∂2Π
∂wi∂ti
= Li,
∂2Π
∂wi∂tj
= 0 (3.13)
for i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j, we ﬁnd
∂Φi
∂ti
=
(1− δ)Li(1− tj)ΠTj
Π2
> 0 (3.14)
∂Φi
∂tj
= −(1− δ)Li(1− ti)ΠTj
Π2
< 0 (3.15)
with i, j ∈ {a, b}, i = j. Hence, ∂wi/∂ti > 0 and ∂wi/∂tj < 0 
A rise in the domestic corporate tax rate exerts two eﬀects on the local wage bargaining
game. First, a higher tax rate enlarges the MNE’s tax bill and therefore leads to a
decline of the MNE’s after-tax proﬁt. This induces lower wages being bargained at the
domestic aﬃliate. Second, an increase in the corporate tax rate lowers the MNE’s proﬁt
sensitivity to local workers’ wages. As payroll costs are deductible from the corporate
5See for example Hammond et al. (2005).
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tax base, a corporate tax rise increases the value of this deduction and therefore makes
corporate proﬁts less vulnerable to enlarged payroll cost. This eﬀect tends to raise the
wage level bargained at home. According to equation (3.14) the latter eﬀect prevails
and a tax increase raises wage level bargained at the domestic aﬃliate.
In contrast, a corporate tax increase leads to a reduction in the wage rate bargained
at the foreign country. Since payroll costs are only deductible from the domestic
corporate tax base, tax increases do not exhibit any eﬀect on the proﬁt sensitivity with
respect to foreign wages. The foreign wage bargaining process is only aﬀected by the
reduction in after-tax proﬁts. Thus, the wage level of the foreign aﬃliate’s workers
decline.6 Concluding, it can be said that increases in the domestic corporate tax lead
to a ‘redistribution’ of wage income from the foreign aﬃliate’s workers towards the
domestic workers.
3.2.3 Tax Competition
At the ﬁrst stage, we investigate a tax competition game between the countries’ govern-
ments which are assumed to levy a corporate income tax on the MNE’s proﬁts. Each
government maximizes a social welfare function comprising tax revenues multiplied by
the marginal cost of public funds (ρ) and the residents’ wage income. For simplicity
reasons, we assume the MNE to be owned by a third party not being resident in coun-
tries a and b.7 Under SA all proﬁts earned are subject to corporate taxation in the
country where they accrue and the social welfare function is deﬁned
SWi = ρtiΠ˜T i + (w˜i − w)L˜i + wN (3.16)
6It shall be pointed out that the strategic responses to wage changes in the other country amplify
the described wage eﬀects. As shown above, a rise in the corporation tax increases the domestic
wage rate. This wage increase lowers the MNE’s after-tax proﬁt and hence reduces the wage rate
bargained at the foreign location. Equivalently, the corporate tax increase directly reduces the wage
rate bargained at the foreign country, which induces domestic wages to increase.
7This assumption will not qualitatively change our results.
Taxing Multinationals under Union Wage Bargaining 77
with L˜i, w˜i, w˜j, p˜i, p˜j and Π˜T i = Π˜T i(L˜i, w˜i, p˜i, p˜j) representing the optimal values
chosen at the second and third stage according to equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.8) for
i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. Each government is assumed to maximize the social welfare
function given by equation (3.16) not taking into account the eﬀects of its tax policy
on the foreign country’s social welfare. Therefore it holds
∂SWi(ta, tb)
∂ti
= 0 (3.17)
The MNE’s aﬃliates are structurally identical across countries, additionally the work-
force potential N and the reservation wage w are presumed to be equal in a and b.
Therefore, we focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium with equal tax rates t˜ = ta = tb.
Equilibrium tax revenue in country i can be derived
SWi(t˜, t˜) =: SW (t˜) (3.18)
Our analysis investigates whether the countries choose ineﬃciently high or low tax
rates in equilibrium. Therefore we determine the impact of a coordinated increase in
the common tax rate t˜ on the social welfare of the countries. Diﬀerentiating (3.18)
yields
dSW (t˜)
dt˜
=
∂SWi(ta, tb)
∂ti
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
+
∂SWi(ta, tb)
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
(3.19)
whereas ∂SWi/∂ti = 0 according to equation (3.17) and ∂SWi/∂tj represents the ﬁscal
externality on the other country’s welfare, with i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j.
∂SWi
∂tj
= ρti
{
∂Π˜T i
∂p˜i
∂p˜i
∂tj
+
∂Π˜T i
∂p˜j
∂p˜j
∂tj
+
∂Π˜T i
∂L˜i
(
∂L˜i
∂tj
+
∂L˜i
∂w˜i
∂w˜i
∂tj
)
+
∂Π˜T i
∂w˜i
∂w˜i
∂tj
}
+L˜i
∂w˜i
∂tj
+ (w˜i − w)
(
∂L˜i
∂tj
+
∂L˜i
∂w˜i
∂w˜i
∂tj
)
(3.20)
for j, i ∈ {a, b} and i = j. Since we investigate a symmetric equilibrium of the tax
competition game, we evaluate equation (3.20) for equal corporate tax rates ta = tb = t˜.
It follows from equations (3.4) and (3.5)
∂L˜i
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
= 0,
∂p˜i
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
= −∂p˜j
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
=
1
θ′′(1)
> 0,
∂Π˜T i
∂Li
= F ′(Li)− wi = 0(3.21)
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for i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. Moreover, under symmetry it holds that La = Lb = L˜,
wa = wb = w˜, pa = pb = 1 and a = b = ˜. Consequently, equation (3.20) can be
simpliﬁed to
∂SWi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
=
2ρ t˜
θ′′(1)
+
{
1 + ˜− ρ t˜} L˜ · ∂w˜i
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=t
(3.22)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the tax competition game under SA attains a symmetric
equilibrium ta = tb = t˜; then the governments may either set too high or too low
corporate tax rates depending on the relative size of a positive proﬁt shifting externality
and an ambiguous wage income externality.
Proof: It follows from equations (3.11) and (3.21) that 1/θ′′(1) > 0 and L˜·∂w˜i/∂tj < 0.
Moreover, it must hold that 1 + ˜ > 0 as was demonstrated in section 2.2. Therefore,
the proﬁt shifting externality 2ρ t˜/θ′′(1) is positive while the wage income externality{
1 + − ρ t˜} L˜ · ∂w˜i/∂tj carries an ambiguous sign. 
We derive ambiguous ﬁscal externalities under SA. The ﬁrst term on the right hand
side of equation (3.22) represents the well-known proﬁt shifting externality derived
under SA. The ﬁscal externality is established by the following mechanism: If one
country raises its corporate tax rate, the MNE has an incentive to shift proﬁts to the
foreign jurisdiction thereby increasing the foreign tax base. This imposes a positive
ﬁscal externality on the other country and motivates a race-to-the-bottom in corporate
taxes.
Our model’s contribution is the derivation of an ambiguous wage income externality
established by the endogenous determination of wages in a bargaining process. For-
mally the eﬀect is represented by the second term on the right hand side of equation
(3.22). In the previous section we proved that raising the corporate tax rate lowers
the wages bargained at the foreign location. First, the decline in the foreign wage
rate reduces the foreign location’s payroll cost and thereby raises the MNE’s after-tax
proﬁt and the foreign tax base. This imposes a positive ﬁscal externality on the foreign
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country. Second, the reduction in foreign workers’ remuneration leads to a direct fall
in workers’ utility from wage income and imposes a negative ﬁscal externality on the
foreign country.8 The sign of the wage income externality depends on the relative size
of these countervailing eﬀects. Equation (3.22) reveals that the income externality and
in consequence the sum of externalities will tend to be negative if the marginal cost of
public funds ρ and the absolute value of the labor demand elasticity with respect to
the wage rent are low.
3.3 Empirical Test of Tax Eﬀects on Workers’ Wages
The purpose of this section is to test the theoretical predictions of Proposition 1.
Therefore, we will investigate how the statutory corporate tax rate at the aﬃliate and
parent location impacts on the average workers’ wage rate.
3.3.1 Empirical Estimation Methodology
Proposition 1 suggests the following equation to be estimated
log Wit = α1 + α2 ln Taxit + α3Inttaxit + α4 ln TaxFit + α5Xit + α6XFit + φi + it
Since the corporate wage rate exhibits a rather skewed distribution, we employ the log-
arithm of the average wage rate at the subsidiary level as endogeneous variable. The
central explanatory variable is the corporate tax at the aﬃliate and parent location
(Taxit and TaxFit) which enters the equation in log-form. The variable φi symbol-
izes a full set of aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects. These allow for unobserved and time-invariant
heterogeneity between the subsidiaries and hence may capture heterogeneity due to
8The induced changes in workers’ wages lead to adjustments in the MNE’s labor demand behavior
in the opposite direction. The MNE reacts to a decline in the bargained wage level with increased
labor demand and vice versa. Nevertheless, since  > −1 this does not overcompensate the direct
wage eﬀects.
Taxing Multinationals under Union Wage Bargaining 80
diﬀerences in ﬁrm technology and workers’ skill level. We also include a full set of year
eﬀects that control for unobserved heterogeneity over time common to all subsidiaries
like skill biased technological change (see also Budd et al. (2005)). Moreover, we in-
clude a set of time varying control variables, like the corporate capital intensity and the
value added per employee, national GDP per capita and a national earnings-index for
the manufacturing industry. We additionally include a full set of time-industry eﬀects.
While the eﬀect of the foreign corporate tax on domestic workers’ wages is driven by
after-tax proﬁt adjustments only, the impact of corporate taxes on domestic workers’
wages can be split in a negative proﬁt level eﬀect and a positive proﬁt sensitivity
eﬀect (see Section 3.2). To separate the latter two eﬀects we interact the log domestic
corporate tax rate with the MNE’s log employment. This isolates the proﬁt sensitivity
and the proﬁt income eﬀect since marginally increasing the aﬃliate employment raises
the corporate tax eﬀect on the MNE’s proﬁt sensitivity with respect to domestic wages
∂3Π/∂wi∂ti∂Li = 1 but does not have any eﬀect on the proﬁt sensitivity with respect
to the corporation tax ∂2Π/∂ti∂Li = F
′(Li) − wi = 0. Hence, we would presume the
interaction eﬀect to be positive and hence to provide direct evidence for the existence
of the proﬁt sensitivity eﬀect.
3.3.2 Data Description and Sample Statistics
Our empirical analysis employs the AMADEUS data base which is compiled by Bu-
reau van Dijck and contains detailed accounting and ﬁrm structure information for
1.6 million corporations in 38 countries. The data is available from 1995 to 2005,
but unbalanced in structure. Since our analysis centers around corporate tax eﬀects
on multinational ﬁrms, we restrict our sample to subsidiaries which are directly and
ultimately owned by a foreign parent company.9 Additionally, for an aﬃliate to be
9The Amadeus data contains information on a corporation’s direct and ultimate investment in other
ﬁrms. For a corporation to be identiﬁed as parent company, it has to hold at least 50 percent
in a respective aﬃliate directly and ultimately. Since the ownership information is missing for a
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included in the data set it has to be ultimately owned by an industrial corporation and
has to employ more than 50 employees.10
Otherwise, we include companies based on the availability of the essential information
needed for our analysis (wages, corporate tax rate at aﬃliate and parent location).
Additionally, aﬃliate observations could only be used in the regressions if the link to
the global ultimate owner as well as basic information on this parent corporation was
available with AMADEUS. Last, we had to restrict the sample to corporate groups
with unconsolidated accounting information.
The ownership information in our data refers to the last reported date which is the
year 2005 for most corporations in our data set. Thus, ownership has a cross sectional
dimension only. In line with previous work based on the same data, we are not too
concerned about this assumption. To the extend that we are potentially including a
few aﬃliates which were not aﬃliated in earlier years, we are introducing measurement
error that biases our results towards zero (Budd et al. (2005), Navaretti et al. (2003)).
Matching parent companies to foreign aﬃliates leaves an unbalanced panel with 1213
aﬃliates and 564 parent corporations over 10 years. Table 1 exhibits the country
distribution. The distribution looks broadly in line with basic patterns of FDI in
Europe. Most of the global ultimate owners are concentrated in western European
countries like France, Germany and Belgium. In contrast, many subsidiaries are located
in the European South (Spain and Italy) as well as in new EU member states like the
Czech Republic and Poland.11
substantial number of observations and the existing ownership information points out that less than
5% of aﬃliates are not directly owned by their global ultimate owner, we assume aﬃliates with
missing information on direct ownership to be directly owned by the global ultimate owner. We
exercised some sensitivity checks with respect to this assumption which proved to lead to similar
results as the ones presented in this section.
10Both assumptions are not qualitatively decisive for our results.
11The ﬁrm distribution shows an under-sampling of British global ultimate owners and the absence of
Finish ﬁrms. This is ascribed to a lack of reporting requirements for these corporations (see Budd
et al. (2005)).
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The data contains 7045 aﬃliate-year observations. Thus, the accounting information
is available for 5.5 years on average. Table 2 summarizes basic sample statistics. The
average wage rate at the aﬃliate level is measured to be 46, 899 US Dollar. The
wage rate is constructed dividing the corporate wage bill by the number of employees
which is standard in the literature on international proﬁt sharing (e.g. Budd et al.
(2005), Hildreth and Oswald (1997)).12 Since there is a considerable spread in the
wage variable, we hedge against results that are driven by outliers in the endogenous
wage component by excluding observations in the ﬁrst and 99th percentile of the wage
distribution.13
In line with the proﬁt sharing literature on multinational ﬁrms (see for example Budd
et al. (2005)), we include the value added per capita at the aﬃliate and parent location
as a measure for corporate proﬁts. The variable will serve as control in the empirical
analysis. However, since the information is missing for nearly half the observations,
the inclusion leads to a drastic reduction in sample size. The measure for value added
is substantially lower at the aﬃliate than at the parent-ﬁrm level which might partly
be explained by a signiﬁcantly higher capital-to-labor ratio at the parent level.
Moreover, the average corporate tax rate at the parent location is slightly higher than
the corporate tax rate at the aﬃliate location which is line with the common per-
ception that headquarters are mainly located in western European high-tax countries
while production also takes place through aﬃliates in Eastern and Southern European
countries with lower corporate tax rates.
3.3.3 Results
The results for the ﬁxed-eﬀects model are presented in Table 3. Speciﬁcation (1) is our
baseline estimation and regresses the log wage level on the statutory corporate tax rate
12Unfortunately, AMADEUS does provide a skill indicator for a corporation’s workforce.
13We thus only include corporations with an average wage rate above 5,700 US-Dollar and below
141,072 US-Dollar. However, our results are not sensitive to this data exclusion.
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at the subsidiary and parent location. In line with our theoretical analysis the data
points to a positive correlation between the statutory corporate tax and the domestic
wage level. Increasing the corporate tax rate by 10% thus enlargens workers’ wages by
2%. In contrast, the tax at the parent location exerts a signiﬁcantly negative impact
on the average wage rate. A 10% rise in corporate tax rates at the parent location
reduces wages bargained by 1%. The speciﬁcation includes aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects, year
and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and time-varying country characteristics like the GDP per
capita and a manufacturing earning’s index.
In speciﬁcation (2) we include an interaction term between the statutory corporate tax
rate and the number of employees. As described above, the tax sensitivity eﬀect should
be captured by the interaction since it positively depends on the number of employees
while the proﬁt eﬀect is independent of employment numbers. The result is in line
with our theoretical predictions since the interaction term carries a positive sign and is
statistically signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcient for the domestic corporate tax rate turns
negative. Hence, increases in the domestic corporate tax lower workers wages since
after-tax proﬁts decline. But higher corporate taxes also raise the value of deducting
wage costs from the tax base. The larger the number of employees the larger the gains
from raising these wages.
Speciﬁcation (3) additionally controls for the value added per worker at the aﬃliate and
parent location. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of both variables
on workers’ wages which is in line with the results presented by Budd et al. (2005)
on rent sharing in international ﬁrms. Moreover, the capital-labor ratio at the aﬃliate
level is found to increase the wage rate. Since a higher capital stock per worker should
raise labor productivity, the eﬀect carries the expected sign.
Concluding, we provide qualitative evidence for corporate tax eﬀects on workers’ wages
that is broadly in line with our theoretical model. Thus, the corporate tax rate at
foreign parent companies has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on workers wages, while
we ﬁnd evidence for a negative proﬁt level eﬀect and a positive proﬁt sensitivity eﬀect
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of the domestic corporate tax rate.14
3.4 Extensions
In the extension, we investigate within our theoretical framework how wage bargain-
ing between MNEs and subnational labor unions is aﬀected by a switch from SA to
FA. Although SA principles apply for the taxation of MNEs at the international level,
several subnational corporate tax systems follow formula apportionment principles.
Moreover, the EU Commission proposed to switch from SA to FA within EU borders,
and, hence, the topic is at the policy agenda. Under FA the MNE’s proﬁts are con-
solidated and apportioned to the aﬃliates according to a formula based on relative
payroll cost, relative capital investment and/or relative sales. For simplicity, we con-
centrate on apportionment according to the relative payroll share. The MNE’s tax
burden in country i ∈ {a, b} calculates Ti = tiβi [ΠTa + ΠTb], with βi being the fraction
of the consolidated tax base apportioned to country i, which is assumed to comprise
the MNE’s relative payroll share βi = wiLi/(waLa + wbLb).
As is commonly known, the MNE has no incentive to shift proﬁts under a FA system;
therefore the corporation sets the transfer price equal to the true price (pi = 1) for
i ∈ {a, b}. The MNE’s labor demand in country i is determined by the following ﬁrst
14Note, that these results contradict a recent paper by Devereux et al. (2007) who ﬁnd that increases
in the corporate tax rate lower domestic wages. The diﬀering ﬁndings are most likely attributable
to diﬀerences in the study design. Devereux et al. (2007) employ data on national ﬁrms mostly
and observe relatively few observations from Scandinavian and Continental European countries
which are characterized by high union bargaining power, while our theoretical model applies to
MNEs in unionized labor markets only. The theoretical results do not apply to national ﬁrms.
Moreover, Devereux et al. (2007) include the eﬀective corporate tax rate as explanatory variable
in their estimations, while our theory predicts eﬀects of the statutory corporate tax rate on wages
bargained.
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order condition
F ′(Li) = wi +
(ti − tj)
(1− t)
βjwi∑
i wiLi
[ΠTa + ΠTb] (3.23)
with t being deﬁned as the MNE’s average tax rate t = taβa + tbβb and i, j ∈ {a, b} and
i = j. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (3.23) reﬂects the MNE’s labor
demand Li to decline in the workers’ wage rate wi. The second term represents the FA
eﬀect stating that the MNE’s labor demand is biased towards the low-tax country. The
intuition can be described as follows: under FA the consolidated corporate tax base
is apportioned according to the aﬃliates’ relative payroll shares, thus the MNE has
an incentive to employ an over-proportional number of workers at the low-tax location
since this increases its relative payroll share and the proﬁt taxed in the low-tax country
and reduces the overall corporate tax burden.
At the second stage the MNE and local labor unions bargain over workers’ wages.
Analogously to our analysis under SA, the bargaining parties maximize the objective
function given by equation (3.6) with respect to the wage rate wi. We exercise a
comparative static analysis to determine the corporate tax eﬀect on bargained wages
in equilibrium. Since we will focus on a symmetric equilibrium at the ﬁrst stage of the
tax competition game, we will derive the marginal tax eﬀects on workers’ wages for
symmetric tax rates.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose the tax competition game at the ﬁrst stage attains an equi-
librium with ta = tb = tˆ. Then, under FA the local corporate tax rate is likely to exert
a negative (positive) eﬀect on local (foreign) workers’ remuneration.
Proof: Appendix A
In the following, we will explain why the corporation tax is likely to exert a negative
eﬀect on domestic wages while the eﬀect on foreign workers’ wages is likely to be
positive.
The corporate tax eﬀect on domestic wages constitutes from three sub-eﬀects: First, a
rise in the local tax tends to decrease local labor demand since the MNE has an incentive
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to shift employment to the foreign aﬃliate. This tends to reduce the bargained wage
level of domestic workers. Second, increasing the corporate tax rate raises the MNE’s
tax burden and leads to a decline in the MNE’s after-tax proﬁt which also tends to lower
bargained wages. Third, increasing the domestic corporate tax exerts an ambiguous
eﬀect on the proﬁt sensitivity with respect to domestic wages. On the one hand, payroll
cost are deductible from the tax base and hence, raising the corporate tax rate reduces
the MNE’s proﬁt sensitivity with respect to the domestic wage level in absolute terms.
On the other hand, increasing the local corporate tax rate raises the proﬁt sensitivity
in absolute terms since higher wages induce an enlarged amount of the consolidated
tax base to be apportioned to the home country and then to be taxed at the increased
local corporate tax rate. Since we are not able to determine the sign of the relevant
eﬀect analytically, we simulate the model for a Cobb Douglas production function of
the form F (L,G) = G1−αLα, with G being a ﬁxed production factor. We set G and
the outside wage w equal to 1 and simulate the model for diﬀerent parameter values of
α and δ. The result is presented in ﬁgure 1. The dotted area symbolizes combinations
of α and δ for which the impact of the corporate tax on domestic wages is negative.15
Thus, unless the union bargaining power and the labor share in corporate production
are very low, the corporate tax exerts a negative eﬀect on bargained wages. Note, that
at least for European countries union bargaining power is estimated to be well beyond
30% (Dumont et al. (2006)) and the labor share in production is not minor in most
industries. Thus, for the EU, our model predicts a negative impact of corporate taxes
on domestically bargained wages.
In contrast, increasing the domestic corporate tax rate is likely to raise foreign workers’
wages. Again, the eﬀect comprises three sub-eﬀects. First, a rise in the local corporate
tax rate increases foreign labor demand and therefore tends to increase the workers’
wage level bargained at the foreign location. Second, domestic corporate tax increases
impact on the wage bargaining process since they lower the MNE’s after-tax proﬁt and,
hence, tend to reduce bargained foreign wages. Third, domestic tax increases aﬀect the
15We exercised sensitivity checks with respect to the parameter values for G and w, and found Graphic
1 to be reasonably robust against variations in these parameters.
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proﬁt sensitivity to changes in the foreign wage rate. On the one hand, payroll cost are
deductible from the corporate tax base and therefore reduce the MNE’s consolidated
proﬁt. Domestic corporate tax increases raise the value of this deduction. Additionally,
increasing the local corporate tax rate makes foreign wage increases less costly since
higher foreign wages raise the foreign relative payroll share and the corporate proﬁt that
is taxed at the constant tax abroad. Both eﬀects tend in the direction of higher foreign
wages. Again we simulate the eﬀect making use of the above described assumptions.
The conditions for foreign wages to increase in the domestic corporate tax rate turn
out to be equally captured by ﬁgure 1. For α− δ-combinations in the dotted area the
eﬀect is positive, which is a plausible assumption with regard to European countries.
At the ﬁrst stage, we consider a tax competition game under FA. The social welfare
function is deﬁned
SWi = ρtiβˆi
[
ΠˆTa + ΠˆTb
]
+ (wˆi − w)Lˆi + wN i ∈ {a, b} (3.24)
whereas the hat symbol indicates the optimal values chosen at the second and third
stage of the game. Analogously to SA, social welfare is assumed to comprise corporate
tax revenues and residents’ wage income. The corporate tax base under FA is deter-
mined by the relative payroll share βi, which represents the fraction of the consolidated
proﬁts apportioned to country i. Since both countries maximize their social welfare, it
holds ∂SWi(ta, tb)/∂ti = 0. The countries are assumed to be identical, therefore it is
reasonable to focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game.
Let tˆ = ta = tb be the equilibrium tax rate. Equilibrium social welfare is given by
SWi(tˆ, tˆ) =: SW (tˆ). (3.25)
To investigate whether the countries choose ineﬃciently high or low tax rates in equi-
librium, we have to determine the impact of a coordinated increase in the common tax
rate tˆ on the tax revenue of the countries. Diﬀerentiating equation (3.25) yields
dSW (tˆ)
dtˆ
=
∂SWi(ta, tb)
∂ti
∣∣∣
ta=tb=tˆ
+
∂SWi(ta, tb)
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=tb=tˆ
i, j ∈ {a, b}, i = j (3.26)
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whereas ∂SWi/∂ti = 0. The cross eﬀect ∂SWi/∂tj reﬂects the ﬁscal externalities.
∂SWi
∂tj
= tiρ
{
βˆi
∑
k=a,b
[
∂ΠˆT
∂wˆk
∂wˆk
∂tj
+
∂ΠˆT
∂Lˆk
∂Lˆk
∂tj
]
+ ΠˆT
∂βˆi
∂tj
}
+ (1 + ˆ)Lˆi
∂wˆi
∂tj
+(wˆi − w)∂Lˆi
∂tj
i, j ∈ {a, b}, i = j (3.27)
with ΠˆT =
[
ΠˆTa + ΠˆTb
]
and ˆ = ∂Lˆi/∂wˆi · (wˆi − w)/Lˆi. Evaluating equation (3.27) at
the symmetric equilibium leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose the tax competition game under FA attains a symmetric
equilibrium ta = tb = tˆ and it holds that ∂wi/∂tj > 0; then countries set ineﬃciently
small corporate tax rates due to a positive FA externality and a positive wage income
externality.
Proof: Appendix B
Two ﬁscal externalities are derived under FA. First, if a country raises its corporate tax
rate it induces the MNE to shift labor demand to the foreign country thereby increasing
the relative payroll share of the foreign aﬃliate and the fraction of consolidated proﬁt
taxed at the foreign country. Moreover, the increase in the corporate tax rate tends
to lower the local bargained wage rate and simultaneously increases the wage level
bargained at the foreign aﬃliate. Therefore the wage adjustments further enlarges the
relative payroll share in the foreign country. This implies that a larger fraction of
the MNE’s consolidated proﬁt is apportioned to the foreign country which constitutes
a positive ﬁscal externality. Second, we observe a positive wage income externality.
Raising the corporate tax rate leads to an increase in the bargained wages of the
foreign aﬃliate and thereby raises foreign residents’ utility from wage income. The
wage income externality is additionally enforced, since a marginal rise in the domestic
corporate tax rate induces the MNE to employ an increased number of workers at the
foreign location. Since additional labor demand increases the aggregated foreign utility
from labor income, the wage income externality is fostered.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The theoretical analysis introduces union wage bargaining in a standard tax com-
petition framework with multinational corporations. Under SA we derive a positive
(negative) corporate tax eﬀect on the local (foreign) wage level. The main insight
emerging from a tax competition game is that endogenously determining wages in im-
perfectly competitive labor markets leads to a new ﬁscal externality under SA. Besides
the well-known proﬁt shifting externality we derive a wage income externality which
may lead to ineﬃciently large or small corporate tax rates. Moreover, we test the pre-
dicted eﬀects of corporate taxes on domestic and foreign workers’ wages with European
ﬁrm data and ﬁnd results in line with our theoretical predictions.
Under FA, corporate tax eﬀects on workers’ wages are fundamentally altered. Here, tax
increases are likely to lower (enlarge) workers’ remuneration bargained at the domestic
(foreign) aﬃliate. A tax competition game establishes two ﬁscal externalities. The well-
known FA externality is augmented by a wage income externality. Both externalities
are positive and motivate a race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates.
Our model’s policy implications include that a switch from an international SA system
to FA might imply fundamental changes in the rent sharing of multinational corpo-
rations. While under the current SA system, countries with relatively high corporate
tax rates receive higher rents, the picture turns under FA. In the literature on tax
competition, FA is often seen as a means to reduce international tax competition and
dampen the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates caused by a positive proﬁt shift-
ing externality. Our model suggests the opposite to be true. We derive a wage income
externality which might lead to a race-to-the top under SA but is unambiguously pos-
itive under FA implying that under this system tax competition is fueled.
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3.6 Appendix
Appendix A
A comparative static analysis derives the marginal tax eﬀects on domestic and foreign
wages which are determined by
∂wi
∂ti
=
−∂Φi/∂ti · ∂Φj/∂wj + ∂Φj/∂ti · ∂Φi/∂wj
∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj − ∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi (3.28)
∂wi
∂tj
=
−∂Φi/∂tj · ∂Φj/∂wj + ∂Φj/∂tj · ∂Φi/∂wj
∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj − ∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi (3.29)
i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. For the objective function to be concave, it holds that
∂Φi/∂wi = ∂Φj/∂wj < 0. Additionally, it can be shown that ∂Φi/∂wj = ∂Φj/∂wi =
−(1− δ)/Π2 · ∂Π/∂wi · ∂Π/∂wj < 0, as ∂Li/∂wi∂wj = ∂Li/∂wj = ∂Π/∂wi∂wj = 0
and ∂Π/∂wi < 0. Since our analysis focuses on stable equilibriums, the determinant
of the equation system (3.8) and (3.9) is assumed to be positive, ∂Φi/∂wi · ∂Φj/∂wj −
∂Φi/∂wj · ∂Φj/∂wi > 0. Thus, the signs of equations (3.28) and (3.29) are determined
by ∂Φi/∂ti and ∂Φi/∂tj .
∂Φi
∂ti
=
δ
Li
∂2Li
∂wi∂ti
− δ
L2
∂Li
∂wi
∂Li
∂ti
+
(1− δ)
Π
∂2Π
∂wi∂ti
− 1− δ
Π2
∂Π
∂wi
∂Π
∂ti
(3.30)
∂Φi
∂tj
=
δ
Li
∂2Li
∂wi∂tj
− δ
L2
∂Li
∂wi
∂Li
∂tj
+
(1− δ)
Π
∂2Π
∂wi∂tj
− 1− δ
Π2
∂Π
∂wi
∂Π
∂tj
(3.31)
Diﬀerentiating equation (3.23) and applying the symmetry assumption yields the fol-
lowing second order conditions with respect to the MNE’s optimal labor demand
∂Li
∂wi
=
1
F ′′(Lˆ)
< 0, (3.32)
∂Li
∂wj
=
∂Li
∂wj∂tj
= 0 (3.33)
∂2Li
∂wi∂ti
= − ∂
2Li
∂wi∂tj
= − [F
′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 2ΠˆT ]
4(1− tˆ)F ′′(Lˆ)2Lˆ2 (3.34)
∂Li
∂ti
= −∂Li
∂tj
=
ΠˆT
2(1− tˆ)F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ < 0 (3.35)
for i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j. While we unambiguously show that the partial derivatives
of equation (3.33) are zero and equation (3.35) takes on negative values, the sign
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of equation (3.34) is ambiguous and depends on the sign of F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 2ΠˆT . For a
Cobb Douglas function of the form F (Li) = L
α
i G
1−α
i α ∈ [0, 1], with G being a ﬁxed
production factor, we show that F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 2ΠˆT > 0 holds. The MNE’s labor demand
is determined by (3.23), therefore it follows Lˆ =
(
αGˆ1−α/wˆ
) 1
1−α
. Under symmetry
(ta = tb = tˆ) it holds that La = Lb = Lˆ, wa = wb = wˆ, ΠTa = ΠTb = ΠˆT . Thus we can
modify the term F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 2ΠˆT = α(α− 1)LˆαGˆ1−α + 2
[
LˆαGˆ1−α − wˆLˆ
]
= 2− α > 0.
To determine the sign of equations (3.30) and (3.31), we additionally diﬀerentiate the
MNE’s after-tax proﬁt with respect to the wage level and the corporate tax rate
∂Π
∂wi
= −(1− tˆ)Lˆ < 0, ∂Π
∂ti
=
∂Π
∂tj
= −ΠˆT < 0 (3.36)
∂2Π
∂wi∂ti
=
1
2
[
Lˆ− ΠˆT
wˆ
− ΠˆT
F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ
]
,
∂2Π
∂wi∂tj
=
1
2
[
Lˆ +
ΠˆT
wˆ
+
ΠˆT
F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ
]
(3.37)
Plugging in these second order eﬀects in equation (3.30) and (3.31) gives
∂Φi
∂ti
=
δ
Li
∂2Li
∂wi∂tj
− δ
L2
∂Li
∂wi
∂Li
∂tj
+
(1− δ)
Π(wi)
∂2Π
∂wi∂tj
− 1− δ
Π2
∂Π
∂wi
∂Π
∂tj
=
=
[F ′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 4δΠˆT ]
4(1− tˆ)F ′′(Lˆ)2Lˆ3 +
1− δ
4(1− tˆ)wˆ (3.38)
∂Φi
∂tj
=
δ
Li
∂Li
∂wi∂ti
− δ
L2
∂Li
∂wi
∂Li
∂ti
+
(1− δ)
Π(wi)
∂Π
∂wi∂ti
− 1− δ
Π2
∂Π
∂wi
∂Π
∂ti
=
= − [F
′′(Lˆ)Lˆ2 + 4δΠˆT ]
4(1− tˆ)F ′′(Lˆ)2Lˆ3 −
1− δ
4(1− tˆ)wˆ (3.39)
Appendix B
The ﬁscal externality of corporate taxation in jurisdiction j on the social welfare in
jurisdiction i, with i, j ∈ {a, b} and i = j, reads
∂SWi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=ta=tˆ
= ρtˆ · 2ΠˆT ∂βˆi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=ta=tˆ
+ (1 + ˆ)Lˆ
∂wˆi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=ta=tˆ
+ (wˆ − w)∂Lˆi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=ta=tˆ
(3.40)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium the FA externality can be written
∂βˆi
∂tj
∣∣∣
ta=ta=tˆ
=
[
∂βˆi
∂wˆi
+
∂βˆi
∂Lˆi
∂Lˆi
∂wˆi
]
∂wˆi
∂tj
+
[
∂βˆi
∂wˆj
+
∂βˆi
∂Lˆj
∂Lˆj
∂wˆj
]
∂wˆj
∂tj
=
1
4wˆ
[
1 +
∂Lˆi
∂wˆi
wˆ
Lˆ
]
∂wˆi
∂tj
− 1
4wˆ
[
1 +
∂Lˆj
∂wˆj
wˆ
Lˆ
]
∂wˆj
∂tj
> 0 (3.41)
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As for standard convex labor demand functions the elasticity of labor demand with
respect to the wage rate is smaller than 1 in absolute terms, it follows that equation
(3.41) is unambiguously positive. Note that under the symmetry assumption cross
eﬀects of the foreign wage rate on the local labor demand are zero. The change in the
local corporate tax rate does not exhibit any eﬀect on the MNE’s total payroll cost
since under symmetry ∂wj/∂ti = −∂wi/∂ti. Additionally employing equation (3.23)
for the symmetry case delivers F ′(Li) = wi and we prove
∑
k
[
∂ [ΠTa + ΠTb]
∂wˆk
∂wˆk
∂tj
+
∂ [ΠTa + ΠTb]
∂Lˆk
∂Lˆk
∂tj
]
= 0, j, k ∈ {a, b} (3.42)
According to equation (3.35) and our result in proposition 3 we can show that the wage
income externality is unambiguously positive
(1 + ˆ)Li
∂wˆi
∂tj
+ (wˆ − w)∂Lˆi
∂tj
> 0 (3.43)
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Note: Throughout ∗ will indicate signiﬁcance on the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance on the
5% level and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcance on the 1% level.
Table 1: Country Statistic
Aﬃliate Parent
Austria 33 12
Germany 70 96
Belgium 61 80
Czech Republic 53 1
Denmark 57 43
Estonia 30 0
Spain 161 45
France 222 105
United Kingdom 254 2
Hungary 8 0
Ireland 4 4
Italy 85 61
Luxembourg 5 9
Netherlands 51 14
Poland 80 2
Portugal 15 8
Sweden 46 79
Slovakia 14 0
Sum 1213 564
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Table 3: Fixed Eﬀect Regression, End. Variable: Log Wage Rate
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log Statutory Tax Rate Aﬃliate 0.1980∗∗∗ −1.0002∗∗∗ −1.0003∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0638) (0.1572)
Log Statutory Tax Rate Parent −0.0998∗∗ −0.1456∗∗∗ −0.2371∗∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0432) (0.1064)
Log Statutory Tax Rate Aﬃliate * Log Employment 0.2092∗∗∗ 0.1986∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0237)
Log GDP per Capita Aﬃliate 0.1975 0.1567 −0.0231
(0.1256) (0.1189) (0.2883)
Log GDP per Capita Parent 0.4780∗∗∗ 0.5394∗∗∗ 0.1100
(0.1600) (0.1514) (0.4246)
Log Earnings Aﬃliate 0.8879∗∗∗ 0.9665∗∗∗ 0.8750∗∗∗
(0.0788) (0.0746) (0.2255)
Log Earnings Parent 0.4567∗∗∗ 0.6063∗∗∗ 0.5755
(0.1857) (0.1758) (0.5011)
Value Added per Capita Aﬃliate /1000 0.2144∗∗∗
(0.0484)
Value Added per Capita Parent/1000 0.0222∗∗∗
(0.0062)
Capital Intensity Aﬃliate 0.0869∗∗∗
(0.0123)
Capital Intensity Parent −0.0075
(0.0125)
Year, Year-Industry
√ √ √
Number of Observations 6821 6821 1338
Number of Groups 1166 1166 343
R-squared within 0.5110 0.5625 0.6386
R-squared between 0.0862 0.0335 0.0656
R-squared overall 0.1612 0.0885 0.1052
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Impact of domestic corporate tax on wages
On the horizontal axis we depict all values of α, the vertical axis measures δ.
The shaded area depicts those combinations of α and δ for which an increase in the
domestic corporate tax rate has a negative eﬀect on domestic wages, but a positive
eﬀect on foreign wages.
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Chapter 4
Employment Distortions under
Formula Apportionment: Evidence
from the Population of German
Firms
Employment Distortions under Formula Apportionment 98
4.1 Introduction
Reform options for corporate taxation of multi-jurisdictional ﬁrms have been on policy
makers’ agenda for some time. Over the last decade, economic integration has fostered
the number and importance of multinational entities (MNEs) and hence the topic
ﬁnds increasing public and political attention. Traditionally, corporate taxation of
multinationally operating ﬁrms follows separate accounting (SA) principles, that is,
proﬁts are taxed in the country where they accrue. However, under this current system
MNEs are well known to shift proﬁt from high-tax locations to tax havens to achieve a
reduction in their overall tax burden. Since countries compete for the shifty tax base,
this gives rise to ineﬃciencies in the international tax scheme.
In 2001, the European Commission therefore proposed to abolish the existing SA sys-
tem within the borders of the European Union and to introduce an alternative taxation
system called formula apportionment (FA). The idea behind FA is that the corporate
tax base of a MNE is consolidated at the group level and is afterwards apportioned to
the aﬃliates on basis of a formula that shall measure the relative corporate activity.
The main advantage of FA is that proﬁt consolidation at the group level abolishes the
incentives to engage in proﬁt shifting activities. However, it is well known that the
system may introduce new distortions, mainly investment distortions induced by the
inclusion of input factors in the apportionment formula. Although FA has not been
implemented at the international level yet, sub-national corporate taxation in the US,
Canada and Germany has followed FA principles for decades.
While the proﬁt shifting externality under SA is well-reported (see Devereux (2006)),
empirical evidence on distortions under FA is thin. The small number of papers that
investigates the impact of policy choices on real investment under FA (e.g. Weiner
(1994), Klassen and Shackelford (1998), Goolsbee and Maydew (2000)) is moreover
strongly inspired by the FA system implemented in the US, where states happen to
choose both, the corporate tax rate and the apportionment formula, autonomously.
Thus, the literature mainly centers around the question if US states may improve
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their economic development by reducing the corporate tax rate or rather by changing
the factor weights in their apportionment formula. Evidence in this ﬁeld is far from
being conclusive. While some authors derive signiﬁcant eﬀects of tax rate changes on
investment and employment levels (e.g. Lightner (1999)), others are not able to ﬁnd a
stable relation and claim the apportionment formula to be the decisive policy means
under FA (e.g. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000)).
The focus of the cited studies may, however, be inappropriate to provide policy rec-
ommendations with respect to the European Commission’s proposal. Following the
legislation of existing FA unions apart from the US, the European Commission plans
to delegate the decision on the apportionment formula to a central layer while the single
member countries may autonomously choose their corporate tax rates only (European
Commission (2002)). Thus, it is seems most relevant to quantify distortions caused
by an autonomous corporate tax rate choice under FA. Since the assessment criterion
for multinational corporate taxation schemes is usually seen in the size of policy ex-
ternalities exerted on foreign jurisdictions (see e.g. Nielsen et al. (2001)), this calls
for empirical work to quantify corporate tax eﬀects on foreign jurisdictions’ investment
and pre-tax proﬁts in a FA system.
The present paper tries to ﬁll this gap. We obtain data on the population of German
ﬁrms that are liable to the German local business tax. The tax is raised at the munici-
pality level and prescribes ﬁrms that operate aﬃliates in more than one community to
consolidate their pre-tax proﬁt at the national level and to apportion it according to
the relative payroll share. Since our dataset allows us to identify all aﬃliates within a
corporate group that are consolidated under FA regulations, we can, in contrast to pre-
vious studies, not only test the impact of the local corporate tax rate on the aﬃliate’s
investment and employment level, but may also determine the impact of corporate
taxes at other group aﬃliates on the input choice. The latter eﬀect represents the ﬁs-
cal externality under FA and captures the ineﬃciencies introduced by this tax scheme.
Precisely, since theoretical models show that the investment decision under FA depends
on the tax rate diﬀerential between a jurisdiction and foreign group locations, we will
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investigate the investment dependency on a tax diﬀerence measure.
Since apportionment under the German local business tax system takes place according
to the relative payroll share, we expect the (major) distortions to fall on the payroll
choice of the multi-regional ﬁrm. We employ a simple theoretical model to receive
guidance for the speciﬁcation of the estimation equation and eventually regress the
aﬃliate payroll to capital ratio on the tax rate diﬀerential between the subsidiary tax
and the average tax rate of other group entities. Intuitively, a rise in the corporate
tax rate diﬀerential should decrease the aﬃliate’s payroll to capital ratio since the
multi-regional ﬁrm has an incentive to shift payroll expenditure to aﬃliates with a
low corporate tax rate. Our results conﬁrm this presumption as we ﬁnd a stable and
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of the tax rate diﬀerence on the payroll to capital ratio.
Thus, our paper is the ﬁrst one to provide rigorous evidence on ﬁscal externalities
under FA. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to provide evidence
on corporate tax distortions under FA within the EU. Since the existing empirical
evidence is restricted to the US and Canada (e.g. Mintz and Smart (2004)), policy
recommendations with respect to the European Commission’s proposal should largely
gain from the investigation of FA systems within EU borders.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, we will give a short introduction
to the German local business tax, section 3 presents a simple theoretical model that
shall motivate our estimation speciﬁcation. In section 4, we present the estimation
methodology and provide information on the data base. The estimation results are
found in section 5, section 6 concludes.
4.2 German Local Business Taxation
The German federation currently comprises 12,544 municipalities. Each community
may autonomously choose the local corporate business tax, while the tax base deﬁnition
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is set at the national level. In our dataset, the average ﬁrm faces a local business
tax rate of 16.25%, whereas the rate varies between 0% and 45%.1 The considerable
cross-sectional and longitudinal variation is usually accredited to the fact that the
local business tax is the only major revenue instrument at communities’ discretion and
therefore is often adjusted to local budget needs.
Liable to the business tax are individual enterprises, non-incorporated and incorporated
ﬁrms. The former two groups beneﬁt from tax allowance of 24,500 Euros2 and reduced
taxes for the preceding pre-tax proﬁts up to 72,500 Euros.3 The allowances do not
apply to incorporated ﬁrms. Hence, non-incorporated businesses face a progressive tax
scheme, while incorporated groups are taxed according to a linear scheme.
The calculation of the German local business tax applies a rather special system that
shall be sketched shortly. Starting point for the tax base calculation is the (corporate)
income tax base for taxes paid at the national level. This measure is adjusted by
certain positions. For example, (50% of) interest payments on long-term debt are
added to the local business tax base while the tax base is shorted by a share of the
corporate property value. To calculate the corporate tax liability, the adjusted tax
base is multiplied by ﬁrst, a percentage value called ’Steuermesszahl’ (SMZ), which
takes on values between 1% and 5%, and second, by the municipality’s business tax
rate, which varies between 0 and 900 business tax points for our sample years. The
progressivity in the tax scheme for non-incorporated ﬁrms is thus reﬂected by the
SMZ values. While for incorporated groups a SMZ value of 5% applies throughout,
non-incorporated groups observe lower SMZ-values for income under the threshold of
72,500 Euros. Note, that the maximum business tax points can be recalculated in a
’standard’ percentage tax value by multiplying the tax points by the maximum SMZ
value of 5%; for example 325 tax points correspond to a (maximum) tax rate of 16.25%.
1Note, in 2002 a minimum local business tax of 1% was introduced. However, since our data set
comprises earlier years this does not aﬀect our analysis.
2Until January 1, 2002: 48,000 Deutsche Mark (DM)
3Until January 1, 2002: 144,000 DM
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If a corporation operates aﬃliates in more than one community, a FA system applies.
Thus, income of the multi-regional ﬁrm is consolidated at the national level and is
apportioned to the single entities according to the relative payroll share. In seldom
cases, apportionment takes place according to diﬀerent factors if the payroll share does
not reﬂect the actual business activity of a corporate group in a proper way.
In the following section, we will present the theoretical model that builds the basis of
our empirical estimation strategy and will derive the main hypotheses.
4.3 Theory
We consider a standard model of corporate taxation under FA (similar models can be
found in Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Nielsen et al. (2002) among others). The model
comprises two symmetric countries a and b which host one aﬃliate of a representative
MNE. The MNE produces a homogeneous good using labor Li and capital Ki as input
factors, with i ∈ {a, b}. We assume perfect competition on the product market whereas
the price of the good is normalized to 1. A ﬁxed production factor gives rise to positive
proﬁt which is taxed at rate ti with i ∈ {a, b}. Workers receive a wage rate wi which
is ﬁxed from the MNE’s perspective and which we normalize to 1 for all jurisdictions.4
The capital costs are denoted by the interest rate r and are assumed to be partially
deductible from the corporate tax base, whereas the deduction parameter is given by
γ and is assumed to be equal across jurisdictions.5 The MNE’s proﬁt function reads
Π =
∑
i
[(
1− t) (F (Ki, Li)− Li − γrKi)− (1− γ)rKi] , i ∈ {a, b} (4.1)
4This reﬂects the notion of a common labor market for all jurisdictions, that is, workers are mobile
across borders which is well justiﬁed with respect to German municipalities. Moreover, a single ﬁrm
is assumed not to be able to alter equilibrium wages by changing its individual labor demand.
5Note, that this corresponds to the German legislation since the deductibility of capital costs from the
corporate tax base is chosen centrally at the national level while each jurisdiction may autonomously
decide on the corporate tax rate parameter.
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whereas t describes the MNE’s average corporate tax
t = ta
La
La + Lb
+ tb
Lb
La + Lb
(4.2)
Thus, corporate proﬁt comprises output minus factor costs and is taxed according to a
weighted average of the corporate tax rates in jurisdictions a and b in which the MNE
observes business activity. This applies since under FA every unit of income earned in
the corporate group is consolidated at the national level and is then apportioned to the
single jurisdictions according to relative payroll share and taxed at the local statutory
corporate tax rates. The MNE maximizes (4.1) by choosing its optimal labor demand
Li and the optimal capital stock Ki. This leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions
∂F (Li, Ki)
∂Li
= 1 +
(ti − tj)
(1− t)
Lj
(La + Lb)2
(ΠPa + ΠPb) , i, j ∈ {a, b} , i = j (4.3)
∂F (Li, Ki)
∂Ki
=
(1− tγ)r
1− t (4.4)
whereas ΠPi = (F (Ki, Li)− Li − γrKi), for i ∈ {a, b}, represents the MNE’s tax base
in jurisdiction i. According to equation (4.3) the MNE’s labor demand is distorted by
corporate proﬁt taxes. If ti > tj, the MNE has an incentive to reduce its labor demand
in country i since it thus lowers the share of consolidated proﬁt which is apportioned to i
and taxed at the high corporate tax rate. If ti < tj the MNE has an incentive to distort
labor demand in favor of country i since this increases the fraction of the consolidated
tax base that is taxed in country i at the relatively low tax rate ti.
6 Optimal capital
demand which is given by equation (4.4) is equally distorted by corporate taxation
since capital costs are assumed to be only partially deductible from the corporate tax
base. In case of full deductibility (γ = 1), the corporate tax becomes a pure proﬁt tax
and capital demand is undistorted by corporate taxation.
Thus, the corporate tax rate of the foreign location tj inﬂuences local input factor
choice through two channels. Assuming that ti > tj an increase in tj will reduce the
6Note that we could easily introduce a complementarity eﬀect between input factors at the two
locations in the spirit of Nielsen et al. (2001) and Becker and Riedel (2007). However, it can be
shown that under FA the complementarity eﬀect of corporate taxes abroad on home country input
demand is always dominated by the formula eﬀect described in this paragraph.
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tax rate diﬀerential ti− tj and will thus tend to increase labor demand in jurisdiction i
according to equation (4.3). Second, if the foreign location tj increases its corporate tax
rate, this raises the average corporate tax for all aﬃliates in the multi-regional group
and therefore lowers investment at all subsidiary locations. These two mechanisms
constitute the basic ﬁscal externalities under FA, since they reﬂect an eﬀect of foreign
tax policy on local investment and the corporate tax base (which is not present in
the benchmark case of tax coordination). While the former eﬀect is usually referred
to as formula externality, the latter is known as investment externality (Nielsen et al.
(2001), Soerensen (2004)). Our analysis will mainly focus on the formula externality.
To obtain guidance for the speciﬁcation of the estimation equation, let us assume a
Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form
F (Li, Ki) = L
α
i K
β
i G
1−α−β
i , (4.5)
where Gi represents a ﬁxed production factor. Dividing equation (4.3) by equation
(4.4) and accounting for the Cobb Douglas technology one obtains
Li
Ki
=
α
β
· (1− tγ)r
(1− t) + (ti − tj) Lj(La+Lb)2 (ΠPa + ΠPb)
(4.6)
This expression is a modiﬁed version of the well-known relation between labor and
capital demand and the relative factor price in the Cobb Douglas case. Taking the log
of equation (4.6), we arrive at
log
Li
Ki
= logα− log β + log (1− tγ)r
(1− t) − log (1 + κ(ti − tj)) (4.7)
≈ logα− log β + log (1− tγ)r
(1− t) − κ(ti − tj) (4.8)
with
κ =
1
(1− t)
Lj
(La + Lb)2
(ΠPa + ΠPb) (4.9)
Thus, equation (4.8) suggests to regress the labor to capital ratio on the tax rate
diﬀerence between a considered aﬃliate and other subsidiaries belonging to the same
corporate group as well as on a measure for the average corporate tax rate of the multi-
regional ﬁrm. As mentioned above, labor demand is distorted downwards by increases
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in the tax rate diﬀerential between the home and foreign jurisdiction. As we assumed
labor and capital to be complements (by the Cobb Douglas speciﬁcation), the reduced
labor demand at the home jurisdiction will translate in a reduced capital demand.
However, the eﬀect on capital is smaller than the initial labor adjustment. Thus, the
labor to capital ratio will drop.
Moreover, taxes are predicted to aﬀect the labor to capital ratio through the term
(1− tγ)r/(1− t). Increases in the local tax rates ta and tb raise the multi-regional
ﬁrm’s average tax and thereby raise (1− tγ)r/(1− t). Thus, raising the tax rate at
either group location, will tend to increase the labor to capital ratio. The result
is driven by the partial deductibility of capital costs from the corporate tax base.
Partial deductibility implies that increases in the corporate tax rate distort the multi-
regional’s capital demand downwards which tends to increase the labor to capital ratio.
Since under FA, proﬁt is eﬀectively taxed at an average tax rate, this mechanism
holds for increases in either of the group’s aﬃliate taxes. Note, that if we assumed
full deductibility of the capital costs from the corporate tax base (γ = 1), it holds
that (1− tγ)r/(1− t) = r. Hence, in this case the term will reﬂect corporate capital
costs only. The relative importance of labor and capital in the production process is
represented by the parameters α and β and may well vary across industries. We will
therefore account for industry eﬀects in our estimation strategy.
The well-known problem with the equation derived above is that the size of the formula
distortion may depend on the endogenous variables Li and Ki. It is hence not possible
to derive a closed-form solution for labor demand in location i. Theoretical papers in
the FA literature therefore assume symmetric tax competition equilibria throughout to
avoid this complication. The analysis then centers around the investigation of marginal
deviations of the corporate tax rate diﬀerence from the symmetric equilibrium. Ad-
justments of κ driven by changes in the endogenous variable thus play no role in the
analysis anymore. In the empirical model that follows we will also neglect the indirect
impact of the tax rate diﬀerential on the κ term. Although this might be a rather
strong assumption with respect to our empirical analysis, it nevertheless enables us
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to receive some guidance on the model speciﬁcation. Since the average tax diﬀerence
between the locations is small (as will be shown in the sample statistics presented in
Table 1), we are conﬁdent that our speciﬁcation is not invalid.
It shall moreover be pointed out that equation (4.8) employs labor demand over cap-
ital investment as dependent variable. Our data set does not comprise information
on employment but includes the aﬃliate’s payroll costs only. Hence, the dependent
variable used in the analysis will be payroll over capital investment. If we were willing
to assume that wages are ﬁxed, the implications derived in the analysis above will not
be altered by this modiﬁcation in the dependent variable. This may however not be
true. Riedel (2006), for example, shows in a union bargaining model that under FA
wages in the home country are likely to fall in the national corporate tax rate, while
foreign wages are likely to increase. These wage eﬀects point in the same directions as
the formula externality, and are thus likely to amplify the estimation for the formula
eﬀect.7 This does not have to be true, however, with respect to the capital investment
eﬀects. Precisely, it can be shown that increases in the home jurisdiction’s corporate
tax rate lower capital investment, but simultaneously lower wages bargained, that is
the overall eﬀect on the payroll capital ratio is ambiguous. In turn, increases in foreign
aﬃliates’ corporate tax rates also lower the aﬃliate’s capital investment, but tend to
increase the wage level bargained, henceforth the payroll to capital ratio is predicted
to increase.
7Precisely, the formula eﬀect states that increases in the tax rate diﬀerential between the aﬃliate and
foreign group locations will reduce the aﬃliate’s labor demand and henceforth the payroll to capital
ratio. The wage eﬀects prescribe that increases in the home jurisdiction’s tax as well as decreases
in foreign jurisdictions’ taxes (that correspond to an increase in the tax rate diﬀerential between
the home jurisdiction and foreign group locations) will reduce the wage level bargained in the home
jurisdiction. Thus, the two eﬀects point in the same direction.
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4.4 Estimation Methodology
Following the discussion in the previous chapter, we estimate a model of the following
form
log wi,t = β0 + β1(ti,t − ti,t) + β2tˆi,t + β3xi,t + β4xi,t + φi + i,t (4.10)
whereas wi,t denotes the ratio of payroll cost to capital employed by multi-regional
plant i at time t. Since the distribution of payroll expenses is substantially skewed
to the right, we employ the log of payroll cost as endogeneous variable. The central
explanatory variable of the analysis comprises the diﬀerence between the corporate
tax rate at the considered jurisdiction i and the tax rate at foreign aﬃliates ti,t − ti,t.
Moreover, we include a tax measure tˆi,t that shall capture the group’s average corporate
tax. Since our data comprises two time periods, the estimation approach controls
for aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects that capture unobserved time-constant plant-characteristics
like the industry speciﬁc capital labor ratio. Moreover, we control for time-varying
locational and industry characteristics at the home and foreign location xi,t and xi,t.
The time-varying locational characteristics thereby comprise the local unemployment
rate, the number of inhabitants and the number of employees.
One major advantage of our study compared to previous work lies in the possibility to
connect aﬃliates of the same corporate group. This enables us to determine the impact
of the corporate tax rate at foreign locations on the payroll to capital ratio as suggested
by the theoretical model. However, the inclusion of information on subsidiaries in other
jurisdictions also raises the need to ﬁnd a proper weighting scheme for cases in which a
corporate group consists of more than two entities. Theoretically, the average corporate
tax rate reﬂects the tax burden on proﬁt at foreign subsidiaries. Since the actual tax
payment depends on the apportionment shares after consolidation and hence on the
relative distribution of the payroll shares, the calculation of the average corporate tax
rate at foreign aﬃliates should employ relative payroll weights. However, this may
give rise to endogeneity problems since tax rate changes induce an adjustment of the
payroll share that is employed as a weighting scheme.
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Nevertheless it shall be noted that the direction of the distortion is not clear. To
illustrate that, consider a corporate tax increase at one of the foreign aﬃliates. The
optimal payroll adjustment would imply to lower the relative payroll share at this
aﬃliate. Thus, the average tax increase is understated and the coeﬃcient estimate
for the eﬀect of the average corporate tax rate on the local payroll costs tends to
be too high. In contrast, if the corporate tax rate was lowered, the opposite picture
emerges. Decreases in the corporate tax imply that the relative payroll expenditures at
this aﬃliate are enlarged. This tends to overstate the reduction in the average foreign
aﬃliate tax and thus leads to an underestimation of the eﬀect of foreign corporate
taxes on the local payroll share. The distortions thus point in diﬀerent directions and
may even cancel out each other, whereas this clearly does not have to be the case.
We hedge against this endogeneity concern by two strategies. First, we will employ
an unweighted corporate tax measure. This will introduce measurement error to our
average corporate tax variable. However, as long as this measurement error is un-
systematic, it will just bias our results towards zero. If we can derive statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects, we might interpret them as a lower bound to the actual relation be-
tween the corporate taxes and the payroll to capital ratio. For the measurement error
introduced to be unsystematic the corporate tax rates at foreign aﬃliate locations have
to be uncorrelated with the aﬃliates’ size. One might have some concerns with respect
to this assumption, since larger communities tend to charge higher local business rates
and also host relatively large corporations. This could possibly introduce systematic
measurement error that may bias the estimations in both directions. We will there-
fore run speciﬁcations that rely on average tax measures which are calculated on the
basis of the lagged payroll shares in the previous period and moreover will experiment
with speciﬁcations in which we instrument for the average tax rate using the average
tax of the previous period. Note, that all speciﬁcations will also control for other
time-varying characteristics at foreign aﬃliate locations. For consistency reasons, the
calculation methods (unweighted, payroll weighted) for the control characteristics will
follow the calculation method for the tax rate variable.
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4.5 Data Set and Sample Statistics
We test our theoretical hypotheses using a unique dataset provided by the German
Federal Statistical Oﬃce. The data contains tax reports for the whole population of
German corporations that are subject to local business taxation. The data is gathered
directly from the German tax oﬃces and is available for the years 1998 and 2001.
German corporations are obliged to ﬁle a detailed tax return for the calculation of
their business tax liabilities every year. In each cross section, we observe 3 million
corporations with respect to their location, capital investment, payroll cost, industry,
multi-regional status (multi-regional vs. uni-regional ﬁrms), legal form (incorporated
vs. non-incorporated ﬁrms), and taxable proﬁt. Note, that the data set unfortunately
does not include the number of employees, but only the payroll costs variable. Hence,
we will estimate corporate tax eﬀects on the payroll to capital ratio.
Most of the variables contained in the business tax database were quality checked by
the tax oﬃces and the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce since individual tax payments
were calculated on basis of this data. The only exception is the information on the
corporate input factors, i.e. capital investment and payroll expenses. Therefore, we
ran plausibility checks on the data and excluded aﬃliates in the 1st and 99th percentile
of the payroll and capital investment distribution from our empirical analysis.8 Since
our theory analyzes corporate tax eﬀects on multi-jurisdictional ﬁrms, we restrict the
regressions to multi-regional groups that on average observed a positive proﬁt in the two
sample years. The latter restriction is justiﬁed since the distortions we are interested
in critically depend on positive multi-regional ﬁrm proﬁts.
The dataset contains 130, 672 multi-regional corporations with 3.1 aﬃliates on average.
While 42% of the aﬃliates in our data belong to a group that consists of two aﬃliates
only, there are some groups with a substantial number of corporate facilities, the largest
one comprising more than 1,000 entities. However, 95% of the corporate groups consist
8Note, however that this exclusion is not decisive for our qualitative and quantitative results.
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of less than 50 aﬃliates. Hence, we will restrict our focus to ﬁrms with less than 50
entities for computational reasons.9
Furthermore, we augment our data by municipality characteristics at the ﬁrm location.
Besides the corporate tax rate, we add the number of inhabitants, the number of em-
ployees and the local unemployment rate. The data for the community characteristics
is thereby also gathered from the Federal Statistical Oﬃces (mostly from the REGIO-
STAT data base). The average corporate tax rate for the multi-regional ﬁrms in our
data set is measured to be 325 local business tax points which translates in a percentage
tax rate of approximately 16.25%. The other community variables summarized in Ta-
ble 1 exhibit a pronounced heterogeneity across German municipalities. For example,
population size varies between 5 inhabitants in the community of Wiedenborstel (state
of Schleswig-Holstein) and 3.5 million inhabitants in the city of Berlin. Moreover, the
economic situation of the municipalities diﬀers and is proxied by the unemployment
rate in our empirical analysis. While some communities observe low unemployment
rates of around 1%, others are faced with more than 50% of the work force without
job.
Moreover, we add Gauss-Krueger coordinates to our data and could thereby calculate
the average distance between a group’s aﬃliates. We obtain as a side result that the
unweighted mean of the distance between the corporate subsidiaries amounts to 91.14
kilometer. If the distance between aﬃliates was weighted by the aﬃliates’ payroll or
capital shares the average distance reduces to 77.34 and 77.52 kilometers respectively.
Unsurprisingly, the average distance between the corporate aﬃliates increases in the
aﬃliate number. While corporate groups with two subsidiaries are located 65.23 kilo-
meters apart on average, the (unweighted) average distance between corporate groups
with ﬁve subsidiaries is 100.94 kilometers and the (unweighted) average distance for
9The main reason is that with larger ﬁrms it is time consuming to calculate an appropriate average
corporate tax rate for the foreign aﬃliates.
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groups with 10 to 50 subsidiaries is calculated to be 132.39 kilometers.10
Table 1 contains the basic sample statistics. The average corporate tax base of a
multi-regional ﬁrm is estimated to be 660, 270 DM (around 340, 000 Euros). Corporate
payroll expenses and capital invested amount to 54 million DM and 68 million DM
respectively. The payroll to capital ratio is calculated with an average of 2889 which
is excessivly large. However, a more detailed look at the data reveals that this mean
calculation is driven by substantial outliers since the median of the distribution is
1.82 and the 95th percentile of the distribution is calculated with 34.82. We will
therefore run sensitivity checks on our analysis excluding the upper percentiles from
the estimation which will turn out to have no eﬀect on our qualitative and quantitative
results. Note moreover, that 48% of the multi-regional aﬃliates in our data belong to
incorporated groups. Additionally, we obtain detailed information on the industry of a
corporate group which we cluster to industry groups basically according to the NACE
code and obtain 20 categories that broadly correspond to the NACE two-digit level.
Last, since our estimation strategy comprises a ﬁxed eﬀect approach that relies on the
panel structure of the employed data, we should comment on the fact that the panel
dimension in our dataset is rather small. Precisely, around 20% of the observations
are linkable between the years. This roots in the fact that the identiﬁcator variable in
the data is the multi-regional ﬁrm’s tax account number which happens to be identical
for all aﬃliates in a corporate group and is determined by the location of the corpo-
rate headquarter. This number may potentially change over time in the course of tax
oﬃce restructuring or in case of headquarter moves to diﬀerent municipalities (or in
large cities even by a move to another quarter). We thus presume that the availablity
of a panel dimension with a certain observation is randomly determined by tax oﬃce
restructurings and corporate location changes and does not follow any underlying sys-
10The ’average distances’ are calculated as the average distance of one aﬃliate to all other members
of a corporate group for which the FA regulation applies.
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temtatic.11 Moreover, we aggregate the data at the community level and hence treat
all entities in a community as one single aﬃliate.
The following section will provide the estimation results for the empirical strategy laid
out above.
4.6 Results
The basic estimation results can be found in Table 2.12 The endogenous variable is
the payroll to capital ratio. We focus on the formula externality ﬁrst and include the
tax rate diﬀerential between the corporate aﬃliate and other members of the corporate
group. The average tax rate at other members’ location is thereby calculated as an
unweighted average. Moreover we include a set of control variables comprising the
legal status of the corporation as well as a set of industry-year dummies, aﬃliate ﬁxed
eﬀects and time varying control characteristics at the subsidiary location that include
inhabitants, employment and the local unemployment rate. The control variables on
employment and inhabitants thereby enter in log-form, however, this is neither quali-
tatively nor quantitatively relevant for our results. Speciﬁcation (1) indicates that the
tax rate diﬀerential between the considered subsidiary and the rest of the corporate
group exerts a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the payroll to capital ratio. This is in
line with our theoretical presumptions since the theory predicts that an increase in the
corporate tax rate diﬀerence reduces labor demand at the aﬃliate which only partly
translates in reduced capital investment through a complementarity relation. The other
control variables broadly exhibit the expected signs. Non-incorporated ﬁrms tend to
have a signiﬁcantly higher payroll to capital ratio than incorporated ﬁrms (the latter
11Note, that we cannot determine the headquarter within a corporate group since the original tax
account number was removed due to conﬁdentiality requirements.
12Note that we report the calculation scheme for the average corporate tax rate of foreign aﬃliates at
the bottom of the estimation tables. ‘UW’ thereby denotes that the average corporate tax rate was
calculated as an unweighted measure. ‘PW’ denotes that we used payroll weights for the calculation.
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constitute the base category) which corresponds to the common notion that the pro-
duction process of non-incorporated ﬁrms is more labor-intensive than the production
process of incorporated ﬁrms.13 With respect to the location controls for the munici-
pality characteristics of the own as well as of other group members’ locations (‘OGM’
= Other Group Members), only employment at the home jurisdictions exerts a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant eﬀect. The positive coeﬃcient indicates that corporate labor intensity
is higher in communities with a large labor market. Speciﬁcation (2) additionally in-
cludes a full set of state-year dummies that shall capture shocks over time to one of the
16 German states. The results do not change by much, however, the impact of the tax
rate diﬀerential on the payroll to capital ratio slightly drops in size and signiﬁcance as
does the coeﬃcient estimate for the number of local employees.
As we pointed out in section 2, non-incorporated and individual enterprises are granted
tax allowances for pre-tax proﬁts below 72,500 Euros. The tax regulation for this group
of ﬁrms thus exhibits a convex scheme. In contrast, the tax scheme for incorporated
ﬁrms is linear. This implies an underestimation of the relation between the tax rate
diﬀerential and the payroll to capital ratio if we included non-incorporated ﬁrms in our
regressions. To avoid this problem, we rerun our estimations accounting for incorpo-
rated ﬁrms only. In line with our presumption, the estimated coeﬃcient for the tax
rate diﬀerence increases in absolute size, now suggesting a semi-elasticity of −0.0008.
Speciﬁcation (3) thereby controls for industry-year dummies only, while Speciﬁcation
(4) also accounts for state-year dummies. To get an idea for the quantitative size of
this estimate, we might consider a rise in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point
that corresponds to an increase in the local business tax by 20 points. This will induce
a decline of the payroll to capital ratio by 1.6%.
The estimation results so far were based on the calculation of an unweighted average
of the tax rate at foreign locations. As pointed out above, from a theoretical point of
13Note, that we observe some changes in the legal status of corporate groups that we can track over
the time period. This explains why the dummy variables on the legal status do not drop out despite
the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Employment Distortions under Formula Apportionment 114
view a more appropriate measure might be the calculation of a payroll weighted average
corporate tax rate. The results are presented in Table 3 and comprise estimates for
the group of incorporated ﬁrms. The estimation exhibits the same pattern as the
speciﬁcation based on the unweighted average tax although the coeﬃcients for the tax
rate diﬀerence eﬀect on the payroll to capital ratio are now slightly larger in absolute
terms and estimated to be −0.0010. One may interpret this result to be in line with
our presumption that the point estimate for the tax diﬀerence variable shall be lower
if the tax diﬀerence was calculated based on an unweighted average tax measure since
this introduces measurement error that biases the coeﬃcient estimate towards zero.
However, as described in the ’Methodology’ section, we cannot fully exclude that both
coeﬃcient estimates, the estimate for the unweighted as well as for the payroll weighted
average tax, are systematically biased. We will address this later by IV estimations.
But beforehand, we account for the corporate tax eﬀects on capital investment derived
in our model. Since our theory predicts the corporate tax at the home jurisdiction to
distort capital investment downwards, we presume the payroll to capital ratio to rise
with corporate tax increases. In Table 4, we augment our estimation model by the
inclusion of the home jurisdiction’s corporate tax rate. In Speciﬁcation (1), we employ
data on all multi-regional ﬁrms irrespective of their legal status; the tax rate diﬀeren-
tial is calculated on basis of an unweighted average of the foreign aﬃliate taxes. The
control variables include industry-year eﬀects and time-varying community character-
istics. The tax rate diﬀerential remains to exert a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
impact on the payroll to capital ratio whereas it slightly increases in absolute size
compared to the estimation results presented in Table 2. The coeﬃcient estimate for
the local corporate tax rate in turn exhibits a positive eﬀect on the payroll to capital
ratio as expected from our theoretical model. The estimates for the control variables
show the same pattern as before. Speciﬁcation (2) reestimates the relation additionally
controlling for state-year eﬀect. The coeﬃcient estimates on the tax rate variable gain
in absolute size without loosing their statistical signiﬁcance.
Speciﬁcation (3) presents estimations for the sub-group of incorporated ﬁrms. The
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speciﬁcation resembles Speciﬁcation (1) for the group of all ﬁrms. In line with the
presumption, the coeﬃcient estimate for the tax rate diﬀerence variable is now slightly
larger in absolute terms. Interestingly, the eﬀect of local corporate taxes on the payroll
to capital ratio, in contrast, looses in size compared to estimates including all multi-
regional ﬁrms and does not exhibit statistical signiﬁcance. There are basically two
explanations for this phenomenon. First, corporate tax increases deter capital invest-
ment by non-incorporated ﬁrms more than capital investment by incorporated ﬁrms.
Second, in a union wage bargaining setting, increases in the corporate tax rate lead to a
reduction of wages bargained at the local aﬃliates, as was pointed out by Riedel (2006).
This would tend to lower the payroll sum and therefore point in the opposite direction
than the capital eﬀect described in our theoretical model. If one assumes that the wage
setting process in incorporated, and hence often large, multi-regional corporations is
to a larger extent characterized by union wage bargaining than in non-incorporated
ﬁrms, this might explain the diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients. Speciﬁcation (4)
additionally accounts for state-year eﬀects and shows qualitatively and quantitatively
equal results to Speciﬁcation (3). All of the estimations presented so far in this table
relied on a foreign corporate tax measure which was calculated as an unweighted av-
erage. In Speciﬁcation (5), we use a payroll weighting scheme to calculate the foreign
aﬃliates’ average corporate tax rate. Clearly, the results do neither qualitatively nor
quantitatively change.
As we discussed above, including a weighted or unweighted average tax rate calculation
in our regression model may introduce endogeneity or measurement problems that may
drive the eﬀects presented in the last paragraphs. We address that by exploiting the
panel structure of our data. Using observations on all ﬁrms for which we have data
in both years and which did not change the composition of their group aﬃliates over
the sample period, we determine the average corporate tax rate in 2001 based on the
relative payroll shares in 1998. The lagged values shall hedge us against endogene-
ity problems with respect to the payroll weights. The estimation results are found in
Speciﬁcations (1) to (3) in Table 5. Speciﬁcation (1) presents estimation results for the
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sub-group of incorporated ﬁrms and includes three tax measures: the payroll weighted
tax rate diﬀerence between the subsidiary and foreign locations, the corporate tax rate
at the subsidiary location and a the payroll weighted average corporate tax rate at the
foreign aﬃliate location. The latter variable was ignored so far in our estimations al-
though our theoretical model clearly predicted a positive impact of the foreign average
tax on the payroll to capital ratio. In line with the previous estimation results, we ﬁnd
the corporate tax at the home jurisdiction to exert a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the
payroll to capital ratio. The coeﬃcient estimate for the tax rate diﬀerence carries a
negative sign, as expected, although it does not fully gain statistical signiﬁcance. The
coeﬃcient for the average corporate tax rate at foreign aﬃliates, however, exhibits a
negative sign (which contradicts our theoretical presumptions) but is far from being
statistically signiﬁcant (t-ratio: -0.73). Thus, we may value this as evidence that our
data does not point to a negative investment externality in the sense that increasing
the foreign corporate tax lowers investment at a group’s aﬃliates under FA. In Spec-
iﬁcation (2), we thus only include the home jurisdiction’s corporate tax rate and the
tax diﬀerence variable. Both coeﬃcient estimates on the tax variables loose in absolute
size, the coeﬃcient estimate on the tax diﬀerence variable still does not gain statistical
signiﬁcance. In Speciﬁcation (3), we reestimate the model for all multi-regional ﬁrms.
Here, the coeﬃcient estimates gain statistical signiﬁcance, whereas the semi-elasticity
for the tax-diﬀerence term is estimated with −0.0405 and the semi-elasticity for the
corporate tax rate at the home jurisdiction is estimated to be 0.0818. Thus, the es-
timates based on the lagged payroll weights conﬁrm the qualitative estimates derived
from the ﬁxed eﬀects model above, but suggest quantitatively smaller eﬀects.14
In a last step, we employ an instrumental variable approach to account for possible
endogeneity concerns. We thereby instrument for the average corporate tax rate (and
other average jurisdictional characteristics) in 2001 using the average corporate tax
value in 1998. Speciﬁcation (4) displays the estimation results for the group of incor-
porated ﬁrms, while Speciﬁcation (5) displays the results for the estimation accounting
14Note, that the calculation of the other control variables in the analysis equally employs the relative
payroll weights from the year 1998.
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for all multi-regional corporations irrespective of their legal status. Both estimations
derive results in line with our basic hypotheses. That is, the tax rate diﬀerence ex-
erts a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the local payroll to capital ratio, while the home
jurisdiction’s corporate tax is shown to have a positive impact. The estimation for
the subgroup of incorporated ﬁrms for example suggests that an increase in the local
business tax by 1 percentage point (20 local business tax points) reduces the payroll
to capital ratio by 1.6%, an estimate which is in line with the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations
based on unweighted average tax rate calculations (see Table 2).
4.7 Conclusion
We may conclude that we ﬁnd evidence for a quantitatively relevant distortion of the
payroll to capital ratio by corporate taxation under the German FA system. This
gives rise to a positive ﬁscal externality that translates into ineﬃciently low corporate
taxes under FA. In turn, we cannot ﬁnd evidence for a negative investment externality.
Thus, the results indicate, that ﬁrms possess substantial ﬂexibility in adjusting their
payroll to capital ratio to changes in the tax rate diﬀerentials between their corporate
subsidiaries at the intensive margin.
With respect to the European Commission’s proposal to introduce FA within the Eu-
ropean Union, our results suggest that some caution is warranted since the investment
distortions under FA may be substantial. Our results indicate that a 1 percentage
point increase in the corporate tax rate reduces the payroll to capital ratio by 1.6%
which points to a strong adjustment of payroll expenditure according to which income
in the German FA system is apportioned.
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4.8 Appendix
Note: Throughout ∗ will indicate signiﬁcance on the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance on the
5% level and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcance on the 1% level.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Multiregional Firms
Variables (in DM) Average Standard Error
Corporate Tax Base /1,000 660.27 16,121
Payroll Cost / 1,000 54,805 7,470,045
Capital Invested / 1,000 67,940 10,0329,111
Payroll to Capital Ratio 2889.0 161, 433.7
Local Corporate Tax (in %) 16.25 1.640
Local Corporate Tax (in ’Hebesatz’ points) 325 0.032
Tax Diﬀerence (Unweighted, in ’Hebesatz’ points) 1.94 · 10−08 54.71
Tax Diﬀerence (Capital Weighted, in ’Hebesatz’ points) −3.73 57.76
Inhabitants 6740.48 403.90
Employees 2368.55 174.28
Unemployment Rate 0.1162 0.070
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Table 2: End. Var.: Log Payroll to Capital Ratio
All Firms Incorp. Firms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate Diﬀerence × 100 −0.0505∗∗∗ −0.0442∗ −0.0806∗∗ −0.0843∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0401) (0.0403)
Individual Enterprise 0.2015 0.2056
(0.1761) (0.1761)
Non-Incorporated Firm 0.5070∗∗∗ 0.5165∗∗∗
(0.1425) (0.1425)
Inhabitants 0.0292 −0.0612 −0.2496∗ −0.2773∗∗
(0.0921) (0.0953) (0.1373) (0.1429)
Employment 0.1086∗∗∗ 0.0727∗ 0.1914∗∗∗ 0.1897∗∗
(0.0408) (0.0418) (0.0634) (0.0648)
Unemployment Rate 0.0784 0.2016 −0.4353 −0.6869
(0.2391) (0.2636) (0.3846) (0.4361)
Inhabitants OGM 0.0278 0.0447 0.0561 0.0626
(0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0439) (0.0443)
Employment OGM −0.0064 −0.0174 −0.0178 −0.0221
(0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0370) (0.0372)
Unemployment OGM −0.3222 −0.1888 −0.8854∗∗ −1.0091∗∗
(0.2670) (0.2794) (0.4216) (0.4363)
Year / Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √ √
State-Year Dummies
√ √
Weight UW UW UW UW
Number of Observations 342, 827 342, 827 150, 217 150, 217
Number of Groups 286, 272 286, 272 127, 824 127, 824
R Squared 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
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Table 3: End. Var.: Log Payroll to Capital Ratio
Incorp. Firms
Variable (1) (2)
Tax Rate Diﬀerence × 100 −0.1074∗∗∗ −0.1037∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0335)
Inhabitants −0.2452∗ −0.2691∗∗
(0.1350) (0.1404)
Employment 0.1995∗∗∗ 0.1932∗∗∗
(0.0617) (0.0631)
Unemployment Rate −0.5003 −0.6253
(0.3741) (0.4235)
Inhabitants OGM 0.0506 0.0588
(0.0424) (0.0427)
Employment OGM −0.0186 −0.0239
(0.0359) (0.0361)
Unemployment OGM −0.8060∗∗ −0.8602∗∗
(0.4117) (0.4269)
Year / Industry - Year Dummies
√ √
State - Year Dummies
√
Weight PW PW
Number of Observations 148, 042 148, 042
Number of Groups 126, 131 126, 131
R Squared 0.97 0.97
Table 4: End. Variable: Log Payroll to Capital Ratio
All Firms Incorp. Firms
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Tax Diﬀ. × 100 −0.1145∗∗∗ −0.1267∗∗∗ −0.1258∗∗ −0.1394∗∗∗ −0.14182∗∗∗
(0.0361) (0.0367) (0.0559) (0.0482) (0.0490)
Corp. Tax Rate × 100 0.1202∗∗ 0.1591∗∗∗ 0.0843 0.0914 0.0981
(0.0471) (0.0502) (0.0729) (0.0672) (0.0720)
Individual Enterprise 0.1996 0.2036
(0.1761) (0.1761)
Non-inc. Firms 0.5039∗∗∗ 0.5130∗∗∗
(0.1425) (0.1425)
Inhabitants 0.0362 −0.0529 −0.2425∗ −0.2328∗ −0.2606∗
(0.0921) (0.0954) (0.1374) (0.1352) (0.1405)
Employment 0.1104∗∗∗ 0.0726∗ 0.1925∗∗ 0.1981∗∗∗ 0.1903∗∗∗
(0.0408) (0.0417) (0.0634) (0.0617) (0.0631)
Unemployment Rate 0.0297 0.1756 −0.4774 −0.5029 −0.6286
(0.2399) (0.2638) (0.3863) (0.3749) (0.4250)
Inhabitant OMG 0.0142 0.0288 0.0469 0.0770∗ 0.0855∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0446) (0.0396) (0.0398)
Employment OMG −0.0028 −0.0141 −0.0156 −0.0538 −0.0591∗
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0370) (0.0331) (0.0333)
Unemployment OMG −0.4017 −0.2565 −0.9539∗∗ −1.1068∗∗∗ −1.1735∗∗∗
(0.2688) (0.2803) (0.4257) (0.3751) (0.3867)
Year /Industry - Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
State - Year Dummy
√ √ √
Weight UW UW UW UW PW
Number of Obs. 342, 827 342, 827 150, 217 148, 009 148.009
Number of Firms 286, 272 286, 272 126, 328 126, 128 126, 128
R Squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Table 5: End. Variable: Log Payroll to Capital Ratio
Weight 98 IV Estimation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Tax Diﬀ. × 100 −0.1061 −0.0543 −0.0405∗ −0.0776∗ −0.0614∗∗
(0.0798) (0.0363) (0.0239) (0.0457) (0.0294)
Corp.Tax Rate × 100 0.1274∗ 0.0816∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.1132∗ 0.1113∗∗∗
(0.0785) (0.0470) (0.0305) (0.0658) (0.0419)
Average Tax × 100 −0.0629
(0.0864)
Individual Enterprise −0.8565∗∗∗ −0.8558∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0171)
Non Inc. Firms −0.6166∗∗∗ −0.6161∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0196)
Inhabitants 0.0367 0.0349 0.0239 0.0330 0.0212
(0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0218) (0.0347) (0.0220)
Employment 0.0359 0.0369 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0385 0.0617∗∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0163) (0.0261) (0.0164)
Unemployment Rate 0.6526∗ 0.6336∗ 0.1535 0.5606 0.1050
(0.3687) (0.3677) (0.2396) (0.3689) (0.2399)
Inhabitants OMG 0.1157∗∗∗ 0.1116∗∗∗ 0.0834∗∗∗ 0.1052∗∗∗ 0.0747∗∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0370) (0.0233) (0.0384) (0.0242)
Employment OMG −0.0225 −0.0213 0.0186 −0.0215 0.0211
(0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0184) (0.0297) (0.0185)
Weighted Unempl. OMG −1.1805∗∗∗ −1.182∗∗∗ −0.8068∗∗∗ −1.0939∗∗∗ −0.7390∗∗∗
(0.2686) (0.2686) (0.1852) (0.2686) (0.1850)
Year + State + Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Number of Obs. 24, 878 24, 878 57, 779 24, 877 57, 775
Adj. R Squared 0.1791 0.1791 0.1834 0.1790 0.1835
Chapter 5
Corporate Taxation and
Complementarities within
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5.1 Introduction
In the public opinion, multinational enterprises (MNE) are considered to be accelerators
of globalization. From a ﬁscal point of view, MNEs are supposed to be those companies
that adjust their tax base elastically to corporate tax increases - by re-allocating either
production or proﬁts abroad. There is extensive evidence that proﬁts are shifted across
borders in response to tax rate diﬀerentials (e.g. Hines and Rice (1994) and Clausing
(2003)). Moreover, a large number of studies shows that multinational investment
decreases in the national corporate tax rate (see e.g. Devereux (2006) for a survey).
While most authors implicitly interpreted the latter results as evidence for production
relocation to foreign subsidiaries, the link has never been tested explicitly to the best
of our knowledge.
The last years have seen a number of studies that investigate whether increased foreign
capital investment of MNEs replaces domestic investment. The rather surprising result
that emerges from these papers, is that foreign investment does not reduce domestic
investment, it rather boosts it (see e.g. Desai et al. (2004), Egger and Pfaﬀermayer
(2003)). Therefore, increasing capital, employment and sales abroad is suggested to
trigger enhanced activity at home. In technical terms, foreign and domestic activities
are not substitutes, they are complements.
This observation may have important consequences for optimal tax policy consider-
ations, as we theoretically demonstrate in Becker and Riedel (2007b). If domestic
and foreign asset stocks are complements, not substitutes, domestic taxes may exert
a negative externalities on the foreign stock of assets and consequently on the foreign
corporate tax base. This eﬀect obviously runs counter to the well-established positive
externality due to proﬁt shifting. In simple words, domestic taxes increase foreign tax
revenue because reported foreign proﬁts increase due to shifting activities, and they
reduce foreign tax revenue because foreign activity is deterred due to complementarity
eﬀects. Which of the two externalities prevails is an open, i.e. an empirical question.
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The purpose of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we use a large ﬁrm-level data set in
order to empirically measure the tax eﬀects on capital stocks within a multinational
ﬁrm. Our results show that there is a strong and economically signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect of domestic taxes on foreign assets. Secondly, we try to quantify the externalities
caused by the intra-ﬁrm complementarities and proﬁt shifting behavior. Here, our
results indicate that the proﬁt shifting eﬀect dominates. However, the complementarity
eﬀect is shown to compensate a substantial part of the proﬁt shifting externality on
foreign aﬃliates’ pre-tax proﬁt (around 30%). If one takes into account that increased
multinational activity may raise national welfare through other channels (for example,
through a reduction in the national unremployment rate), the welfare eﬀects caused
by complementarity relations within MNEs may be even larger. Our ﬁndings thus
imply that distortions caused by corporate taxation of MNEs might be less severe than
usually considered and that defensive measures like the introduction of a multinational
corporate taxation scheme following Formula Apportionment principles as proposed by
the European Commission (see European Commission (2001)) may not be justiﬁed.
The literature on the causal relationship between foreign and domestic investment
starts with Feldstein (1995) who provides evidence using aggregate investment data and
claims that investment abroad reduces domestic investment ’dollar for dollar’. Desai
et al. (2005a) conﬁrm this result with respect to aggregate values but they also ﬁnd
that US multinationals increase their domestic capital stock in response to investment
abroad. In Desai et al. (2005b), they use ﬁrm-level data of US multinationals and
show that foreign investment in plant, property and equipment (PPE) is associated
with higher domestic PPE investment. Similarly, Egger and Pfaﬀermayer (2003) ﬁnd
that foreign investment increases domestic investment in tangible assets and does not
decrease investment in intangibles. Castellani et al. (2004) and Jaeckle (2006) show
that going abroad increases domestic productivity and competitiveness. Lipsey (1995)
analyzes a cross-section of American multinational ﬁrms, reporting a mild positive
correlation between foreign production and domestic employment levels. Stevens and
Lipsey (1992) analyze the investment behavior of seven multinational ﬁrms, concluding
Corporate Taxation and Complementarities 126
that investments in diﬀerent locations substitute for each other due to costly external
ﬁnancing. The absence of compelling instruments that satisfy the necessary exclusion
restrictions complicate the interpretation of this evidence, a problem that likewise
appears in studies of aggregate FDI and domestic investment. Devereux and Freeman
(1995) come to a diﬀerent conclusion in their study of bilateral ﬂows of aggregate
investment funds between seven OECD countries, ﬁnding no evidence of tax-induced
substitution between domestic and foreign investment. Desai et al. (2006) ask whether
investment in tax havens diverts activity from non-havens and ﬁnd that non-haven
activity rises in response to tax haven investment activity.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies analyzing complemen-
tarity eﬀects from a public ﬁnance point of view. There are only a few theoretical
contributions. Nielsen et al. (2004) show that production in the multinational ﬁrm’s
aﬃliate and headquarter can be complementary in the presence of a ﬁrm-wide public
good (e.g. a brand, patent, etc.). They build a model in which taxes have negative
ﬁscal externalities and suggest that complementary production structures may give
rise to overtaxation. In Becker & Riedel (2007), we show that overtaxtion is no likely
result if capital market externalities on the interest rate are accounted for. However,
the presence of MNEs lowers the degree of tax competition, and equilibrium tax rates
are higher the higher the fraction of multinationals.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, two hypothe-
ses are developed and the estimation methodology is set out. Section 3 presents the
data, gives some descriptive statistics and reports the results. In section 4, we consider
several extensions of the analysis. Section 5 discusses some implications and concludes.
5.2 Hypotheses and Estimation Methodology
In this section, we derive two theoretical hypotheses (5.2.1) and outline the basic
estimation methodology to identify the proposed eﬀects (5.2.2).
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5.2.1 Hypotheses
Consider the following illustrative model. There are two countries, called the domestic
and the foreign country, in a large world capital market. The domestic country hosts
the headquarters of a representative MNE, the foreign country the aﬃliate. The MNE
produces output in both locations using capital K as the only production input. Capital
is provided by the world capital market at an interest rate of r. For the headquarters
level, output reads F h
(
Kh
)
where h denotes the headquarters. For the aﬃliate level,
output is given by F a
(
Kh, Ka
)
, the superscript a denotes the aﬃliate. The aﬃliate’s
output depends on the aﬃliate’s capital stock and the headquarter endowment with
capital.
What is the intuition of this assumption? The aﬃliate’s output may depend on the
headquarters capital stock if research and development (R&D) is carried out at the
headquarter, and aﬃliate investment becomes more proﬁtable and/or productive if
R&D is successful. Moreover, if an increased headquarters capital stock increases the
quality of the product for which aﬃliate output is a complement, the proﬁtability (i.e.
the marginal productivity) of the aﬃliate capital stock is increased. Alternatively, a
third story would consider the aﬃliate as a pure distribution center which has some
ﬁxed cost but very low marginal cost for distributing one extra unit of output. If
the headquarters’ capital stock and output increases, the value of the capital at the
subsidiary rises, too.
Thus, the after-tax proﬁts of the MNE is given by
Π = F h
(
Kh
) (
1− τh)+ F a (Kh, Ka) (1− τ)− r (Kh + Ka)
+
(
τh − τ) s− C (s) (5.1)
whereas τh and τ denote the corporate tax rates at country h and country a respec-
tively. For simplicity reasons, we assume that capital cost are not deductible from the
corporate tax base which corresponds to full equity ﬁnance of the investment projects.
Moreover, the MNE may shift proﬁts between the headquarters and its aﬃliate. The
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amount of proﬁt shifted from the headquarters to the aﬃliate is thereby denoted with
s, whereas s > 0 (s < 0) if proﬁt is shifted from the headquarters to the aﬃliate
(from the aﬃliate to the headquarters). To derive an interior solution, we assume that
proﬁt shifting causes convex concealment cost of C (s) with ∂C/∂s = sign(τh − τ)
and ∂2C/∂s2 > 0 (see e.g. Hauﬂer and Schjelderup, 2000). Optimal proﬁt shifting
activities are determined by the ﬁrst order condition Cs = τ
h− τ . Optimal investment
implies
Kh : F hh + F
a
h
1− τ
1− τh =
r
1− τh (5.2)
Ka : F aa =
r
1− τ (5.3)
with F hh = ∂F
h/∂Kh, F ah = ∂F
a/∂Kh, F aa = ∂F
a/∂Ka. Equations (5.2) and (5.3)
determine the capital demand functions for Kh and Ka.
As laid out above, we are interested in the corporate tax eﬀects on the own and foreign
capital stock. From equations (5.2) and (5.3) it follows that the marginal eﬀect of a
corporate tax increase at the parent ﬁrm on headquarters and subsidiary investment
reads
dKh
dτh
=
F aaa
(1− τh)F hhhF aaa + (1− τ) (F ahhF aaa − F ahaF aah)
· F hh (5.4)
dKa
dτh
= − F
a
ah
(1− τh)F hhhF aaa + (1− τ) (F ahhF aaa − F ahaF aah)
· F hh (5.5)
We assume that F ahhF
a
aa − F ahaF aah > 0 holds, which ensures concavity of the produc-
tion function F a in Kh and Ka. Moreover, we presume F aah > 0 which corresponds
to a complementary relationship between capital investment at the aﬃliate and sub-
sidiary level. It follows then directly that dKh/dτh < 0, and dKa/dτh < 0. Intuitively,
increases in the headquarter tax rate enhance the local capital cost and reduce in-
vestment at the headquarter location. If production at the aﬃliate and headquarters
level are complements as suggested by the empirical work cited in the introduction, the
investment reduction at the headquarters location translates in a drop of investment
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at the aﬃliate. Note that, in the absence of any interdependencies, i.e. F aah, F
a
ha = 0,
tax eﬀects are given by dKh/dτh = r/
[
F hhh
(
1− τh)2] and dKa/dτh = 0. Note that
expression (5.4) and (5.5) are derived assuming constant interest rates.1 Hypothesis 1
directly follows
Hypothesis 5.1 Consider the investment at the headquarter and aﬃliate location to
be complements. Then a corporate tax increase at the headquarter location reduces
capital investment at the subsidiary level.
If hypothesis 1 is true, then domestic taxes have a negative externality on the foreign
country’s tax revenue. Let Ti = τi·Bi, i ∈ {h, a}, denote the tax revenue in the domestic
and the foreign country, whereas Bi describes the local tax base which is given by the
representative multinational’s pre-tax proﬁt Bh = F (Kh)−s and Ba = F (Ka, Kh)+s.
The eﬀect of the domestic country’s tax rate increase on the foreign country’s tax
revenue is given by dTa/dτ
h = τ · dBa/dτh with
dBa
dτh
=
∂F a
∂Ka
∂Ka
∂τh
+
∂F a
∂Kh
∂Kh
∂τh
+
∂s
∂τh
(5.6)
In the absence of these complementarities, the externality caused by corporate taxation
would comprise solely the proﬁt shifting eﬀect ∂s
∂τh
> 0. This is the externality usually
associated with national tax policy in the presence of multinational entities: If the
parent company faces a higher tax rate, then proﬁt is shifted to the aﬃliate country
which increases the corporate tax base of the aﬃliate location.
However, in the presence of complementarities in production, ∂Ka/∂τh > 0 and
∂F a/∂Kh > 0, the positive proﬁt shifting externality may be compensated by a nega-
tive externality of the headquarters tax on the aﬃliate’s capital stock. The rationale of
this result is that a corporate tax increase at the headquarters location does not only
1It seems that the assumption of constant interest rates is justiﬁed in the framework of our empirical
purpose. The sample under consideration mainly consists of MNEs located in European countries
which may be considered small from world capital point of view. However, interest rate eﬀects will
be discussed where necessary.
Corporate Taxation and Complementarities 130
induce the shifting of paper proﬁt to the subsidiary, but additionally reduces headquar-
ters capital investment that translates into a lower investment level at the subsidiary
location in the presence of intra-ﬁrm complementarities. In sum, the externality of cor-
porate taxation may be positive or negative. In terms of tax competition, that implies
that equilibrium tax rates may be ineﬃciently low or high. This is captured by the
following hypothesis
Hypothesis 5.2 The positive ﬁscal externality due to proﬁt shifting opportunities of
MNEs is (partially) compensated by the negative ﬁscal externality due to production
complementarities.
It is worth discussing brieﬂy how hypothesis 2 relates to the standard literature on
multinational proﬁt shifting in the presence of tax diﬀerentials between countries. Es-
pecially, we could ask if hypothesis 2 implies that studies measuring the impact of
tax diﬀerentials on proﬁt shifting are misled. From our point of view, the answer is
no, because these studies usually choose as dependent variable the proﬁtability of each
aﬃliate as reported by the multinational ﬁrm, where proﬁtability means the ratio of re-
ported proﬁts over assets. By dividing proﬁts through assets, this approach abstracts
from all eﬀects on assets. We argue that these studies correctly measure the proﬁt
shifting activity per unit of capital. Estimations of the total amount shifted by multi-
national ﬁrms, though, will be biased if the complementarity externality is not taken
into account. Our results imply that low-tax countries proﬁt far less than expected
from high tax environments in other countries.
Moreover, it shall be pointed out that the same relation between the corporate tax
rate and foreign multinational investment can be derived by funding restrictions in the
sense that the MNE may not receive the ﬁnancing for all proﬁtable investment projects
within its group. If new investment projects are partly ﬁnanced from retained proﬁt,
then a corporate tax reduction at the headquarters location increases the headquarters’
after-tax proﬁt and thus the funds available for project ﬁnance within the corporate
group. This may equally raise the capital stock invested at the foreign aﬃliates. In
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the following, we will not be interested in the identiﬁcation of channels through which
capital taxes abroad reduce capital investment at the aﬃliates, but will simply try to
provide evidence that a negative causal relationship exists.
5.2.2 Estimation Methodology
The purpose of the empirical section is to test for the hypotheses derived above. We
ﬁrst determine the eﬀect of corporate taxes at the headquarters location on foreign
subsidiaries’ capital stock. This is captured by the following estimation equation
log ki,t = β0 + β1 τi,t + β2τhi,t + β3xi,t + β4xhi,t + φi + i,t (5.7)
whereas ki,t denotes the ﬁxed assets of aﬃliate i at time t. Since the distribution of
ﬁxed assets is rather skewed, we employ the logarithm as endogeneous variable. To
determine the cross eﬀect of headquarters taxes on foreign subsidiaries’ investment, we
include the corporate tax rate at the headquarter location τhi,t as explanatory variable.
Additionally, the estimation approach controls for aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects φi that capture
unobserved time-constant plant-characteristics, and for time-varying locational and
industry characteristics xi,t, as well as time-varying characteristics of the parent country
xhi,t.
The aim of the analysis is to capture the eﬀect of parent country taxes on subsidiary
investment accounting for other possible investment determinants. The theory predicts
that subsidiaries with parents in high-tax countries invest less than subsidiaries with
parents in low-tax countries. Therefore, we expect β2 to be negative. In some spec-
iﬁcations, we include country-year ﬁxed eﬀects which fully capture the impact of tax
rate and other policy variable changes at the subsidiary’s location. Hence, we are able
to implicitly compare capital investment of subsidiaries in the same country that only
diﬀer in their parent’s location and thus in the parent country’s tax policy. Note that
if tax rate changes have eﬀects on the interest rate, these eﬀects will be equal for all
ﬁrms and will therefore be absorbed by the country-year ﬁxed eﬀects, too.2
2Of course, we are also interested in the sign and the size of β1 which measures the eﬀect of the
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As a robustness test to our analysis, we will rerun the estimations using not the na-
tional tax rate, but the aﬃliate’s actual tax payments as explanatory variable. Since
there might be some reverse causality concerns with respect to the impact of actual
tax payments on the corporate capital stock, we estimate equation (5.7) employing a
ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach which follows Arellano and Bond (1991). First-diﬀerencing
controls for aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects, and if there is no serial correlation, the lagged tax
payments is not correlated with the diﬀerenced error term and is therefore a valid in-
strument for the current tax payments. Lack of serial correlation provides a moment
restriction, so that equation (5.8) can be estimated using the general methods of mo-
ments restriction. In comparison to conventional instrumental variables estimators,
this moment restriction provides additional instruments so that this GMM estimator
is more eﬃcient. To test the validity of these instruments we use a Sargan/Hansen
test (Sargan, 1958, Hansen, 1982) of overidentifying restrictions. Because the model
is estimated in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, the equation will be characterized by the presence of
ﬁrst-order serial correlation. But the validity of the GMM estimator relies on the ab-
sence of second-order serial correlation. The tests for second-order serial correlation by
Arellano and Bond (1991) will be reported at the bottom of the result tables.3
In a second step, we will quantify the impact of corporate taxes on the multinational’s
pre-tax proﬁt. If complementarities in asset stocks are accounted for, there are two
eﬀects which compensate each other. Firstly, higher tax rates at the parent’s location
increase the reported proﬁts of the subsidiary due to proﬁt shifting activities. Secondly,
higher parent location tax rates reduce the subsidiary’s stock of capital and thereby
subsidiary’s location tax rate on the subsidiary’s asset stock size. Note, though, that we cannot
fully exclude that other unobserved policy changes drive the result in the regressions in which we
include the national corporate tax rate as explanatory variable since the national corporate rate
aﬀects all (proﬁtable) corporations in a given country in the same way and hence, a ’control group’
to the analysis within the same country is missing. However, we address this problem in an extension
section by regressing the capital stock on the actual corporate tax payments.
3We have chosen the lags of the instruments on the basis of the serial correlation test and the Sargan
Hansen test.
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reduces the subsidiary’s proﬁts. The estimated equation is given by
Δ log bi,t = α1Δ Diffi,t + α2Δ log ki,t + α3Δxi,t + α4Δxhi,t + Δi,t (5.8)
The coeﬃcient α1 measures the impact of the corporate tax rate diﬀerence Diffi,t
between the headquarter and the aﬃliate country on the reported pre-tax proﬁts bi,t.
In contrast, α2 captures the eﬀect via the asset stock size ki,t which may be aﬀected
by the parent tax rate; xi,t and xhi,t are control variables as deﬁned above.
In contrast to the proﬁt shifting channel, the impact of the ﬁrm’s assets on proﬁt’s may
be mismeasured due to reverse causality problems: high proﬁts may equally trigger high
capital investment. Therefore, we estimate the eﬀect of an asset increase on proﬁts by
employing the ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach by Arellano and Bond (1991) shortly described
above. Note, that Δ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable. First-diﬀerencing controls
for aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects, and if there is no serial correlation, lagged ﬁxed assets are not
correlated with the diﬀerenced error term and are therefore valid instruments for the
current ﬁxed assets. Following equation (5.7) we additionally include the corporate
tax rates at the aﬃliate and parent location as instruments for aﬃliate ﬁxed assets.
To test the validity of these instruments we again use a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions.4
5.3 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Results
In this section, we describe the data base (5.3.1), give some descriptive statistics (5.3.2)
and report the result of the estimation approach outlined above (5.3.3).
4Note moreover, that the standard errors of the GMM model presented in the Result Section are
robust one-step errors. Simulation studies have shown that the eﬃciency gain from using the two-
step procedure is very modest even in the presence of considerable heteroscedasticity (Arellano and
Bond (1991)).
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5.3.1 Data Set
Our empirical analysis relies on the AMADEUS data base which is compiled by Bu-
reau van Dijck and contains detailed accounting and ﬁrm structure information for
1.6 million corporations in 38 countries. The data is available from 1995 to 2005,
but unbalanced in structure. Since our analysis centers around corporate tax eﬀects
on multinational ﬁrms, we restrict our sample to subsidiaries which are directly and
ultimately owned by a foreign parent company.5 Additionally, for an aﬃliate to be
included in the data set it has to be ultimately owned by an industrial corporation and
has to employ more than 10 workers (see for example Navaretti et al. (2003)).
Apart from this, we include companies based on the availability of the essential infor-
mation needed for our analysis (ﬁxed assets, corporate tax rate at aﬃliate and parent
location). Additionally, aﬃliate observations will only be used in the regressions if the
link to the global ultimate owner as well as basic information on this parent corporation
is available with AMADEUS. Last, we have to restrict the sample to corporate groups
with unconsolidated accounting information.
The ownership information in our data refers to the last reported date which is the
year 2005 for most corporations in our data set. Thus, ownership has a cross sectional
dimension only. In line with previous work based on the same data, we are not too
concerned about this assumption. To the extent that we are potentially including a
few aﬃliates which were not aﬃliated in earlier years, we are introducing measurement
error that biases our results towards zero (Budd et al. (2005), Navaretti et al. (2003)).
Matching parent companies to foreign aﬃliates gives an unbalanced panel with 5429
aﬃliates and 2049 parent corporations over 10 years. Table 1 exhibits the country
distribution which is basically consistent with patterns of multinational ﬁrms in Europe.
Most of the global ultimate owners are concentrated in Western European countries
5The AMADEUS data contains information on a corporation’s direct investment in other ﬁrms. For
a corporation to be identiﬁed as parent company, it has to own 100% of the subsidiary directly and
ultimately.
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like France, Germany and Belgium. In contrast, many subsidiaries are located in the
European South (Spain and Italy) as well as in new EU member states like the Czech
Republic and Poland.
Since our analysis investigates corporate tax eﬀects on capital investment and pre-
tax proﬁt, we merge the ﬁrm data with data on the statutory corporate tax rates for
EU 25 countries as well as other country characteristics like GDP per capita, GDP
growth rate, the population size and an earnings index for the manufacturing industry.
The corporate tax rates are thereby taken from the European Commission (European
Commission (2006)), while the information on GDP per capita and population size is
obtained from the OECD (OECD (2007)).
5.3.2 Sample Statistics
The data contains 34237 aﬃliate-year observations. Thus, the accounting information
is available for 6.3 years on average. Table 2 summarizes basic sample statistics. The
average amount of ﬁxed assets at the aﬃliate level is measured to be 36 million US
Dollar. Moreover, the average employment level amounts to 250 employees while the
corporations earn a pre-tax proﬁt of 3 million US dollar on average. The average corpo-
rate tax rate at the parent location is measured with 0.35 and is, hence, slightly higher
than the corporate tax rate at the aﬃliate location which is 0.33. This observation is
line with the common perception that headquarters are mainly located in western Euro-
pean high-tax countries while production also takes place through aﬃliates in Eastern
and Southern European countries with lower corporate tax rates. Additionally, we
will run sensitivity checks on our regressions using the actual corporate tax payments
instead of the national tax rate as explanatory variable. We calculate this measure by
dividing actual corporate tax payments by corporate total asset. Total assets are used
because this information is available for more parent corporations than pre-tax proﬁt
or ﬁxed assets and hence, we hedge us against loosing too many observations. The
average tax payment per total assets amounts to 0.04 at the aﬃliate level and 0.02 at
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the headquarter location. Interestingly, (assuming equal productivity) the headquarter
thus carries a lower tax burden than the subsidiaries.
5.3.3 Estimation Results
Our central aim is to determine the eﬀect of the corporate tax rate at the aﬃliate and
parent level on the volume of aﬃliate’s ﬁxed assets. This shall capture the complemen-
tarity eﬀect described in our theoretical analysis. In a second step, we will determine
the corporate tax eﬀect on pre-tax proﬁts distinguishing the complementarity eﬀect
from the proﬁt-shifting eﬀect.
Table 3 contains ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations of the corporate ﬁxed assets on the statu-
tory corporate tax rate at the aﬃliate and parent location. In Speciﬁcation (1), we
include a full set of year and aﬃliate dummies to control for time-constant aﬃliate
characteristics and shocks common to all aﬃliates over time. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect of both, the domestic and the foreign statutory tax rate, on ﬁxed assets.
The semi-elasticities are calculated with −0.6903 and −0.3874 respectively. Speciﬁca-
tion (2) reestimates the relationship including a set of variables controlling for time-
varying country characteristics at the aﬃliate and parent location. We account for
GDP per capita, population size, the growth rate of GDP per capita and earnings in
the manufacturing industry. Multinational ﬁrms tend to locate high investment levels
in countries with high populations, while a large population at the parent country de-
ters investment. This is in line with the basic proximity concentration trade-oﬀ known
from trade-theory models. The service of large markets via exports is associated with
high transport costs. That increases the attractiveness of FDI compared to exports.
Moreover, a high GDP growth and high earnings in manufacturing tend to increase
multinational capital investment, whereas we ﬁnd also weak evidence that high levels
of these controls in the parent country tend to increase the ﬁxed asset stock at the
aﬃliate.6 Although GDP per capita at the aﬃliate exhibits an unexpected negative
6All control variables despite the GDP growth rate enter the estimation equation in log form. This
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sign, this can be explained by the additional inclusion of earnings in the manufacturing
index as a proxy for the (change) in national income as well. Without the inclusion of
manufacturing earnings, GDP per capita captures the positive income eﬀect on capital
investment.
The inclusion of the additional country controls substantially increases the estimated
coeﬃcients for the statutory tax at the aﬃliate as well as at the parent country. Spec-
iﬁcations (3) and (4) additionally include a set of industry year dummies and a set of
year - Eastern Europe dummies accounting for possible diﬀerences in shocks to Western
and Eastern Europe over time. Industry is thereby speciﬁed at the NACE 1-digit level.
The estimated taxation coeﬃcients are robust to these inclusions and remain large and
statistically signiﬁcant. The semi-elasticities estimated in Speciﬁcation (4) are −0.6903
for the tax at the aﬃliate country and −0.3874 for the tax at the parent country. Last,
in Speciﬁcation (5) we add country-year eﬀects which absorb all country-speciﬁc shocks
to the subsidiary and also capture the corporate tax eﬀect on local investment (hence,
there is no coeﬃcient estimate reported for this eﬀect). For this speciﬁcation, the
estimated coeﬃcient slightly drops in size but remains statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. In Table 4, we re-estimate the model including the corporate tax eﬀects in
log-form. The coeﬃcient estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the
results for the semi-logarithmic form. Controlling for country-year eﬀects, Speciﬁca-
tion (5) suggests that a 10% increase in the parent tax rate reduces investment at the
aﬃliate level by 1.9%.
Thus, we can conclude that there is quite robust evidence for a negative and sig-
niﬁcant impact of home country taxes on host country activity.7 This generates a
speciﬁcation is chosen since it seems to ﬁt the data slightly better than an inclusion in levels. Note,
however, that the estimated corporate tax coeﬃcient are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the controls.
7Note again, that the purpose of our study is not to provide evidence on the exact channel through
which parent taxes impact on aﬃliate investment. However, evidence that our data is broadly con-
sistent with the theory presented above, we regressed ﬁxed assets at the parent location on corporate
taxes at the parent country. The results are displayed in Table 5. As presumed the eﬀect is signiﬁ-
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potentially important externality of domestic tax policy on the foreign country’s tax
revenue. Therefore, this ﬁnding may have implications for tax eﬃciency in the presence
of multinational corporations and is thus related to another hotly debated question:
ineﬃciencies caused by cross-border proﬁt-shifting. It is straight-forward to ask how
these two externalities are related to each other. While tax rate increases exert a
positive externality on the other country’s tax revenue via the proﬁt shifting channel,
complementarities generate a negative externality. Our aim is to quantitatively weigh
these two eﬀects against each other.
Therefore, we investigate the causal eﬀect of domestic and foreign corporate taxes on
corporate pre-tax proﬁt, thereby diﬀerentiating the proﬁt shifting and the complemen-
tarity eﬀect. One unique feature of proﬁt shifting activity is that the shifting volume is
determined by the tax diﬀerential deﬁned as domestic statutory corporate tax minus
parent statutory corporate tax rate. Thus, we can capture the proﬁt shifting eﬀect
by including the tax rate diﬀerential in the estimation equation for corporate pre-tax
proﬁt. In contrast, the complementarity eﬀect is driven by the impact of foreign cor-
porate taxes on domestic input factor choice which in turn aﬀects domestic corporate
pre-tax proﬁt. Hence, we include ﬁxed assets in the estimation equation. Following
our analysis so far we estimate a GMM model where we instrument for ﬁxed assets
using the domestic and foreign statutory corporate tax rates. Moreover the third to
ﬁfth lag of the ﬁxed assets variable are included among others to instrument for the
change in ﬁxed assets.8
cantly negative. Note, however, that the number of parent ﬁrms for which the information of ﬁxed
asset investment is available falls short from the overall number of parents in our study. Moreover,
since ﬁxed assets variable for the parent location exhibits substantial variation, the estimations pre-
sented in Table 5 exclude the 5th and 95th percentile of the ﬁxed asset variable. Note furthermore,
that the eﬀect of corporate taxes at the parent location on aﬃliate ﬁxed assets reported in Table 3
is quantitatively substantial and may not exclusively explained by complementarities in ﬁxed assets
at the parent and subsidiary location. Instead, limiting ﬁnancing may also play a signiﬁcant role in
explaining the results. We leave a detailed analysis to future research.
8The lags of instruments were chosen based on the test on second order autocorrelation and the
Sargan/Hansen test.
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Table 6 presents several model speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcation (1) controls for GDP per
capita and population at the aﬃliate and parent country and year dummies. The tax
rate diﬀerential enters with a negative sign, as expected, the semi-elasticity is estimated
with −0.7189. Thus, a larger diﬀerence between the statutory tax rate at the aﬃliate
level and statutory taxes at the parent location reduces the MNE’s pre-tax proﬁt.
This observation is in line with proﬁt shifting behavior. The coeﬃcient estimate on
ﬁxed assets indicates that a 1% increase in ﬁxed assets raises pre-tax proﬁt by 0.42%
on average. The following estimations (2) to (4) additionally control for industry-
year dummies and the GDP growth rate as well as the earnings in manufacturing.
Especially, the inclusion of the additional country control variables lead to a slight
drop in the absolute size of both coeﬃcients, the estimated coeﬃcient for the ﬁxed
asset investment as well as the coeﬃcient for the diﬀerence in statutory tax rates.
These estimates enable us to quantify the proﬁt shifting eﬀect against the comple-
mentarity eﬀect. How do pre-tax proﬁt change with increases in the corporate tax
rate? According to the theory and estimation set up presented above, the eﬀect can
be written as
dbˆi
dτhi
= − ∂bˆi
∂(τi − τih) +
∂bˆi
∂(ki)
∂ki
∂(τhi)
=
[
−αˆ1 + βˆ2 · αˆ2
]
bi (5.9)
for the semi-logarithmic estimation of the corporate tax impact on capital investment.
αˆ1, βˆ2, αˆ2 thereby indicate the estimated coeﬃcients. Drawing on the coeﬃcient esti-
mates in Table 3, Speciﬁcation (5) (βˆ2) and Table 6, Speciﬁcation (4) (αˆ1 and αˆ2), we
ﬁnd that accounting for the complementarity eﬀect reduces the semi-elasticity of re-
ported proﬁts from dbˆi
dτhi
1
bˆi
= 0.67 to 0.53, a reduction of 21% of its value.9 If we consider
the log-log speciﬁcation in contrast to the semi-logarithmic model and evaluate the es-
timated eﬀects at the sample average of the corporate tax rate at the parent country,
we ﬁnd a slightly larger drop of 24%.10 Therefore, if an empirical proﬁt-shifting study
concluded that a ten percentage point increase in the parent company’s statutory tax
rate increased reported proﬁts by 6.7%, we would have to add that this is true in terms
90.6688 + (−0.4632) · 0.3015 = 0.5291
100.6688 + (−0.1885) · 0.3015/0.35 = 0.5064
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of per capital unit; since the asset stock at the subsidiary’s location is reduced by the
tax rate increase, the overall reported proﬁt only increases by somewhat more than
three forth of this eﬀect, which approximately amounts to 5%.
5.4 Extensions
5.4.1 Eﬀective Corporate Tax Rate
Our results in the previous section provide evidence that the statutory corporate tax
rate at the headquarter location exerts a negative impact on investment at the aﬃliate
level. Although our theory section does not distinguish between the statutory corpo-
rate tax and the eﬀective corporate tax rate, it is obvious that the complementarity
eﬀect hinges on the eﬀective corporate tax rate for which the statutory rate was used
as proxy above. As a sensitivity check we therefore reestimate the causal impact of
headquarters’ taxes on aﬃliate employment using the actual corporate tax payment
per unit of total assets at the headquarters’ location as explanatory variable. Since
the inclusion of actual corporate tax payment in the capital investment equation may
be prone to endogeneity problems, we again employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) ap-
proach estimating a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation with lagged corporate taxation levels as
instruments for the change in tax payment. The results can be found in Table 7. The
ﬁrst equation controls for time ﬁxed eﬀects while the second speciﬁcation additionally
includes industry-year dummies.11 Both estimations provide evidence in line with our
results and indicate that an increase in the corporate tax burden at the headquarters
location translates in signiﬁcantly lower investment levels at the aﬃliates.
11Both speciﬁcations employ the second lag of eﬀective average tax payments as instruments.
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5.4.2 Investment Eﬀects of Proﬁt Shifting
Our simple model presented in the theory section abstracted from corporate tax eﬀects
on multinational capital investment that is driven by proﬁt shifting considerations.
Part of the literature suggests that proﬁt shifting is facilitated with increasing size of
corporate investment at the aﬃliate location. This reﬂects the notion that enlarged
investment activity corresponds to an increased intra-ﬁrm trade connection between
the aﬃliates which makes it easier to shift proﬁt between the locations (see e.g. Grubert
and Slemrod (1998), who introduce the term of “avoidance-adjusted cost of capital”).
The modeling strategy would for example presume that proﬁt can be shifted per unit
of capital at the aﬃliate location (see Eggert and Schjelderup (2005) and Riedel and
Runkel (2007)) and hence multinational after-tax proﬁt could be summarized as
Π = F h
(
Kh
) (
1− τh)+ F a (Kh, Ka) (1− τ)− r (Kh + Ka)
+
[(
τh − τ) s− C (s)]Ka (5.10)
Thus, optimal investment at the aﬃliate location is given by
F aa =
r − [(τh − τ)s− C]
1− τ (5.11)
It holds that (τh − τ)s − C > 0 since the multinational would otherwise not engage
in paper proﬁt shifting. This implies that positive proﬁt shifting activities lead to
increased investment at the aﬃliate level whereas the investment is higher the larger
the amount shifted. Assuming shifting costs to be constant across multinational ﬁrms
located in diﬀerent countries, proﬁt shifting activity increases in the gross shifting gains
which are given by the absolute tax rate diﬀerence between two locations. Therefore,
the theoretical extension would predict that the aﬃliate capital stock raises in the
absolute tax diﬀerence to the home country.
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Calculating the eﬀect of headquarter taxes on the aﬃliates’ capital investment gives
dKa
dτh
= − F
a
ah
(1− τh)F hhhF aaa + (1− τ) (F ahhF aaa − F ahaF aah)
· F hh
−
(
1− τh)F hhh + (1− τ)F ahh
(1− τh)F hhhF aaa + (1− τ) (F ahhF aaa − F ahaF aah)
· s
1− t (5.12)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side corresponds to equation (5.4). The second term
reﬂects the impact of proﬁt shifting on investment behavior. For a better understand-
ing, assume for the moment that there are no complementarities, F aah = F
a
ha = 0. The
expression then becomes:
dKa
dτh
= − 1
F aaa
· s
1− t (5.13)
It is obvious that the eﬀect of the parent location’s tax rate carries the same sign as
the proﬁt shifting term s. If the parent location’s tax rate is higher than the subsidiary
location’s, τh > τ , then increasing τh leads to an increase in the subsidiary’s stock
of capital. The intuition for the result is very simple. An increase in τh leads to
an increase in the tax diﬀerential between parent and subsidiary ﬁrm. This increases
the incentive to shift proﬁts and to lower the avoidance-adjusted cost of capital by
enlarging the subsidiary’s stock of capital.
To test for these capital eﬀects, we include the absolute tax rate diﬀerential between
the headquarter and the corporate subsidiary in the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation described
by equation 5.7. The results are presented in Table 8. In line with the theoretical
prediction, the absolute tax rate diﬀerence exerts a signiﬁcantly positive impact on
aﬃliate investment and is robust against the inclusion of industry-year and country-
year dummies. The estimated coeﬃcient for the absolute corporate tax rate diﬀerence
in Speciﬁcation (3) presents a semi-elasticity of 0.4567.
The size of the eﬀects of headquarters’ taxes on aﬃliate investment thus depends
on the relation of corporate taxes. If the headquarters’ tax falls short from the tax
rate at the aﬃliate location, the complementarity and proﬁt shifting investment eﬀect
point in the same direction. Increases in the corporate tax rate at the headquarters
location lead to a substantial drop in aﬃliates’ assets. In turn, if the headquarters’ tax
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exceeds the corporate tax at the aﬃliate location, then an increase in the headquarter
tax reduces aﬃliate investment through the complementarity eﬀect but may, however,
increase corporate investment due to proﬁt shifting induced considerations. According
to Speciﬁcation (3) in Table 8, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of corporate taxes at the parent
location on ﬁxed assets at the aﬃliate is represented by a semi-elasticity of −1.2278
(= −0.7711 − 0.4567) if τh < τ . In turn, if the headquarters country is the high-tax
country and τh > τ holds, then the complementarity investment eﬀect and the proﬁt
shifting investment eﬀect point in diﬀerent directions. This translates in an estimated
semi-elasticity of −0.3144 (= −0.7711+0.4567). This implies that if (equilibrium) tax
rates feature τh < τ , then the described investment eﬀects dampen the proﬁt shifting
eﬀect by 55% (0.6688−0.3015 ·1.2278 = 0.2986). In contrast, if (equilibrium) tax rates
feature τh > τ then the share of the proﬁt shifting eﬀect compensated amounts to 14%
only (0.6688− 0.3015 · 0.3144 = 0.5740).
In this context it is interesting to note that in our sample 52% of the aﬃliates have
their direct parent corporation in country with a higher statutory corporate tax rate
while 48% are owned by parent corporations that pay a lower statutory tax rate on
average.
5.4.3 Employment Eﬀects
It is a standard notion of the economic literature (and in the public debate) that the
adjustment of capital investment in the wake of corporate tax changes is likely to go
hand in hand with employment eﬀects in the same direction. The basic argument can
be demonstrated by a simple extension of our theoretical model presented in section
2. For simplicity reasons and without loss of generality, we assume that production at
the headquarters’ location employs capital as the only input factor while production
at the subsidiary level additionally relies on the use of labor input La. The wage level
in country a is given by wa and assumed to be exogenous from the MNE’s perspective.
Corporate Taxation and Complementarities 144
This motivates the following after-tax proﬁt function
Π = F h
(
Kh
) (
1− τh)+ F a (Kh, Ka, La) (1− τ)− waLa − r (Kh + Ka)
+
(
τh − τ) s− C (s) (5.14)
First order conditions with respect to Kh, Ka and s replicate the equations given in
section 2, apart from the fact that the production function F a is now dependent on labor
input La. By assuming that the determinant of this equation system D is positive, the
marginal eﬀect of headquarters’ taxes on employment at the aﬃliate location is given
by
dLa
dτh
= −(1− τ)
D
·
[
∂F h
∂Kh
· ∂
2F a
∂Ka∂Kh
· ∂
2F a
∂La∂Ka
− ∂F
h
∂Kh
· ∂
2F a
∂(Ka)2
· ∂
2F a
∂La∂Kh
]
(5.15)
Assuming the cross eﬀects to be positive for capital investment at the headquarters
and aﬃliate location as well as as for labor and capital input (∂2F a/∂Ka∂Kh > 0,
∂2F a/∂La∂Ka > 0, ∂2F a/∂La∂Kh > 0), it is obvious that equation (5.15) exhibits
a negative sign, that is, production at the subsidiary level falls in the headquarters’
tax. The intuition behind this result is that increases in the corporate tax liability at
the headquarters location reduce the headquarters’ capital stock which translates in
reduced investment and employment levels at the aﬃliate.
Therefore, we reestimate the above equations using the number of employees instead
of ﬁxed assets as endogeneous variable. Since employment numbers are equally skewed
to the right as ﬁxed asset investment, we employ the logarithm of employees as en-
dogeneous variable. Table 9 shows the results of estimations of aﬃliate employment
numbers on the statutory corporate tax rates at the aﬃliate and headquarters country.
The estimation results replicate those for the ﬁxed asset equations. Thus, a rise in the
statutory tax rate at the aﬃliate level as well as at the parent level leads to a reduction
in employment numbers. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) thereby account for various time-
varying country characteristics as well as year dummies and industry year eﬀects. In
Speciﬁcation (3) we add a full set of country-year dummies and still ﬁnd the corporate
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tax at the parent location to exert a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the number of
employees. The semi-elasticity is thereby estimated with −0.2659.
How does that change our results for the corporate tax eﬀects on pre-tax proﬁt? Ac-
counting for employment input in the proﬁt equation, in line with the basic intuition,
we ﬁnd that employment as well as ﬁxed assets have a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on the proﬁt level. According to the estimate, a 10% increase in ﬁxed assets raises
pre-tax proﬁt by 4.4%; similarly, increasing employment by 10% raises pre-tax proﬁt
by 4.1%. Since, the estimated coeﬃcients on the input factors labor and ﬁxed assets
add up to 0.81 < 1, the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Note, that we
again employ a dynamic GMM approach to handle endogeneity problems. It should
moreover be pointed out, that the estimated coeﬃcient on the statutory tax rate dif-
ference increases in absolute size and gains statistical signiﬁcance. If we accounted
for complementarity eﬀects through both input factor channels, we now ﬁnd (based
on the estimation results in Table 3, Speciﬁcation 5, Table 9, Speciﬁcation 3, Table
10, Speciﬁcation 2) that the complementarity eﬀect oﬀsets 34% of the proﬁt shifting
externality on foreign pre-tax proﬁt (= 0.9259− 0.4469 · 0.4632− 0.4033 · 0.2659).
Note moreover, that our argumentation so far restricted national welfare to be repre-
sented by corporate tax revenues. However, this may be to restrictive since for example
wage earnings may constitute part of overall national welfare. Thus, if we accounted
for further welfare components, corporate tax increases at the headquarters’ location
that translate in reductions of aﬃliate employment, decrease national wage income
and thereby national welfare and may additionally enlarge government spending for
unemployment beneﬁts and welfare aid if the dismissed workers will not be employed
by national ﬁrms that pay lower wages. Accounting for these eﬀects surely goes beyond
the scope of our paper. However, we show that corporate taxes exert a negative exter-
nality on the investment and employment levels of foreign multinational aﬃliates and
that this eﬀect may compensate a substantial part of the well-studied positive proﬁt
shifting externality.
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we used a large ﬁrm-level data set to test for tax policy eﬀects in the
presence of complementarities within multinational enterprises. Our results show that
tax increases at the parent location negatively aﬀect the subsidiary’s stock of capi-
tal. Consequently, domestic tax policy imposes a negative externality on the foreign
country’s tax revenue. In a second step we quantiﬁed this externality and contrasted
it with the well-established positive externality due to proﬁt shifting. We found that
the shifting externality is considerably compensated by up to 34%. We concluded that
low-tax countries do not proﬁt as much from tax rate increases in high-tax countries
than is usually assumed.
What does this mean for the current policy debate? The EU debates about replac-
ing the current taxation scheme for MNEs based on separate accounting principles by
a scheme of proﬁt consolidation and formula apportionment (European Commission
(2001)). The main argument brought forward by supporters of this move are ineﬃ-
ciencies caused by proﬁt shifting activities of multinational ﬁrms under the current
system. However, the debate has neglected so far that tax policy also exerts a negative
impact on foreign aﬃliates capital stock which points in the opposite direction than
the positive proﬁt shifting externality and hence brings the corporate tax system closer
to the eﬃcient solution. In other words, if a foreign country reduces its tax rate the
home country is hurt by multinational proﬁt that is shifted out of its borders, but
beneﬁts by increased investment and employment levels of MNEs located in the tax-
reducing country. Therefore, our analysis casts some doubt on the necessity to abolish
the existing corporate tax scheme for a FA solution that is prone to ineﬃciencies and
administrative diﬃculties.
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5.6 Appendix
Note: Throughout ∗ will indicate signiﬁcance on the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance on the
5% level and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcance on the 1% level.
Table 1: Country Statistic
Aﬃliate Parent
Austria 61 42
Belgium 416 146
Cyprus 0 2
Czech Republic 181 0
Germany 292 311
Denmark 232 136
Estonia 91 6
Spain 785 82
Finland 196 79
France 730 209
United Kingdom 834 317
Greece 49 4
Hungary 104 2
Ireland 208 58
Italy 379 144
Lithuania 26 2
Luxembourg 27 28
Latvia 39 1
Netherlands 352 219
Poland 302 6
Portugal 78 17
Sweden 306 233
Slovenia 2 2
Slovakia 39 0
Sum 5, 429 2, 049
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Aﬃliate
Fixed Assets 34, 237 36, 254.54 428, 470.50
Employment 25, 433 250.33 857.16
Proﬁt Loss Before Tax 32, 299 3, 400.60 54, 808.74
Statutory Tax Rate 34, 237 0.3300 0.0710
Average Tax Payment 21, 343 0.0379 0.0459
GDP per Capita 31, 386 24, 396.27 5, 763.54
Parent Company
Statutory Tax Rate 34, 237 0.3515 0.0777
Average Tax Payment 10, 392 0.0180 0.0245
GDP per Capita 32, 143 27, 022.56 4, 737.58
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Table 5: End. Variable: Log Fixed Assets Parent Subsidiary
Variable (1) (2)
Log Corporate Tax, Parent −0.2396∗∗∗ −0.2556∗∗∗
(0.0848) (0.0946)
Population, Parent 1.5711
(1.0812)
GDP per Capita, Parent −0.0808
(0.3407)
Year Dummies
√ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√ √
Number of Observations 9, 260 8, 420
Number of Firms 1, 275 1, 262
R2 0.94 0.95
Table 6: Endogeneous Variable: Log Proﬁt Before Tax
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Proﬁt/Loss Before Tax, Lag1 0.1934∗∗∗ 0.2299∗∗∗ 0.1742∗∗∗ 0.2207∗∗∗
(0.0688) (0.0712) (0.0707) (0.0740)
Tax Rate Diﬀerential −0.7189∗∗ −0.6455∗ −0.7316∗∗ −0.6688∗
(0.3434) (0.3648) (0.3542) (0.3786)
Log Fixed Assets 0.4178∗∗∗ 0.3342∗∗ 0.3912∗∗∗ 0.3015∗∗
(0.1419) (0.1490) (0.1432) (0.1503)
GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate 1.6901∗∗∗ −2.2670 0.9580 −2.1576
(0.3063) (2.3276) (0.6059) (2.4166)
GDP per Capita, Parent −0.6320∗ 2.7974 0.6471 3.3277
(0.3316) (2.1964) (0.7331) (2.2538)
Population, Aﬃliate −3.1975∗ 1.5058 −3.2930∗ 1.2461
(1.7875) (3.8639) (1.7913) (3.9950)
Population, Parent −0.5169 −0.0857 −0.1864 −0.11278
(2.8615) 4.9902 (2.8514) (5.1257)
GDP per Capita Growth, Aﬃliate 3.9304∗ 4.0450∗
(2.1527) (2.2173)
GDP per Capita Growth, Parent −2.6185 −3.3005
(2.5160) (2.5985)
Earnings, Aﬃliate 1.8665 1.4639
(2.4429) (2.5916)
Earnings, Parent −2.9354 −3.7479
3.3751 (3.4695)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√ √
Number of Observations 10, 785 10, 513 10, 593 10, 321
Number of Firms 2935 2, 895 2874 2, 834
Test for 2nd Order Autocorrelation (z-Value) 0.608 0.886 0.349 0.641
Sargan Test (p-Value) 0.253 0.469 0.228 0.513
Table 7: Endogeneous Variable: Log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2)
Log Fixed Assets, Lag1 0.4003∗∗∗ 0.3448∗∗∗
(0.1015) (0.0975)
Log Average Tax Payment, Aﬃliate −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0660∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0212)
Log Average Tax Payment, Parent −0.0301∗∗ −0.03450∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0162)
Year Dummies
√ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√
Number of Observations 3252 3208
Number of Firms 1157 1140
Test for Second Order Autocorrelation (z-Value) 0.75 0.74
Sargan Test (p-Value) 0.20 0.36
Table 8: Fixed Eﬀect Estimation, End. Variable: log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Statutory Tax Rate, Aﬃliate −1.2092∗∗∗ −1.2392∗∗∗
(0.2351) (0.2385)
Statutory Tax Rate, Parent −1.1219∗∗∗ −1.1525∗∗∗ −0.7711∗∗∗
(0.2537) (0.2577) (0.2899)
Absolute Diﬀerence Statutory Taxes 0.6744∗∗∗ 0.7014∗∗∗ 0.4567∗
(0.2018) (0.2051) (0.2589)
GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate −0.6789∗∗ −0.7273∗∗∗
(0.2819) (0.2848)
GDP per Capita, Parent 0.5442∗ 0.6668∗∗ 0.3968
(0.3252) (0.3277) (0.3360)
Population, Aﬃliate 5.1771∗∗∗ 5.1261∗∗∗
(0.7809) (0.7882)
Population Parent −0.6534 −0.7002
(1.0746) (1.1141)
Earnings Manufacturing, Aﬃliate 1.2835∗∗∗ 1.3562∗∗∗
(0.1200) (0.1204)
Earnings, Manufacturing, Parent 0.2742 0.3484 0.4738
(0.3710) (0.3734) (0.3792)
Growth Rate Per Capita, Aﬃliate 1.8295∗∗∗ 1.7149∗∗∗
(0.4093) (0.4131)
Growth Rate Per Capita, Parent 0.6037 0.3854 0.4394
(0.4514) (0.4548) (0.4656)
Year Dummies
√ √ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√ √
Year-Country Dummies
√
Number of Observations 29, 928 29, 292 29, 292
Number of Firms 5, 157 5, 043 5, 043
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91
Table 9: Endogeneous Variable: Log Employees
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Statutory Tax Rate, Aﬃliate −0.7350∗∗∗ −0.7474∗∗∗
(0.1049) (0.1058)
Statutory Tax Rate, Parent −0.3916∗∗∗ −0.4575∗∗∗ −0.2659∗∗∗
(0.1049) (0.1053) (0.1033)
Log GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate 0.8999∗∗∗ 0.8847∗∗∗ 0.2700∗∗∗
(0.1561) (0.1566) (0.1082)
Log GDP per Capita, Parent −0.0994 0.1376 0.4329∗∗∗
(0.1604) (0.1610) (0.1270)
Log Population, Aﬃliate −1.299∗∗∗ −1.4231∗∗∗
(0.4133) (0.4134)
Log Population, Parent −0.4082 −1.1033∗∗ −1.3595∗∗∗
(0.5318) (0.5328) (0.5313)
Growth Rate GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate 0.5465∗∗∗ 0.4124∗∗∗
(0.2225) (0.2229)
Growth Rate GDP per Capita, Parent −0.9916∗∗∗ −0.9831∗∗∗ 0.4917∗∗
(0.2187) (0.2188) (0.2179)
Log Earnings, Aﬃliate −0.1804∗∗∗ −0.1054∗
(0.0564) (0.0562)
Log Earnings, Parent 0.8317∗∗∗ 0.7838∗∗∗ 0.7908∗∗
(0.1899) (0.1902) (0.1944)
Year Dummies
√ √ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√ √
Year-Country Dummies
√
Year-Eastern Parent Dummies
√
Number of Observations 24, 734 24, 255 24, 255
Number of Firms 4, 637 4, 548 4, 548
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Table 10: GMM Estimation, End. Variable: Log Proﬁt before Tax
Variable (1) (2)
Log Proﬁt before Tax, Lag1 0.1887∗ 0.1726
(0.1157) (0.1192)
Log Fixed Assets 0.4407∗∗ 0.4469∗∗
(0.1969) (0.1991)
Log Employees 0.4066∗∗ 0.4033∗∗
(0.2038) (0.2081)
Tax Diﬀerence −0.8872∗∗ −0.9259∗∗
(0.3926) (0.4075)
Log GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate −0.2699 −0.1256
(1.0346) (1.0483)
Log GDP per Capita, Parent 0.6753 0.6272
(0.9395) (0.9593)
Log Earnings, Aﬃliate −0.7284 −0.8678
(0.9586) (0.9598)
Log Earnings, Parent −2.3869 −2.4956∗∗
(1.2728) (1.2903)
Log Growth Rate GDP per Capita, Aﬃliate 2.0409∗∗ 1.8659∗∗
(0.9339) (0.9283)
Log GDP per Capita, Parent 0.0729 −0.1651
(0.8435) (0.8458)
Log Population, Aﬃliate 3.0330 3.1563
(2.9758) (3.0319)
Log Population, Parent 1.7496 1.9942
(3.6877) (3.7122)
Year Dummies
√ √
Year Dummies, Eastern Europe
√ √
Year-Industry Dummies
√
Number of Observations 8, 363 8, 206
Number of Firms 2, 343 2, 295
Test for Second Order Autocorrelation (z-Value) 0.91 0.66
Sargan Test (p-Value) 0.37 0.57
Chapter 6
Corporate Taxes, Proﬁt Shifting
and the Organization of
Multinational Firms
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6.1 Introduction
Some historians trace the existence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) back to bank-
ing under the Knights Templar in 1135. However, for centuries it had been only a few
individual ﬁrms that pursued an international organization. The corporate expansion
to foreign countries became popular in the 19th century when European ﬁrms founded
sales oﬃces in their colonies to serve the local markets. MNEs gained real economic
signiﬁcance some decades ago when growing trade integration between countries led
to the emergence of new markets and the fracture of production processes according
to comparative advantages. The last years, however, did not only observe a rise in
the number of multinational corporations, but also witnessed an increased complexity
in the structure of internationally operating ﬁrms. Foremost, the number of foreign
aﬃliates has steeply increased since the 1970s (e.g. Markusen (2002)).
In the last years MNEs have moreover expanded the functions of foreign aﬃliates. Sub-
sidiaries abroad are no longer used as production centers only, but also serve as research
and development (R&D) units and product design centers. Several multinationals, like
the pharmaceutical producers Pﬁzer and Bristol-Myers Squibb and the software com-
pany Microsoft, have transferred a considerable part of their R&D investments away
from their home countries to Ireland. Others founded trademark holding companies
abroad that own and administer the group’s trademarks and licences. A famous ex-
ample is the British mobile phone company Vodafone whose intangible properties are
held by an Irish subsidiary. Furthermore, not only general group functions have be-
come increasingly mobile across borders but the headquarters themselves seem to be
on the move. Had the headquarters locations traditionally remained untouched for a
long time, this seems to end now. The oil company Shell, founded in London in 1833,
relocated its headquarters from Great Britain to the Netherlands in 2004. In January
2007, the US food company Kraft announced to relocate its European headquarters
from Austria and Great Britain to Switzerland.
One common feature of the relocation examples mentioned above is that real economic
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activity has been shifted to countries with a low corporate tax rate in comparison
to other EU25 locations. There may be various explanations for this development,
the easiest being that the rents generated by the relocated investment shall be taxed
at a low statutory tax rate. With respect to the relocation of headquarters activity,
Huizinga and Voget (2006) also stress double taxation rules and withholding taxes to
have an inﬂuence on the location choice. Since both the Netherlands and Switzerland
have generous taxation rules for holding companies, this may partly explain the head-
quarters relocations mentioned in the last paragraph.
Our paper oﬀers an alternative explanation which refers to the fact that MNEs relo-
cate central (potentially headquarters-) functions to low-tax countries to optimize their
strategies of proﬁt shifting. We will show that the amount of international proﬁt shift-
ing strongly depends on the organizational structure of the MNE. Precisely, MNEs with
service centers located at low-tax countries are shown to engage in more proﬁt shifting
activities than MNEs with service centers located at high-tax locations. Moreover, con-
sistent with this prediction, we will provide evidence that multinationals systematically
locate central services to low-tax locations within their corporate group.
The basic argument is illustrated in a simple theoretical model. We consider a world
with three countries. Each country hosts an aﬃliate of a representative MNE. One of
the aﬃliates takes on the function of a corporate head oﬃce whereas this refers to the
provision of an intermediate good or intercompany service that is used in the production
process at all three aﬃliates. Hence, in our model, legal ownership of all aﬃliated
companies is not suﬃcient to constitute the multinational headquarters. In contrast,
our model refers to the observation that headquarters commonly provide management
and administrative services to their aﬃliates. Since the service good provided by the
corporate head oﬃce is delivered to the aﬃliates in the other two countries, the MNE
may distort the transfer price for this good from its true value to shift proﬁt between
the aﬃliates. We consider a three stage game in which the governments choose the
corporate tax rates at the ﬁrst stage by maximizing corporate tax revenues. At the
second stage, the MNE decides in which country to locate its corporate headquarters.
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At the third stage, the MNE chooses optimal production and sets the transfer price.
The game is solved by backward induction.
At the third stage, the MNE decides on the transfer price for the intermediate good
or intercompany service. We restrict proﬁt shifting to take place between the head-
quarters and the aﬃliates, but not between the subsidiaries. This assumption rests
on the idea that most proﬁt shifting takes place by the distortion of transfer prices
for intangibles like general management services, for which a market price is usually
hard to determine. As we regard the aﬃliates as pure production plants, the pre-
sumption that proﬁt shifting among the aﬃliates is not feasible, seems rather natural.
This assumption has profound consequences for proﬁt shifting possibilities and optimal
transfer pricing strategies, as these now depend crucially on the headquarters location.
Consider the case in which the head oﬃce resides in the country with the highest cor-
poration tax. Then shifting activities are hampered for two reasons. First, since proﬁt
is relocated from the headquarters to the subsidiaries, the sum of shifting volumes to
both subsidiaries is restricted by the amount of pre-tax and ‘pre-shifting’ proﬁt earned
at the headquarters location. In contrast, if the headquarters were located at a low-tax
country, then the upper limit to proﬁt shifting activities through each ‘subsidiary-
channel’1 is given by the amount of each subsidiaries’ proﬁt only. Provided that the
headquarters location does not systematically earn a higher pre-tax and pre-shifting
proﬁt than other corporate aﬃliates, proﬁt shifting opportunities may thus be more
severely constrained for high-tax headquarters.2
Second, tax authorities may use the additional information from simultaneously con-
trolling several proﬁt shifting channels at the headquarters location. If they detect
inconsistencies at one channel, they may intensify their screening activity on other
1In the following, we will call the connection between the headquarter and one of its subsidiaries a
proﬁt shifting channel. In our model the multinational has two aﬃliates and therefore two channels
through which proﬁt may be shifted.
2Note, that this result could equally be obtained by a tax evasion model in the tradition of Reinganum
and Wilde (1985), in which tax authorities control (multinational) entities only if their declared pre-
tax proﬁt fell below a certain threshold level.
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channels which increases the detection risk and thereby the MNE’s proﬁt shifting costs.
In line with previous studies (e.g. Peralta et al. (2003)), we assume that tax authorities
eﬀectively control shifting activities at high-tax locations only. In low-tax countries,
proﬁt shifting enhances national tax revenues and hence oﬃcials do not have incentives
to cut oﬀ shifting activities. It follows that the described increase in shifting costs falls
on high-tax headquarters only since low-tax head oﬃces are eﬀectively not controlled.
At the second stage, the MNE chooses the optimal headquarters location which is
modeled to be the location that maximizes the sum of overall corporate after-tax
proﬁt and an individual location preference parameter. We take this parameter to be a
random variable with mean zero whose realisation is private information of the MNE.
Hence, the headquarters location decision is stochastic but in expectation the MNE
most likely locates in the country with the lowest corporate tax rate since it thereby
maximizes the gains from proﬁt shifting and its after-tax proﬁt.
The ﬁrst stage ﬁnally demonstrates that the corporate tax rate distribution assumed to
be ﬁxed so far is compatible with the equilibrium of a tax competition game between
the countries.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test the main implications of our theoretical
model using a large panel of MNEs headquartered in the countries of EU25. Fol-
lowing (most of) the previous empirical literature on proﬁt shifting behavior, we will
give indirect evidence for shifting activities by regressing the subsidiaries’ pre-tax prof-
itability on the diﬀerential of statutory tax rates at the subsidiary and parent location.
The basic idea behind this approach is that capital market theory predicts investment
proﬁtability to be equal across countries. Thus, higher proﬁtability of investments
in low-tax countries as compared to high-tax countries may point to proﬁt shifting
behavior, while controlling for a range of ﬁrm and country characteristics.
Our estimations conﬁrm other authors’ results that proﬁt shifting is determined by
the diﬀerence in corporate tax rates between multinational aﬃliates. Since we are
interested in the question how the corporate structure aﬀects proﬁt shifting possibilities,
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we split our sample into aﬃliates belonging to MNEs with headquarters in high-tax
and low-tax countries, respectively. Precisely, the aﬃliates of a multinational group are
allocated to the ‘high-tax-parent-sample’ (‘low-tax-parent-sample’) if at least 90% of
the subsidiary assets are located in countries with a lower (higher) statutory corporate
tax rate than the parent.3 In line with our theoretical predictions, we ﬁnd evidence for
signiﬁcant and large proﬁt shifting activities in the ‘low-tax-parent-sample’, while proﬁt
shifting of ‘high-tax-parent-groups’ is found to be substantially smaller and marginally
signiﬁcant at best.
In a second step, we account for the size of the multinational group. Our theory
predicts that proﬁt shifting activities (per channel) are deterred by the presence of
additional shifting opportunities if the headquarters were located in a high-tax country.
In contrast, additional shifting opportunities should not aﬀect the shifting volumes per
channel in ‘low-tax headquarters groups’. We therefore interact the tax diﬀerential with
various measures for corporate shifting opportunities (e.g. the number of subsidiaries)
apart from the considered shifting channel. In line with our theoretical predictions, we
ﬁnd that shifting activities of ‘high-tax headquarters groups’ are heavily deterred by the
presence of additional shifting channels. In contrast, the presence of additional shifting
channels does not seem to aﬀect shifting volumes in companies with headquarters at
low-tax locations.
Finally, we would like to determine whether MNEs adjust their corporate structure
to optimize their proﬁt shifting possibilities. Since the ownership information in our
data set has a cross-sectional dimension only, we cannot investigate the relocation
decision of headquarters. However, as laid out above, our argument does not build
on ownership issues but refers to special purpose units within multinational ﬁrms that
centrally provide services or goods to various production units. Since these units often
rely on intangible goods like patents, royalties or brands, we determine how corporate
taxation aﬀects the location of these intangibles within the corporate group. Thus,
we regress intangibles as a share of overall aﬃliate assets on the tax rate diﬀerential
3Note, that a Chow test suggests separate estimation for the two subsamples.
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between the respective subsidiary and other aﬃliates of the corporate group. Our
theory predicts that the smaller a subsidiary’s tax rate relative to the other aﬃliates
within the group, the higher should be its share of intangible assets. This prediction
is conﬁrmed in the data.
The paper adds to a growing empirical literature that provides evidence for proﬁt
shifting activities. The ﬁrst papers in this ﬁeld were brought forward by Hines and
Rice (1994) and Grubert and Mutti (1991) based on macro data for several countries.
They ﬁnd evidence in line with proﬁt shifting activities. Follow-up studies by Collins et
al. (1998) and Clausing (2003) support these qualitative results but rely on micro data
that allow identiﬁcation of the eﬀect without imposing strong assumptions. Recent
papers by Weichenrieder (2007), Dischinger (2007), Overesch (2006) and Huizinga and
Laeven (2005) investigate shifting using European or German micro data, respectively.
Our paper is most closely related to a work by Desai et al. (2006) who show that
large ﬁrms with high R&D intensities are likely to locate in tax havens.4 Starting from
this result, we investigate how organizational structure aﬀects shifting possibilities and
ﬁnd that locating in a tax haven may not be enough. In contrast, complex MNEs
have to locate their service and special purpose units at low-tax locations to engage
in signiﬁcant proﬁt shifting. We provide evidence that intangibles in fact tend to be
located at low-tax countries relative to other group-aﬃliates.
The following chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical
model. In Section 3 we describe our data base. Section 4 states the basic estimation
methodology while the estimation results are presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses
the results and concludes.
4In addition, Grubert (2003) provides evidence that subsidiaries in countries with a relatively low
or high tax rate engage in a signiﬁcantly larger volume of intercompany transactions which consist
mainly of immaterial, R&D intensive goods like royalties or patents.
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6.2 A Simple Theoretical Model
We consider a model with three countries a, b and c. Each country hosts one aﬃliate of
a representative multinational corporation that produces a homogeneous good for the
local market. The price of the good is normalized to 1 in all countries for simplicity
reasons. The production of the good uses labor L as only input factor and is represented
by a production function with the standard properties F (0) = 0, F ′(L) > 0 and
F ′′(L) < 0. Wage costs are given by w and are considered to be ﬁxed from the
perspective of the multinational ﬁrm. We assume that one of the corporate entities
has the status of the multinational ‘headquarters’ and provides some management
service or patent to all aﬃliates. The true price for the production of this good is
assumed to be 1. However, the headquarters may charge a transfer price pi from the
corporate aﬃliate located in i that diﬀers from the true price. Thus, pre-tax proﬁts at
the headquarters location read
Πh = [F (Lh)− wLh] +
∑
i
(pi − 1)− 1, h, i ∈ {a, b, c}, i = h. (6.1)
whereas the index h indicates the headquarter location, while the index i stands for
the non-headquarter locations. At the subsidiaries pre-tax proﬁt is given by
Πi = [F (Li)− wLi]− pi, i ∈ {a, b, c}, i = h. (6.2)
To derive a ﬁnite solution with respect to the choice of transfer prices, we assume
that distorting the transfer price from the true price involves costs. These costs are
assumed to comprise ﬁne payments to a tax authority in case the proﬁt shifting activity
is detected by the national tax oﬃce. We assume transfer pricing cost to take on the
following functional form5
Ci = Ci(si, sj · α), Ci(0, 0) = 0, sign
(
∂Ci
∂si
)
= sign (si) ,
∂2Ci
∂s2i
> 0 (6.3)
whereas si = pi−1 denotes the proﬁt shifted between the subsidiary i and the corporate
headquarters. This implies that si takes on positive (negative) values if proﬁt is shifted
from the subsidiary to the headquarter (from the headquarters to the subsidiary).
5The interpretation of the parameter α is discussed in the next sub-section.
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The assumptions in equation (6.3) formally capture that tax authorities do not observe
the true price for the internally provided headquarters service. Thus, the MNE can
set a transfer price that diﬀers from the true value in order to shift proﬁt between
its aﬃliates. However, proﬁt shifting causes costs which are assumed to be increasing
and convex in the transfer price distortion. This corresponds to the perception that
tax authorities are more likely to detect irregularities in transfer pricing behavior if the
price strongly deviated from the good’s true value. If the detection of shifting activities
entails ﬁne payments, expected shifting costs rise in the transfer price deviation.6
We assume that proﬁt shifting opportunities exist between the corporate headquarters
and the aﬃliates, but that the subsidiaries can not shift proﬁt among each other. Our
modeling strategy thus refers to (mainly) horizontally organized MNEs which comprise
several local production units and concentrate special functions like management and
R&D activities at the headquarters location.7 Since management and R&D services
are largely corporation speciﬁc goods, their true value is hardly observable by national
tax authorities. Many tax experts claim that most of the transfer pricing distortions
occur on these intangible goods, hence, our modeling strategy should be compatible
with reality (see also Grubert (2003)).
In contrast to the existing proﬁt shifting literature, we do not restrict our analysis
to corporate entities with two aﬃliates only, but allow for more complex groups with
shifting options through more than one shifting channel. This setting gives rise to the
necessity of specifying assumptions with respect to the interaction of proﬁt shifting
costs across channels.
First, we assume that the national tax authority at the headquarters location may use
the additional information from controlling more than one shifting channel. This im-
6See Huber (1997) and Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000).
7As already mentioned, the term ‘headquarters’ has not to be taken literally in this context. Our
model refers to MNEs that tend to concentrate their management and R&D service units at certain
locations which may or may not be the corporate headquarters in an ownership context. We should
point out moreover, that international economics classiﬁes the overwhelming share of MNEs located
in Europe and Northern America to be horizontal in nature. See Markusen (2002).
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plies a positive correlation in detection risks. If tax oﬃcials ﬁnd an implausible transfer
pricing behavior on one channel, they are likely to increase their screening activities on
other channels. Formally, this is captured by a positive cross derivative of the shifting
terms in equation (6.3). It holds, ∂2Ci/(∂si∂(|sj |)) > 0 for i = j. Hence, increased
proﬁt shifting activities between the headquarters and aﬃliate j increase shifting costs
at channel i.
However, only tax authorities in high-tax countries have an incentive to stop proﬁt
relocation since proﬁt is shifted out of their country. Tax authorities in low-tax coun-
tries, in contrast, gain corporate tax base through proﬁt shifting activities. Therefore,
in line with previous studies (e.g. Peralta et al. (2003)), we assume eﬀective transfer
pricing control solely in high-tax countries. Thus, increased shifting costs are observed
for high-tax headquarters only, since multinational groups with head oﬃces in low-tax
countries are eﬀectively controlled solely at the high-tax subsidiaries.8 Since interna-
tional cooperation between tax authorities is basically non-existent they do not face
increased shifting costs.9 We formalize this reasoning by assuming that α takes on
the value of 1 if the headquarters are located in the high tax country, and the value 0
otherwise.
The multinational’s overall after-tax proﬁt is given by
Π = (1− th)Πh +
∑
i
(1− ti)Πi −
∑
i
Ci, i, h ∈ {a, b, c}, i = h (6.4)
with th and ti being the corporate tax rates at the headquarters and subsidiary locations
8Remember that we assume that the subsidiaries can shift proﬁts only to the headquarters and not
to other subsidiaries. Hence, each subsidiary has only a single channel available to shift proﬁts.
9Although some international cooperation among tax authorities had been observed during the last
decades, communication and information exchange is far from perfect. In an interview Jeﬀrey Owens,
Head of Fiscal Aﬀairs at OECD, complains about non-conformities with ‘international standards
on transparency and exchange of information’ (OECD Observer (2000)). Note, however, that our
qualitative results will not depend on the assumption that tax authorities from diﬀerent countries
do not interact with each other at all. A suﬃcient presumption would be that information exchange
is not perfect and hence tax authorities at the subsidiary locations obtain less information than tax
authorities at the headquarters location.
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respectively.
In the following, we will consider a three stage game. At the ﬁrst stage the countries
choose the optimal corporate tax rate that maximizes tax revenues. At the second
stage, the MNE decides where to locate its headquarters. At the third stage, transfer
prices are set and production takes place. The game is solved by backward induction.
6.2.1 Transfer Price and Labor Demand
At the third stage the MNE chooses its optimal transfer prices for the goods deliv-
ered to the subsidiaries and determines optimal labor demand at the three locations.
Maximizing after-tax proﬁt in equation (6.4) with respect to si gives
ti − th = ∂Ci(si, (sj) · α)
∂si
, i, j, h ∈ {a, b, c}, i = j, i, j = h (6.5)
whereas α = 1 if th > ti and α = 0 if th < ti. If th < ti, the corporate tax rate
at the subsidiary location exceeds the corporate tax at the headquarters country and
proﬁt is shifted from the subsidiary to the headquarters by choosing a transfer price
pi larger than the true price 1. Analogously, if th > ti, the headquarters are located in
the high-tax country and proﬁt is shifted from the headquarters to the subsidiaries by
choosing a transfer price smaller than 1.
Thus the direction and volume of proﬁt shifted is shown to depend on the diﬀerence
in the statutory corporate tax rates between the two countries. In the following, we
will demonstrate that proﬁt shifting reacts less sensitively to tax rate diﬀerentials if
the headquarters were located in a high tax country. There are two reasons for this.
First, if the MNE’s headquarters are located at a high-tax country (α = 1), shifting
costs are ceteris paribus larger than in case of headquarters location at the low-tax
country as we clariﬁed in the previous section. Second, for th > ti, an inner solution to
equation (6.5) is guaranteed only if Πh > si+sj. Thus, if the headquarters were located
in the high-tax country, then proﬁt shifting is determined by equation (6.5) only in the
case that the proﬁt at the headquarters location exceeds the desired shifting amount
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to the aﬃliates. Otherwise, proﬁt shifting from the headquarters to the aﬃliates is
characterized by
ti − th
∂Ci(si, (sj)α)/∂si
=
tj − th
∂Cj(sj, (si)α)/∂sj
> 1 with h = i = j (6.6)
Thus, if the amount of proﬁt generated at the headquarters location is low and falls
short of the optimal shifting amount to the aﬃliates located in low-tax countries, the
MNE adjusts its proﬁt shifting activities such that the ratio of marginal shifting gains
to marginal shifting costs is equated across channels (equation (6.6)).
Compare this with the case th < ti. Then, we arrive at an inner solution only if
equation (6.5) holds, i.e. if Πi > si for i ∈ {a, b, c} and i = h. Hence, the optimal
shifting amount determined in equation (6.5) is chosen only if aﬃliate i’s proﬁt exceeded
the desired shifting amount. Otherwise, it holds that si = Πi. Due to the symmetry
in the modeling of headquarters and aﬃliates, the overall pre-tax proﬁt before shifting
is equal across countries as can easily be seen from equations (6.2) and (6.3). Thus,
[F (Li)− wLi] = [F (Lh)− wLh] holds for i, h ∈ {a, b, c} and h = i. It follows that the
restriction of proﬁt shifting through limited amounts of earnings is more likely to occur
if the headquarters were located in the high-tax than if they were located in a low-tax
country.10 The eﬀects described above lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. The volume of proﬁt shifted between the headquarters and its sub-
sidiaries will be more sensitive to tax rate diﬀerentials if the headquarters were located
in a low-tax country than if they were located in a high-tax country.
Since we assume labor cost to be fully deductible from the corporate tax base, we ﬁnd
that optimal labor demand is undistorted by the corporate tax rate and determined
by the following equation.
F ′(Li) = wi with i ∈ {a, b, c} (6.7)
10Note, that the same pattern could be generated with a tax evasion model in the tradition of Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1985) in which tax authorities control proﬁt shifting behavior only if the MNE’s
declared proﬁt fell below a certain threshold.
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Equation (6.7) thereby replicates the well-known results that marginal product equals
marginal cost at the optimum allocation.
6.2.2 Headquarters Location Choice
At the second stage the MNE decides where to locate the corporate headquarters.
Its objective function is thereby to maximize overall after-tax proﬁts and hence it
will choose the headquarters location which implies the highest corporate proﬁt. As
described above the headquarters function is to provide an intra-ﬁrm good to the
local subsidiaries. Hence, the MNE will locate its headquarters in country c if the
multinational’s after-tax proﬁt Πc which corresponds to headquarters in country c is
larger than proﬁts Πa and Πb that correspond to headquarters locations in country a
and country b respectively. Since production takes place at the aﬃliates irrespective
of the head oﬃce functions, the headquarters choice is determined by proﬁt shifting
gains. For the model to ﬁt the data we would like to specify a non deterministic location
choice and therefore make the additional assumption that the location decision of each
ﬁrm is also governed by a speciﬁc valuation parameter μh for each possible location
h ∈ {a, b, c}. μh is taken to be a random variable with mean zero (and positive
variance). Both aspects are reﬂected in
Sh =
∑
i
[(ti − th)(pi − 1)− Ci(si, (sj) · α)] + μh, h, i, j ∈ {a, b, c}, i = j = h (6.8)
Sh thereby stands for the proﬁt shifting gain if the MNE was headquartered in country
h plus the ﬁrm speciﬁc location valuation. The MNE will for example choose location
c as corporate headquarters if Sc > Sa and Sc > Sb. Let us ﬁrst focus on potential
shifting gains conditional on the headquarters choice. Consider for example the tax rate
distribution ta > tb > tc. If we abstract from shifting costs for the moment we know that
the gross shifting gain is identical irrespective of whether the headquarters are located
in country a (with the highest tax rate) or in country c (with the lowest tax rate). This
is true because the tax rate diﬀerentials between the aﬃliates and thus the shifting
gains are identical. However, from equation (6.5) it follows that, for a given diﬀerence
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in corporate tax rates, the shifting costs are larger if the headquarters were located at
the high-tax country. Therefore, since location in the high-tax country implies higher
shifting costs as well as shifting caps caused by limited pre-tax (and pre-shifting) proﬁt,
the MNE will always strictly prefer the low-tax country c as headquarters location.
If the headquarters instead were located in country b, the MNE had an incentive to
shift proﬁt from the headquarters location b toward the low-tax country c and from the
high-tax country a to the headquarters location. Thus, proﬁt is shifted out of country
b only via one channel, and hence the detection risk of proﬁt shifting through diﬀerent
channels is independent from each other. Therefore, the same amount of proﬁt would
be shifted from countries b to c irrespective of headquarters location in country b or
c. However, it holds that ta − tc > ta − tb and hence the tax rate diﬀerential between
countries a and c is larger by assumption than the tax rate diﬀerential between countries
a and b (in absolute terms). Thus, the MNE will earn larger gains by shifting proﬁt
from country a to country c and taxing it there at the lowest available corporate tax
rate. It follows from the reasoning above that the MNE prefers headquarters location
in the low-tax country. Taking into account the intrinsic valuation μh for each location
h, the tax rate distribution ta > tb > tc implies that E(S
c) > E(Sb) > E(Sa). We
arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. For a given distribution of corporate tax rates, the probability to
attract the headquarters of the MNE decreases in the corporate tax rate. Thus, the
country with the lowest corporate tax rate has the highest probability to attract the
multinational headquarters.
6.2.3 Corporate Tax Rate Choice
The purpose of this section is to sketch shortly that the tax rate distribution assumed
so far could be the equilibrium outcome of a tax competition game between the three
countries. At the ﬁrst stage, the government maximizes the corporate tax revenues by
choosing the corporate tax rate. We assume that each country hosts a national industry
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in addition to the multinational aﬃliate. To keep the model simple, we will consider
an inelastic national tax base which may diﬀer across regions. Hence, the national tax
base in country i is denoted Ri with i ∈ {a, b, c}. We allow these national tax bases
to diﬀer across countries. In the country that attracts the corporate headquarters,
corporate tax revenues are deﬁned by
Th = th(Rh + Πh), h ∈ {a, b, c} (6.9)
whereas Πh denotes the proﬁt generated at the headquarters location and is deﬁned
by equation (6.1). Instead, in the other countries corporate tax revenue reads
Ti = ti(Ri + Πi), i ∈ {a, b, c}, i = h (6.10)
whereas Πi is deﬁned by equation (6.2). Since the MNE’s pre-tax proﬁt and the
multinational headquarters are mobile (the former via proﬁt shifting activities), the
regions compete to attract this ﬂexible tax base. As was shown in Propositions 1
and 2, the smaller the corporate tax rate chosen by the national government, the
larger are the proﬁt shifting gains. Moreover, the probability to attract the corporate
headquarters rises when the corporate tax rate declines. Thus, the gains from lowering
the corporate tax rate comprise the attraction of shifty proﬁts.11
However, these gains come at the cost of loosing tax revenues from the inelastic domes-
tic corporate tax base. The higher this domestic tax base, the higher are the cost of
reducing the corporate tax rate. This trade-oﬀ deﬁnes the aggressiveness of a country
in attracting the corporate headquarters and shifty proﬁts from the foreign countries.
The larger the domestic corporate tax base, the higher the costs of lowering the corpo-
rate tax rate and hence the larger is the corporate tax rate in equilibrium. Thus, if we
11Note that the expected shifting gains increase monotonically in the local corporate tax rate. Al-
though the shifting gains from a corporate tax reduction are larger if the country hosted the multi-
national headquarters, the assumption that headquarters location follows shifting considerations as
well as an intrinsic location valuation not observable to national governments ensures that a decrease
in the tax rate only raises the probability to attract the headquarters. Thus the objective function
of each government is a continuous function of the tax rates.
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considered the national tax base distribution Ra > Rb > Rc, then corporate tax rates
in equilibrium are characterized by ta > tb > tc.
6.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical section will investigate the basic hypotheses derived from our theoretical
model above. First, we will test the prediction of the third stage of our theoretical
model that proﬁt shifting behavior is more sensitive to corporate tax rates if a group’s
headquarters (or more generally, a corporate unit that provides an intermediate good or
intercompany service) were located in a low-tax country. Second, we will investigate the
prediction of the second stage and determine whether the location decision of special,
R&D intensive function units within corporate groups is actually distorted towards
low-tax countries.
6.3.1 Data
We use the commercial database AMADEUS which is compiled by Bureau van Dijck.
The version of the database available to us contains detailed information on ﬁrm struc-
ture and accounting of 1.6 million corporations in 38 European countries from 1995 to
2005, but is unbalanced in structure. Since our theoretical model accounts for multi-
national ﬁrms only, we restrict our sample to internationally operating corporations
with headquarters in the EU25. The observational units in the data are the corporate
subsidiaries which are directly owned by a foreign parent ﬁrm. Like the parent, the
subsidiaries are restricted to be located within EU25. Moreover, the parent must hold
at least 90% of the subsidiary shares for the aﬃliate to be included in our sample.12
Nevertheless, our sample will account for information on the worldwide structure of
the corporate groups which is generally available with the AMADEUS data. Thus,
we will calculate the number of subsidiaries within a corporate group as well as the
12Additionally, we include only subsidiaries owned by an industrial corporation.
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average tax diﬀerential between the headquarters and all the groups’ aﬃliates. These
calculations include all aﬃliates irrespective of location within or outside EU25, but
are restricted to aﬃliates owned by at least 90%.13
The AMADEUS data has the drawback that the information on the ownership struc-
ture is available for the last reported date only. Thus, there exists some scope for
misclassiﬁcations of ‘subsidiary-parent-connections’ that changed during the sample
period. However, in line with previous studies, we are not too concerned about this is-
sue since the described misclassiﬁcations introduce additional noise to our estimations
that will bias our results towards zero (see e.g. Budd et al. (2005)). Since our anal-
ysis focuses on the detection of proﬁt shifting activities between corporate aﬃliates,
we merge data on statutory corporate tax rates at the parent and subsidiary location,
as well as other basic country characteristics like the population size and GDP per
capita.14
Table 1 in the Appendix contains the country statistics of our sample. We observe
aﬃliates in all EU 25 countries apart from Malta and Cyprus, whereas a large share
of the ﬁrms is located in France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy. Parent ﬁrms are
mainly located in the Continental European countries, e.g. in Germany and France.
13The information on the multinational ownership structure is available for basically all corporate
groups in the AMADEUS database. That is, one may derive the subsidiary country and basic
information on sales and total assets for all aﬃliates within a group. Therefore, we determine the tax
rate diﬀerential between the headquarters location and all directly and majority owned subsidiaries
contained in the AMADEUS database. There might be concerns that we do not capture the whole
multinational group since some aﬃliates might not be contained in the database. For every parent
corporation the database embodies a variable describing the number of (known) corporate aﬃliates.
Hence, we could check the diﬀerence between the number of subsidiaries which are actually contained
in the dataset and the number of known aﬃliates. Since we found that the diﬀerence is very small
(maximum two subsidiaries), we think this is a minor problem.
14The statutory tax rate data for EU25 is taken from the European Commission (European Commis-
sion, 2006), while the rates for aﬃliates outside the EU are based on data of the tax consultancy
ﬁrm KPMG (KPMG (2006)). Country data for GDP per capita and population are obtained from
the OECD (OECD (2007)).
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Table 2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Our sample comprises
56, 475 year-aﬃliate cells and 8, 237 aﬃliates, hence we observe each aﬃliate for 6.8
years on average. The average ﬁxed asset investment at the aﬃliate level amounts
to 57.1 million US dollars, the average ownership of intangibles is calculated to be
2.9 million dollar on average. Non-surprisingly, the average capital investment at the
parent location is substantially larger than ﬁxed asset investment at the subsidiary
level and amounts to 2, 590.4 million US dollars. The MNEs in our sample employ
201.3 workers on average and earn a pre-tax proﬁt of 3.1 million dollars. In line with
the country statistics presented in Table 1, we ﬁnd that the average statutory corporate
tax rate at the subsidiary location falls short of the parent tax since most corporate
owners are located in the high-tax countries of Continental Europe. In a last step, we
calculated the average number of corporate aﬃliates within a multinational group. If
we account for aﬃliates with an ownership share of strictly larger than 90% only, we
ﬁnd the average number of aﬃliates to be 66.65. Since for a quite large number of
aﬃliates ownership is not observed, we add these ﬁrms for the calculation of subsidiary
numbers in a second step and ﬁnd the average number of aﬃliates to be 117.44. As
these average subsidiary numbers appear to be rather large, note, that the calculated
averages are partly driven by a few very large multinational corporations. The median
of the aﬃliate number distribution is calculated with 17 and 25 respectively.
Since our theoretical model predicts that shifting possibilities are substantially ham-
pered if a MNE is headquartered in a high-tax country, we will split our sample into
corporate groups for which a major fraction of the subsidiaries observes a lower and
higher corporate tax rate than the parent ﬁrm respectively. Low-tax headquarters
groups are thereby deﬁned according to the threshold that less than 10% (and in an
alternative speciﬁcation less than 20%) of the subsidiaries are located in countries with
a lower tax rate than the parent ﬁrm. In contrast, high-tax headquarters groups are
deﬁned to be those with more than 90% (and in an alternative speciﬁcation more than
80%) of subsidiaries in countries with a lower corporate tax rate than the parent ﬁrm.
Table 3 contains the country statistic for the split sample. Subsidiaries of high-tax
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headquarters groups are largely located in Spain and the new European member coun-
tries Poland and the Czech Republic. In contrast, aﬃliates of low-tax headquarters
groups are often located in Germany, Denmark and Italy. The distribution of par-
ent ﬁrms exhibits a similar picture. The headquarters of high-tax groups often locate
in Germany, France and Italy, while many low-tax headquartered groups observe the
parent in Sweden, Ireland and Spain.15
Tables 4 presents descriptive statistics for the split samples according to the thresh-
olds of less than 10% (more than 90%) of subsidiaries being located in countries with
a lower corporate tax than the parent. As expected, the number of observations be-
longing to ’high-tax headquarters groups’ is around twice as large as the number of
observations belonging to ’low-tax headquarters groups’ (14, 553 vs. 7, 802). On av-
erage, subsidiaries of corporate groups which are headquartered in a high-tax country
are found to be slightly smaller than aﬃliates of corporate groups which are head-
quartered in low-tax countries. The mean of ﬁxed asset investment is calculated to be
46.0 million US dollars for aﬃliates with high-tax headquarters versus 55.8 million US
dollars for aﬃliates with low-tax headquarters. In contrast, headquarters of ’high-tax
headquarters groups’ are more than twice as large with respect to ﬁxed assets invest-
ment as headquarters of ’low-tax headquarters groups’ (1, 2 billion US dollars versus
2, 9 billion US dollars). Moreover, corporate groups headquartered in low-tax countries
tend to exhibit slightly fewer corporate aﬃliates (owned by strictly more than 90%),
on average 48.8 in contrast to 51.8 aﬃliates for corporate groups headquartered at a
high-tax location. For ﬁrms headquartered at low-tax countries, the average tax rate at
the subsidiary level is calculated with 0.35 while the average corporate tax rate at the
parent level amounts to 0.30. In contrast, corporate groups headquartered at high-tax
locations have a statutory corporate tax of 0.40 on average at the parent location and
0.32 at the subsidiaries. The analogous sample statistic for the thresholds of 20% and
80% respectively can be found in Table 5.
15Note, that the deﬁnition of high-tax and low-tax groups is undertaken on a year-basis. Since the
corporate tax rate changes over time, corporate groups may be deﬁned to be high-tax headquarters
group in one year and low-tax headquarters groups in the following year.
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6.3.2 Methodology and Identiﬁcation
Our basic estimation strategy is described by the following equation
log PBTi,t = β0 + β1TAXDIFFi,t + β2Xi,t + φi + i,t (6.11)
whereas PBTi,t denotes the pre-tax proﬁt of subsidiary i at time t, TAXDIFFi,t
represents the diﬀerence in statutory corporate tax rates between aﬃliate i and the
corporate headquarters. Xi,t comprises time-varying control characteristics for the
aﬃliate and the parent corporation, e.g. one-digit NACE code industry-year dummies;
i,t describes the error term. Additionally we add aﬃliate ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
time constant aﬃliate characteristics as well as time dummies to capture shocks over
time common to all subsidiaries. Since the dependent variable pre-tax proﬁt observes
a rather skewed distribution we estimate a semi-logarithmic equation.
Since we would like to capture the impact of the multinational corporate structure on
a MNE’s proﬁt shifting opportunities, we extend the basic estimation model in (6.11)
by an interaction term between the tax rate diﬀerence TAXDIFFi,t and the share of
subsidiaries in the corporate group that are located in countries with a lower corporate
tax rate than the headquarters location. The prediction from our theoretical model is
that proﬁt shifting opportunities are better if the headquarters (as a unit that provides
general services to the multinational aﬃliates) were located in a country with a low
corporate tax rate and hence we expect the coeﬃcient estimate for this interaction
term to exhibit a negative sign.
A look at the distribution of corporate groups in our data, however, reveals that 85%
of the observations belong either to a corporate group with less than 20% of their
corporate aﬃliates in low-tax countries or to a corporate group with more than 80% of
subsidiaries in low-tax countries (see ﬁgure 1). Since our theoretical hypotheses with
respect to proﬁt shifting behavior should be most clearly seen for subsidiaries that
belong to ’extreme’ corporate groups in the sense that headquarters service are either
provided from a high-tax location or from a low-tax locations, we will contrast proﬁt
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shifting behavior for these two subsamples of ﬁrms.16 The corporate tax eﬀects on
pre-tax proﬁtability are thereby estimated separately as suggested by a Chow test on
the data.
To get a better understanding for the determinants of the proﬁt shifting intensity, we
interact the tax rate diﬀerential between the headquarters and a respective subsidiary
with potential shifting opportunities via other group channels. The shifting potential
is thereby proxied by various measures which are summarized in Appendix A. Accord-
ing to our theoretical model proﬁt shifting between a subsidiary and the corporate
headquarters should be hampered by the presence of additional shifting channels for
high-tax headquarters groups, while proﬁt shifting activities of low-tax headquarters
groups should not be aﬀected. In contrast, if economies of scope in proﬁt shifting played
a signiﬁcant role (e.g. upfront laywer costs to engage in shifting activities) the average
shifting volume may even increase in the availability of additional shifting channels.
The analysis so far was concerned with the predictions of the third stage of our theo-
retical model. Moreover, we would like to test the predictions of the second stage and
will determine whether MNEs actually distort their corporate structures in a manner
that optimizes proﬁt shifting opportunities. Since we observe the ownership informa-
tion in our panel for the last reported date only, we are not able to track relocations
of the headquarters or ownership changes. However, as stated above, our basic argu-
mentation refers to all central services provided within a corporation which constitute
proﬁt shifting possibilities. This may refer to headquarters functions like the provision
of management or administrative services but might also comprise R&D units that
provide patents to the whole group or brand names owned by special purpose aﬃliates.
The perception of many authors in the proﬁt shifting literature is that proﬁt shifting
by transfer pricing distortions largely takes place via the provision of these intangible
16Note that our theory does not derive clear-cut predictions with respect to proﬁt shifting by corporate
groups with an intermediate corporate tax rate compared to other aﬃliates. However, if the head-
quarters have an incentive to shift proﬁt to some of their subsidiaries while in turn re-allocating proﬁt
from others to the headquarters location, the analysis should be closer to the ’low-tax’ headquarters
case than to the ’high-tax’ headquarters case.
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services, patents or brands. Our theory predicts that intangible assets provided within
a corporate group should be located at low-tax countries to optimize proﬁt shifting
possibilities. Therefore, we estimate the following equation
INTANGi,t = γ0 + γ1TAXDIFFGi,t + γ2Xi,t + φi + i,t (6.12)
whereas INTANGi,t represents the ratio of intangible assets to the overall subsidiary
assets. We refrain from using the direct size of intangible assets as dependent variable to
hedge against mixing up general tax eﬀects on corporate investment with eﬀects on the
size of intangible assets. TAXDIFFGi,t is calculated as the unweighted average tax
between all other aﬃliates (including the corporate headquarters) and the considered
aﬃliate. Theory predicts that the larger this diﬀerence, the larger should be the amount
of intangible assets owned by the subsidiary.
6.3.3 Empirical Results
Following the theoretical model, our empirical analysis aims at determining the inter-
action between the multinational corporate structure and proﬁt shifting opportunities.
As laid out above, MNEs can exploit shifting possibilities much easier if the goods
traded were owned or provided by low-tax aﬃliates.
Table 6 describes the basic ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. The endogeneous variable is proﬁt
per sales at the subsidiary level. We estimate a standard production function including
ﬁxed assets per sales and employees per sales as explanatory variables in the equation.
Additionally, we include the corporate tax rate diﬀerence between the aﬃliate and
headquarters location which is deﬁned by corporate tax at the headquarters location
minus corporate tax at the aﬃliate location. Moreover, the analysis includes a full set
of year dummies, a full set of industry-year dummies and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant impact of the deﬁned tax rate diﬀerential on the aﬃliate’s pre-
tax proﬁtability. Following the predictions of our theoretical model, we now interact
the corporate tax rate diﬀerence with the share of subsidiaries within a corporate
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group with a lower statutory tax rate than the parent ﬁrm. The prediction is that the
larger this share the lower are the corporate shifting possibilities. This hypothesis is
impressively conﬁrmed by the results presented in speciﬁcation (2). While the direct
corporate tax eﬀect that captures the impact for pure low-tax headquarters groups
doubles in size to 1.15, the interaction term carries a negative sign, suggesting that the
larger the share of subsidiaries with a lower corporate tax rate than the parent ﬁrm,
the smaller the proﬁt shifting activities. Speciﬁcation (3) additionally includes control
variables for basic country characteristics like GDP per capita and population size.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the country controls do not exhibit a signiﬁcant impact
on corporate proﬁtability, whereas the impact of corporate taxes on the proﬁtability
measure remains unchanged.
As already mentioned above, the overwhelming part (85%) of corporate groups in our
sample are extreme in the sense that more than 80% of the corporate subsidiaries
are located in countries that either all have a higher or all have a lower statutory
corporate tax rate than the headquarters location. Since our theory draws conclusions
for proﬁt shifting activities of high-tax and low-tax headquarters while the predictions
for intermediate cases are not fully clear, we build subsamples containing the extreme
cases of high-tax and low-tax headquarters ﬁrms. The results can be found in Tables
7 and 8.
Table 7 compares the impact of the corporate tax rate diﬀerential on pre-tax proﬁtabil-
ity distinguishing between corporate groups for which less than 10% of the subsidiaries
are located in low-tax countries and corporate groups for which strictly more than 90%
of the corporate subsidiaries are located in low-tax countries. Speciﬁcations (1) and
(2) thereby control for input factors per sales, year dummies and include ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects. The estimation conﬁrms and even ampliﬁes the results in Table 6 as we ﬁnd that
the corporate tax diﬀerential does not to have any statistically signiﬁcant impact on
pre-tax proﬁtability of subsidiaries with high-tax headquarters.17 In contrast, for the
17Note, that the subsample contains 3, 897 ﬁrms and we can therefore exclude possible explanations
for the statistical insigniﬁcance on the basis of large standard errors induced by a small sample size.
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sample of low-tax headquarters groups, the tax rate diﬀerential exerts a strong impact
on pre-tax proﬁtability which is 200% larger than the eﬀect estimated in Speciﬁcation
(1) of Table 6. Note moreover, that the estimated coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent
at the 5% level. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) additionally control for industry-year eﬀects.
This slightly increases the estimated tax eﬀect on pre-tax proﬁtability for both sub-
samples. However, the estimated coeﬃcient for the corporate tax diﬀerence remains
statistically insigniﬁcant for the subsample of aﬃliates belonging to high-tax parent
groups. Speciﬁcations (5) and (6) add GDP per capita and the population size as
control variables to the analysis. This additionally increases the estimated coeﬃcient
for the tax diﬀerence in the subsample of ﬁrms in ’high-tax headquarters groups’, but
still it does not gain statistical signiﬁcance while the corporate tax diﬀerence eﬀect
on pre-tax proﬁtability remains high and stable for the subsample of ﬁrms in ’low-tax
headquarters groups’. Table 8 reruns the estimations for the subsamples of corporate
groups with at least 80% or less than 20% of corporate aﬃliates located in countries
with a tax rate lower than the headquarters statutory tax. The estimated results are
similar although the speciﬁcation with country control characteristics now exhibits a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for the sample of high-tax headquarters groups (Speciﬁ-
cation (5)). Nevertheless, the point estimate for the subsample of low-tax headquarters
groups still exceeds this coeﬃcient by 200% (Speciﬁcation (6)).
Our theory predicted that the reduced proﬁt shifting opportunities with high-tax head-
quarters locations root in a combination of earnings limitations and increased monitor-
ing possibilities on the side of the tax authority. This predicts proﬁt shifting options
to decline with increased shifting activities between the headquarters and other sub-
sidiaries. In contrast, for groups of multinational ﬁrms with headquarters in low-tax
countries, we should not ﬁnd this eﬀect.18
18In the latter case, an increase in the proﬁt shifting options through other channels may even exert
a positive impact on shifting volume if we observe economies of scope in proﬁt shifting in the sense
that average per-unit concealment costs fall in the shifting volume. This would for example be the
case if the cost of proﬁt shifting entailed a ﬁxed component.
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The results for the subsample deﬁnition according to the 10% and 90% threshold re-
spectively are presented in Table 9. In Speciﬁcations (1) and (2), we employ the
number of corporate aﬃliates within the group (apart from the considered aﬃliate)
as proxy for proﬁt shifting activities on other channels and interact this variable with
the tax rate diﬀerential between headquarters and the subsidiary location. Speciﬁ-
cation (1) shows the result for the subsample of subsidiaries in high-tax headquarters
groups. As predicted by our theory, the estimated coeﬃcient on the tax rate diﬀerential
now becomes positive and statistically signiﬁcant, while the interaction term exhibits
a negative sign. The estimation for the group of subsidiaries with the headquarters
located in a low-tax country shows the opposite result. Here, the direct eﬀect of the
corporate tax diﬀerential on pre-tax proﬁtability remains quantitatively large while
the interaction term is positive but does not gain statistical signiﬁcance. However, the
number of foreign subsidiaries may be a bad proxy for shifting activities between the
corporate headquarters and other aﬃliates. Hence, we employ the average absolute tax
rate diﬀerence multiplied by the number of foreign subsidiaries as proxy for shifting
opportunities through other channels in Speciﬁcations (3) and (4). The picture is qual-
itatively similar to the estimations beforehand and points to a reduced shifting activity
per channel if the headquarters were located in a high-tax country while the shifting
possibilities through other channels do not aﬀect proﬁt shifting if the headquarters were
located in a low-tax country. In a third step we account for the fact that proﬁt shifting
possibilities may depend on investment size at the headquarters and aﬃliate location.
We therefore deﬁne a measure that relates proﬁt shifting possibilities on other channels
to the investment at the headquarter location. We thus multiply the absolute tax rate
diﬀerence on each channel by the amount of ﬁxed assets invested at the subsidiary and
sum this up for all but the considered aﬃliate. We then divide by the ﬁxed asset size
at the headquarter location, as described in Appendix A. The results can be found in
Speciﬁcations (5) and (6) of Tables 9 and are in line with our presumption that proﬁt
shifting is deterred by additional shifting channels and low investment and proﬁt levels
at the parent location for ’high-tax headquarters’ groups, while this does not male a
diﬀerence for shifting activities of ’low-tax headquarters’ groups.
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A general concern with the results may be that we interact the tax rate diﬀerential with
a continuous variable that may exhibit outliers that drive the coeﬃcient estimate for
the interaction term. We ran sensitivity checks by generating a set of dummy variables
that capture diﬀerent percentiles of the shifting measure distribution. If we interacted
these with the tax rate diﬀerence variable we obtain qualitatively equal results (not
reported).19
Finally, we would like to determine whether corporate tax considerations play a role in
the corporate structure choice of MNEs. We therefore investigate in which subsidiaries
the MNE allocates intangible assets that are likely to be used as intermediate factors
at the corporate production sites. Our theory suggests that these intermediates should
be located in low-tax subsidiaries since this opens up proﬁt shifting channels through
transfer pricing distortions that are more pronounced than if the unit was located at a
high-tax location. The estimation results can be found in Table 10. The endogeneous
variable is the ratio of intangible assets to the aﬃliate’s overall assets. We employ
the ratio of intangible assets over total assets to avoid capturing general investment
incentives induced by corporate tax considerations. If instead the ratio of intangibles
was distorted towards low-tax countries, this might be valued as indirect evidence for
our theory. Speciﬁcation (1) includes the corporate tax rate as explanatory variable.
Controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, year eﬀects and year-industry eﬀects, we ﬁnd that
19Note, that we ﬁnd no evidence for economies of scope in international proﬁt shifting in the sense
that larger shifting opportunities reduce per unit shifting costs and therefore increases the shifting
volume. As we described above, the obstacles to proﬁt shifting should be absent for low-tax head-
quarters groups. Nevertheless, an economies of scope eﬀect, if present, should apply to all groups.
Since we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for the interaction term of the corporate tax
rate diﬀerential with additional proﬁt shifting opportunities through other channels, we see this
as evidence that economies of scope play no major role for international proﬁt shifting. However,
economies of scope may arise through ﬁxed costs in the proﬁt shifting process. If this notion was
correct, the eﬀect should exhibit with relatively small multinational groups foremost. We therefore
reran our regressions for the low-tax parent sample restricting observations to aﬃliates with below
average ﬁxed asset investment. The estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term tends to be positive
and to increase in size and signiﬁcance, however, we still ﬁnd no stable eﬀect across speciﬁcations.
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the share of intangible assets held by the aﬃliate falls in the corporate tax rate at the
subsidiary location. Thus the result is in line with our theory. However, the absolute
corporate tax rate at a location may be a relatively imprecise measure since our model
predicts central service units to be located in countries with a low corporate tax relative
to other group members. This is captured in Speciﬁcations (2) and (3). Here, we
include the (unweighted) average tax diﬀerence between a respective subsidiary and
all other aﬃliates of the corporate group (that are owned by the parent with a share
of 90% or more) as explanatory variable. The larger this diﬀerence, the smaller the
subsidiary tax compared to other aﬃliates in the group and the larger should be the
amount of intangible assets located there. This theoretical notion is conﬁrmed by the
data since the estimated coeﬃcient for the average tax rate diﬀerence is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant.
6.4 Conclusion
Although the economic literature has provided extensive evidence on proﬁt shifting
behavior of MNEs, the interaction between organizational structure and the volume
of proﬁt shifting has been largely unexplored. Desai et al. (2006) and Grubert and
Slemrod (1998) are notable exceptions that touch this question. They show that a
multinational’s presence in tax havens is related to the importance of intra-ﬁrm trade
and intangible assets within a ﬁrm. Our paper goes one step further. We analyze
where central multinational functions have to be located within a corporate group to
obtain the best proﬁt shifting opportunities. We provide evidence that proﬁt shifting to
corporate subsidiaries is substantially larger if central units that provide intermediate
goods or services (in our case the corporate headquarters) are located in a low-tax
country relative to the rest of the group. Moreover, we show that MNEs in fact distort
the location of intangible goods towards countries with low corporate tax rates.
While MNEs have been known to relocate production to low-tax countries for some
time, a recent feature of organizational change within MNEs has been the relocation
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of central management units as well as R & D centers and brand holding companies
to tax havens. Our theoretical and empirical model provides a rational and evidence
that a relocation of these special purpose units to low-tax countries may be attractive
under proﬁt shifting considerations. Given that these central corporate entities are
often skill-intensive and comprise the central decision units within the MNE, countries
may desire to locate these parts of the ﬁrm within their borders (BMF, 2007), even
beyond proﬁt shifting considerations. This new mobility of central service units within
the multinational ﬁrm may thus foster tax competition behavior between governments.
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6.5 Appendix
Number of Subsidiaries
’Number of Subsidiaries’ describes number of aﬃliates within multinational group
(apart from the considered subsidiary) that are owned by the parent with a share
of at least 90%. The notion behind this approach is that the multinational ﬁrm may
shift approximately the same amount of proﬁt between the multinational headquarters
and an aﬃliate. Hence proﬁt shifting opportunities through other channels may be
proxied by the number of subsidiary ﬁrms.
Sum of Absolute Tax Diﬀerentials
The ’Sum of Absolute Tax Diﬀerentials’- measure accounts for the fact that proﬁt shift-
ing opportunities and incentives depend on the corporate tax rate diﬀerence between
multinational headquarters and its subsidiary. The larger the absolute tax diﬀerential
between the two locations the larger the gains from engaging in shifting activities and
henceforth the larger the shifting volume. We therefore determine the average abso-
lute tax rate diﬀerentials between the headquarters and all other group aﬃliates and
multiply it by the number of group aﬃliates (apart from the considered subsidiary).
The measurement problem attached here might be that proﬁt shifting increases under-
proportionally in the absolute corporate tax rate diﬀerential due to convex shifting
costs. This would however lead to an underestimation of the coeﬃcient for the interac-
tion term between the corporate tax rate diﬀerential and our shifting measure. Hence,
provided we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect for the interaction term, we can be
save that it eventually captures a true underlying systemtatic.
Sum of Absolute Tax Diﬀerentials, Adjusted for Subsidiary and Parent Size
Several authors have pointed out that proﬁt shifting opportunities may in fact depend
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on investment at the subsidiary location (Grubert and Slemrod (1998), Eggert and
Schjelderup (2005), Riedel and Runkel (2007)). We account for this idea by adjusting
our proﬁt shifting measure by the investment size at the subsidiary location. Hence,
we multiply the absolute tax rate diﬀerence by the size of ﬁxed assets at the subsidiary
and calculate the sum of this product for all aﬃliates in a corporate group (apart from
the considered subsidiary). Moreover, our theory predicts that proﬁt shifting from the
headquarters to the subsidiaries should be more strongly deterred the smaller the size
and pre-tax proﬁt of the parent. We therefore divide the just calculated measure by
the parent ﬁxed assets. For high-tax headquarters groups, an increase in the described
shifting measure is expected to reduce shifting activities for two reasons. First, an
increase in the absolute tax rate diﬀerential as well as an increase in the ﬁxed assets
raise the shifting volumes through other channels and thereby reduce shifting activities
on the considered transaction channel. Moreover, the shifting measure also increases if
the size of ﬁxed assets at the parent ﬁrm falls. A small parent ﬁrm (with a small pre-
tax and pre-shifting proﬁt) should deter shifting activities even further due to proﬁt
limitations. For low-tax groups, we again do not expect a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Note: Throughout ∗ will indicate signiﬁcance on the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance on the
5% level and ∗∗∗ signiﬁcance on the 1% level.
Table 1: Country Statistics - Whole Sample
Country Aﬃliate Parent
Austria 102 95
Belgium 491 257
Cyprus 0 1
Czech Republic 241 4
Germany 388 669
Denmark 503 371
Estonia 155 15
Spain 844 179
Finland 356 123
France 989 572
Great Britain 1, 241 335
Greece 64 9
Hungary 105 4
Ireland 169 41
Italy 540 250
Lithuania 46 3
Luxembourg 37 18
Latvia 74 1
Netherlands 723 231
Poland 481 9
Portugal 115 31
Sweden 520 545
Slovenia 7 2
Slovakia 46 2
Sum 8, 237 3, 767
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Whole Sample
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Fixed Assets/1000, Aﬃliate 55, 921 57, 073.43 668, 000.00
Intangible Assets/1000, Aﬃliate 56, 055 2, 899.54 105, 295.40
Relative Intangible Assets, Aﬃliate 56, 054 0.0250 0.1527
[Intangible Assets/Total Assets ·1/1000]
Fixed Assets/1000, Parent 43, 220 2, 590, 380 8, 624, 102
Employees 44, 010 201.30 856.89
Sales 37, 529 71, 861.14 412, 996.30
Pre-tax Proﬁt 53, 247 3, 092.01 52, 706.78
Statutory Tax Rate, Aﬃliate 56, 475 0.3311 0.0632
Statutory Tax Rate, Parent 56, 475 0.3615 0.0754
Diﬀerence Statutory Tax 56, 475 0.0304 0.0879
[Tax Parent-Tax Aﬃliate]
Number of Aﬃliates 56, 475 66.65 125.78
(> 90% Ownership)
Number of Aﬃliates, NA 56, 475 117.44 228.85
(> 90% Ownership)
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Table 6: Endogenous Variable: Log Proﬁt/Sales - Subsidiary Level
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Tax Diﬀerence 0.5861∗∗∗ 1.1514∗∗ 1.1299∗∗∗
(0.1577) (0.3268) (0.3569)
Tax Diﬀerence*Share Low-Tax Subsidiaries −0.7567∗∗ −0.7329∗
(0.3743) (0.3995)
Log Employees/Sales 0.1101∗∗∗ 0.1171∗∗ 0.1246∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0158)
Log Fixed Cost /Sales 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0100)
Log GDP per Capita −0.1213
(0.2987)
Log GDP per Capita −0.8097
(0.8821)
Year
√ √ √
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √
Number of Observations 28, 640 28, 140 25, 138
Number of Firms 5, 935 5, 912 5, 521
R2 0.69 0.69 0.70
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Table 10: Endogenous Variable: Relative Share Intangible Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Tax Rate −0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0108)
Average Tax Diﬀerence To Others 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0977)
Population/100,000 0.248∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.0621) (0.0689)
GDP per Capita/1,000,000 0.123 0.235
(0.340) 0.365
Year
√ √ √
Year Dummies
√ √ √
Number of Observations 49, 714 45, 806 41, 577
Number of Firms 7, 730 6, 658 6, 411
R2 0.75 0.73 0.74
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Figure 6.1: Share of aﬃliates located in low tax countries
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